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Central Bank Bilateral Currency Swap and Trade Flows: An 
Implication for Renminbi Internationalization 
by 
MOHAMMED Abdullahi Ahmed 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The emerging economic prosperity of China and its increasing economic 
integration with the rest of the world as the second largest economy seems to give 
China an edge to amplify its global competitiveness. For example, the accession of 
China to World Trade Organization in the early 2001 has intensified its rapid GDP 
growth, growing trade and current account surpluses, financial inflows and growing 
stockpiles of reserves holdings. The global financial crisis of 2008 nearly put a halt to 
China’s export-led and current account surpluses trajectory, in 2007 China’s current 
account surplus fell from 10% of GDP to about 2% in 2013. This necessitates the 
internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi to boost trade, investment and hedge 
against foreign currency risk through bilateral currency swap. In bilateral currency 
swap, on the trade date, counter parties exchange notional amounts in two different 
currencies. For instance, one party receives 30 million British pounds while the other 
receives 3.3 million Chinese Renminbi. This implies a GBP/RMB exchange rate of 
1.1, and at the end of the deal they swap again using the same exchange rate. Evidently, 
the currency bilateral swap agreements signed by the People’s Bank of China and 
some Central Banks in advanced, emerging markets and developing economies is 
reinforcing the trend of Renminbi internationalization in global trade. The thesis 
applies trade gravity equation to investigate China’s Renminbi bilateral swap 
agreements and trade flows. Empirically, we investigate impact of the bilateral 
currency swap agreements on international trade flows. Using large panel data of over 
200 countries from 1990 - 2017 for the first time to the best of our knowledge. The 
empirical results show that currency swap as an emerging international trade 
agreement is trade creating. We find that the magnitude is relatively close to what is 
documented in the literature for other kinds of trade agreements like the currency 
unions and free trade agreements. This may potentially provide impetus for countries 
that embrace China’s currency swap line. Similarly, most of the bilateral swap lines 
offered by People’s Bank of China have been to countries that trade more with China. 
Furthermore, since bilateral currency swap enable countries to boost their liquidity 
access in the financial system for trade and financial transaction. Significantly, we 
examine the financial development of both China and its currency swap partners. The 
empirical results show that bilateral currency swap line matters for trade in countries 
with relatively low-level financial development. 
Keywords: Central Banks, RMB Bilateral Currency Swap Line, China, Trade Flows 
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 The first half of the 21st century witnessed one of the powerful international 
financial instrument in the space of international economics, known as “Central Bank 
liquidity swap” by Federal Reserve, which provides backstop liquidity to emerging 
markets and OECD countries during the global financial crisis in 2008. 1  This 
phenomenal adoption of central bank currency swap agreements is at best described 
using the aphorism “necessity is the mother of invention” the currency swaps emerged 
to ease the severity of the 2008 global financial crisis (see Goldberg and Kennedy, 
2010; Destais, 2016; Kwon, 2015;andLiao and McDowell, 2015). Consequently, the 
central banks of some developed economies utilized and embraced a new international 
financial instrument (central bank currency swaps) as a swap line to one another to 
lessen the severe effect of the credit crunch (McGuire and Von Peter, 2012; Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009).2 In contrast, Campanella (2014) and Cheung et al. 
(2017) argued that the People's Bank of China's (PBOC's) objective was seemingly 
geared towards exploiting this tool to support trade, investment and promote the 
internationalization of its currency on a global scale with the aim to discard the 
domination of the US dollar in global trade (see Bank of Korea, 2012). Similarly, 
Cheung et al. (2011) opined that RMB-based trade policy relates to a combination of 
                                                                
1Currency swaps enable central banks to exchange a set of amounts of local currency with another 
central bank at a fixed rate; this sort of arrangement is an important factor in the stabilization of 
financial market and facilitation of trade clearance. Foreign central banks could draw on those lines to 
provide liquidity to institutions within their jurisdiction, thereby, ensuring that domestic banks and 
firms have access to short-term capital for their trade activities. 
2Currency swap provide short-term liquidity to help enhance financial stability for the both counterparts, 
especially in lubricating international trade. 
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factors like China's openness together with its current account surpluses and the bid 
to internationalize RMB. 
 Wilson (2015) reports that the Chinese (RMB) barely not visible in 
international trade or financial flows in the last eight years; its emergence now appears 
in blossom level. Since 2008, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) had signed the 
bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) with more than twenty-five counter-parties (central 
banks) in the bid to facilitate international trade and financial investment across the 
world. It is worthy to note that while several factors were at large behind the 
propagation of RMB usage in recent years, for example the emergence of China as 
the most significant trading nation provides an impetus for RMB internationalization. 
The share of China's world exports has grown from 3.9 percent in 2000 to 12.4 percent 
in 2014 surpassing the United States, a position it held over five decades (see Song 
and Zilibotti, 2009; Aizenman et al., 2017; Wilson, 2015 and Yang and Han 2013). 
 Therefore, with the growing importance of China in the arena of global affairs 
especially international trade, it makes sense for one to understand its proximate 
motive to internationalize the use of Renminbi (Cheung et al., 2011; Cohen, 2012; 
Roubini, 2009; and Eichengreen, 2011). This also coincides with the collapse of trade 
financing during the 2007 global financial crisis.3 Within this period China's exports 
dropped by 20 percent. The PBOC'S response to the risk and problems was to 
encourage the Chinese exporters and importers to settle their trade transactions in 
RMB. In addition, the possession of RMB denominated deposits and bonds held by 
corporations in the offshore markets is highly prevalent around the world. For 
                                                                
3Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009) provides a detail empirical results related to the financial 
stability and foreign currency reserves. Showing that country’s reserve holdings and predicted reserve 
holding after crunch of credit in 2008 can significantly predict exchange rate movements of both 
emerging and advanced countries. Further indicating that the amount of swap to the total foreign 
reserve for a country is an indicator to predict GDP movement. 
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example, some trade transactions denominated in RMB had leaped from zero in the 
year 2009 to more than $300 billion in the first three-quarters of 2012 (BIS, 2013). 
Primarily, the strategic element of the internationalization of China's Renminbi 
involves the negotiation of the bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) between the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC) with a growing number of partner central banks across the 
globe with the plan to propagate the cross-border trade and settlement of direct 
investments. So far, since 2008 more than 25 duly signed bilateral swap agreements 
came into effect. The preceded developments are arguments that provide ample 
motivation for this study. 
 Recently, only a few papers analyze the effect of the currency swap line on 
international trade flows. For example, Lin and Cheung (2016) employed Heckman's 
2-step procedure to analyze the swap line partner’s decisions to sign or not sign the 
China's local currency line. They employ some institutional, political, and economic 
variables like the economics sizes (GDP), political stability, the rule of law, corruption 
and strategic partnership between China and its counterparties, to explain what likely 
binds the currency swap agreement. The point of their argument based on the 
empirical results shows that China's swap line is undetermined by pure economic 
considerations: political and institutional factors also plays a key role. Edwin and Yu 
(2015) evaluate the potentials of China's Renminbi becoming a trade settlement 
currency, their quantitative experiments suggested that there is a broad scope for the 
use of renminbi in trade invoicing in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Theoretically, the 
argument suggest that China needs to open its capital account and liberalize its 
financial market sector to gain the required thick market externalities for the Renminbi 
to emerge as dominant invoicing currency. After investigating the determinants of 
currency invoicing share in trade using euro as the case study, subsequently, 
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inferences drawn from the case study were used to benchmark the potentials of 
Renminbi as an invoicing currency at least in the Asia-Pacific region. Liao and 
McDowell (2015) empirically show that de facto trade interdependence and de jure 
economic integration are vital factors that determine the swap lines of China, with 
FDI inter-dependence having a partial effect. They argued that the existence of prior 
preferential trade agreement (PTA) and bilateral investment treaties (BIT) could 
increase the probability of the bilateral swap agreement (BSA) corporation. Aizenman 
et al. (2011) in general examine the possibility of swap lines to substitute or 
compliment international reserves, empirically they show that swap lines can reduce 
the need for reserve accumulation especially the Asia’s stockpiling appetite. 4 
Evidently suggesting that the scope for swaps to substitute reserves is limited, 
although the swap lines have weakened the precautionary motive for reserve 
accumulation in the Asian region. Similar studies that seek to analyze China's swap 
line in the light of RMB internationalization include Yang and Han (2013) applied 
inventory optimization to analyze the factors related to the optimal currency swap size 
between China and its trading counterparts. The findings show that the mean value of 
the foreign exchange demand, its volatility and the distribution form are essential for 
optimal swap size. Garcia-Herrero and Le (2015) argued that given the China’s 
massive leverage position, it does not appear relevant for China to keep pushing for 
RMB internationalization since the leveraging process will continue to keep interest 
rates artificially low and makes the allocation of savings inefficient. More so, RMB 
                                                                
4 In the words of the Governor of the Central bank of Pakistan Anwar Yaseen, he says ‘the currency 
swap agreement with China represented a watershed event. Without it, Pakistan would have faced a 
balance of payments crisis in 2013. Similarly, the swap deal helped Argentina’s economy to boost its 
reserves. When the first swap took place in October 2014, the amount worth 814 million US dollars. 
Under the agreement, Argentina can also pay RMB when importing goods from China. In effect, the 
agreement saved Argentina from its financial woes, because if came shortly after it fell into its second 
default in 12 years (www.chinaview.cn2015-08-24). 
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internationalization is not sufficient to help Chinese government and corporate firms 
to fund themselves in the international markets without having a reliance on the US 
dollar.  
 The literature is well established both regarding theory and empirics that 
‘currency swap’ is an essential tool to manage the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
trade. Particularly, for firms and countries that engage in international trade and 
investment (see Wei, 1999; Adam-Muller, 2000; Wong, 2003 and Broll and Wong, 
2003). An excellent specimen of currency swap in recent decade is the People’s Bank 
of China’s bilateral swap agreements with the intent to cope with the volatility of its 
currency and that of its trade partners. Simultaneously, other objectives include RMB 
internationalization, promotion of bilateral trade and investment between the two 
signatories that signed currency swap in their local currencies for a specific time frame. 
Indeed, such agreements indicate a positive signal on the prevalence of liquidity of 
the other country’s currency in the onshore markets. Once currency swap line is into 
force, for example, China and say Korea, the exporter will borrow in the currency of 
importer, and sell the currency against the Renminbi and make use of Renminbi for 
its local exchange operations. On the expiration of the contract, the exporter will 
receive the currency of the importer to pay off the importing currency locally, with 
the respective differences having considered. Similar arrangement applies to Chinese 
importer. Therefore, in this respect the adoption of currency swap will substantially 
reduce the demand for an invoicing currency say US dollar.  
 In addition, once currency swap arrangements are into force, the exchange rate 
is determined, and naturally this give impetus to high imports, more especially when 
the other currencies are depreciating. Another major merit of swapping is the 
reduction of transaction costs and hedging against unforeseen volatility, which 
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facilitate the removal of invoicing currency like the US dollar. In other words, 
currency swaps provide a suitable flat form for importers and exporters to counter 
currency risk. Similarly, another distinctive advantage of currency swap is the greater 
recognition of the currencies that entered into such international transactions. 
Invariably, today’s dominance of China in the global currency swap agreements with 
many countries may likely pave way for RMB internationalization process.5 Howbeit, 
whether this type of cross-currency swap agreements exert a substantial and 
significant impact on overall trade flows is an essential empirical question yet 
unanswered in the literature.  
 The thesis seeks to explain the ex-post behavior of China's Renminbi trade 
policy and the pattern of world trade, an essential novelty in this piece of work is to 
investigate the effect of currency swap on trade empirically. The literature of 
international trade provides a scanty evidence in this area. Therefore, our empirical 
investigation provides more elaborate discussion on currency swap and trade which 
will be of interest and relevance to the world. There are two novelties to this study. 
First, we take a line variant of the previous studies, and the foremost objective is to 
investigate empirically trade creation and trade diversion effect of the RMB-based 
trade policy-the bilateral currency swap agreements (BSAs) on bilateral trade. The 
study examines the positive impact on the counterparties to the agreement (trade 
creation) and the adverse effect on non-partner countries (trade diversion). Using the 
gravity model, we intend to show the empirical evidence of trade creation via ex-post 
analysis of the trade flows. Methodologically, the theory consistent structural gravity 
                                                                
5Etymologically: the suffix international embodied international characteristics of a currency to RMB 
in the global economy (trade, investment and reserve currency). The measure of RMB 




model is an essential tool in our research kits to unbundle our goal. Regarding the 
sample, we drew sample 27 countries that were into China's currency swap line for 
empirical analysis. Similarly, our analysis relies on a panel approach which accounts 
for country-pair fixed effects solely to circumvent the embedded endogeneity in trade 
policy analysis, and phase-in effects of the bilateral currency swap agreement, which 
has important implication for future significance of swaps on trade. 
 The outcome of our empirical findings reveals an apparently large impact of 
bilateral currency swaps on trade flows. Succinctly, on average, the estimates suggest 
that bilateral currency swap increases counterparts trade more than three times. An 
important caveat we hold is that currency swap might be different from other forms 
of international trade agreements, such as the currency unions, currency peg, and 
dollarization, and indeed they have a different impact on trade. In a similar vein, we 
also acknowledge that different econometric techniques deliver different results. The 
magnitude of the measured effects of the findings might skeptically rise concerns 
merelyweighing the effects to have been too large to believe. However, we square the 
results with other forms of international trade agreements in the literature to gauge a 
possibility that lies in between. For example, Glick and Rose (2016) found a 
fairlylarge impact currency union on trade in the magnitude of 114%. Earliest 
literature began with Rose (2000) that found triple effects CUs on tradethough this 
sound suspiciously large, and subsequent empirical finding even set out a more 
dampeningeffect (see Esposito 2017; Frankel 1997; Ghosh and Yamarik 2004; Baier 




1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
1. The thesis set to examine the effect of the bilateral currency swap agreements 
(BSAs) on international trade flows. 
2. To investigate the determinants of international trade flows between China and 
its counterparties to the bilateral swap agreements. 
3. To examine relationship between trade and financial development in the light 
of Chinas’ bilateral swap network  
1.3 The Research Questions are as Follows: 
1. Does bilateral currency swap agreements (BSAs) increase members’ 
international trade? 
2. What are the determinants of international trade between China and the 
counterparties to the bilateral swap agreements? 
3. Does currency swap matter for all countries with different level of financial 
development? 
1.4 Contribution 
 The study sets to augment to the general body of literature and knowledge of 
international economics, related to currency swaps agreement on international trade, 
and international bilateral agreements, documenting quantitative implication for the 
Renminbi internationalization, currency swapping and world trade. A vital avenue and 
a novelty for this research are to investigate empirically RMB bilateral swap 
agreement and trade effects as semi currency anchor and measure the extent of trade 
diversion/ trade creation. Given the increasing importance of China to the rest of the 
world in global trade, quantitative evaluation of RMB-trade policy and the pattern of 
trade would provide policymakers and academics a new insight on the effect of large 
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area currency swaps, economic integration, and global trade. Therefore, the thesis will 
extend the literature in this dimension, as a novel and promising research exercise to 
document what lies behind the phenomenal currency swapping as a unique type of 
international agreement on trade. The adoption of central bank bilateral currency swap 
agreements (BSAs) is one of the most significant international monetary 
developments of the post-2007 global financial crisis (see Detais, 2016). Its 
implication has an unprecedented impact on the United States and China, let alone it 
is a far-reaching consequence for the rest of the world. The innovation of this sort will 
have profound effects on both financial development, reserve distribution, and the 
world's investment and trading system, although this is still far from clear.  
1.5 Limitation of the Study: 
 While concomitantly, a possibility of default and moral hazard may linger in 
this type of arrangement since central banks extend loans drawn from the swap line 
to commercial banks to raise liquidity level, especially in financing international trade 
and investment. This may lead to financial frictions, a problem that is likely to 
transform into financial crisis havoc (Rose, and Spiegel, 2012 and Detais, 2016). 
Firms with liquidity need can borrow fund for financing trade through the 
commercials banks to cushion the effect of foreign exchange shortage and therefore, 
avoid the near collapse international trade flows. However, there were growing 
concerns advanced about challenges of the future swap agreement might lead to moral 
hazards problem. Since the central bank currency swap line prevented indiscriminate 
fire sales of assets and other undertaken that could have exacerbated the crisis during 
the currency mismatch (Goldberg and Kennedy, 2010; and Ruan, 2013). Therefore, 
firms risk-taking behavior will be out of control without due caution, given that many 
swap lines now almost appear to be permanent. In effect, this might encourage high 
10 
 
risk-seeking attitude by firms, leading to default, financial friction and subsequently 
colossal currency swap mismatch (Rose, and Spiegel, 2012). Because banks and firms 
felt assured with the expectation that central banks could provide them with foreign 
currency on the rainy days when markets shrink, firms can cover up with funds 
borrowed from central bank swap lines and making the banks to have a foreseeable 
safety valve for short-term funding and mopping other liquidity requirements. 
Therefore, due to data limitation the scope of the thesis and our empirical investigation 
will not cover issues of financial friction and swap default. Indeed, this is a pointer to 
a promising future direction of research in this area of international economics related 







2.1 Renminbi Internationalization: Rationale and Strategy 
 Over the last two decades, the Chinese authorities commenced an extensive 
process to liberalize and internationalize Renminbi particularly under premier Zhu 
Rongji since 1993. The Chinese authorities are committed to achieving full 
convertibility of Yuan (Renminbi) by the end of the century. Before this period, the 
Chinese economy had been operating under a tight capital control since the formation 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 (Cheung et al., 2017; Ito, 2011; 
Vallee, 2012; Yu, 2012; Chen and Cheung, 2012; and Park, 2010). However, the 
liberalization and financial market reform initiated in the 1980s set the center stage 
for the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy. In the year 1994, deliberate and 
conscious efforts were implemented to lessen capital account restrictions in a 
piecemeal fashion and eventually established current account convertibility in 1996 
(see Gao and Yu, 2009). The Asian financial crisis 1997-8 put a temporary halt to this 
objective. The Asian economic upheavals of 1997-8has made the Chinese authorities 
to relax its initial target of ensuring full convertibility by the close of the century. The 
global financial crisis of 2008 causes a decline in the overall trade financing due to 
US dollar shortage. In effect, this culminated to a massive decline in Chinese exports, 
and further exposed the unreliability of the existing international monetary system. 
The situation necessitates a move to safeguardagainst future reoccurrence, largely due 
to high reliance of the Chinese economy on international trade.  
 Consequently, as reported in Campenella, (2014) RMB internationalization is 
now at the apex of the economic policy of China enshrined in the codified 12th five-
12 
 
year plan (for the period 2011-2015). The plan implementation of the plan is through 
the meticulous and strategic engagements of powerful economic and financial 
institutions of the Chinese economy: The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the 
Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Finance. Similarly, the plan is designed 
to enhance the cross-border use of RMB and subsequent liberalization of its capital 
account. In recent years, we have witnessed a passionate commitment by the Chinese 
government to liberalize its capital account through gradual expansion of the 
Renminbi (RMB) for settlement of global trade, development of a robust offshore 
Renminbi environment.  In the bid to facilitate this goal, firms domicile outside China 
can open Renminbi (RMB) accounts in mainland China (Shanghai and four cities in 
Guangdong province) or Hong Kong (He, 2012; Cui, 2013a; Cui, 2013b; and Germain, 
and Schwartz, 2017). Since 2009 this pilot scheme was in operation for RMB trade 
settlement – the scheme is the first legal framework undertaken by the authorities to 
use RMB for current account transactions.  
 To strengthen the internationalization process, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) declared its plan to develop and convert Shanghai into a global financial hub. 
In addition, new offshore clearing centers were extended in Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Europe. Furthermore, negotiations to strike more offshore deals in several other 
countries, like Canada, Australia, and the United States, are ongoing (Cheung et al., 
2017). The extension of offshore Renminbi (RMB) is a strategic move towards 
promoting RMB as global investment currency for capital investment. The people’s 
currency is now an asset class with a broad network of market participants that utilize 
it as an investment currency. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on November 
30, 2015 approved the inclusion of Renminbi in its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
baskets of currencies; this is another turning point for RMB to turn around with the 
13 
 
elite global currencies, including the US dollar, British Pound, Euro and the Japanese 
Yen. Although, the quest for the internationalization agenda still has a long way to go, 
however, the recognition of RMB as part of the SDR basket is indeed a watershed and 
a milestone for the internationalization objective (see David, 2016). 
 Gao and Yu (2009), and Subramanian and Kessler, (2012) maintained that 
before the active internationalization of RMB move, the Chinese government mildly 
started the liberalization of its currency and capital markets, due to concerns from its 
major trading partners. The people’s currency has a history of the pegged exchange 
rate, for example from 1994 to 2005, Renminbi was pegged RMB 8.28 to US dollar 
one. In the second quarter of 2005, the Chinese authorities-initiated policies that 
gradually aided the basing of RMB value subject to a daily trading band and basket 
of currencies, though rigidly controlled around the range of +/- 0.3%. Moreover, the 
Chinese authorities imposed tight capital controls. The relatively flexible exchange 
rate policy has made the RMB to appreciate by 21% from July 2005 to July 2008. 
During the 2008 global financial crisis, the People’s Bank of China retained a peg 
policy to the USD from July 2008 through 2010, and in 2012, the trading band was 
increased to 1% and later 2% in 2014. However, RMB suddenly started witnessing 
two-way volatility in 2014. 6  The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) declared a 
surprising devaluation in August 2015, which depreciate the value of RMB by 3% 
against the US dollar overnight. Since then RMB has depreciated continuously against 
the USD, which may also have to do with Federal Reserve raising its rate, to 
strengthen the US dollar relative to other currencies (Love and Chen, 2015; and 
Campenella, 2014). 
                                                                
6The trading band was increased to 0.5% in 2007. 
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 Chen et al. (2009) evaluate RMB internationalization process as part of the 
broader desire to reform and regenerate the international monetary system to represent 
a more diverse and interconnected global economy. In addition, the study reports that 
the use of RMB in trade financing has rapidly increase in recent years. In the same 
vein, another concern that leads to China’s combined efforts to promote the cross-
border use of RMB relates to the overall move to improve its financial liberalization 
program. In effect, to reduce China’s reliance on the US-centric global financial 
system. Therefore, the RMB internationalization is to support the international 
monetary system reform. For example, the pace at which dollar accumulation expose 
many countries running surpluses in the current account, and by implication stand the 
risk of sudden dollar shortage. Internationalization of RMB in the subsequent years 
ahead is an alternative solution to this form of currency risk. In a way, this could help 
the move towards rebalancing the international monetary system that relies on few de 
facto currencies (Detais, 2016; and Eichengreen, 2011; and Chen and Cheung, 2009; 
Gao and Yu, 2009) argued that challenges still lie ahead for RMB; crucially the 
question is whether Chinese authorities will sequentially alter the status quo by 
ensuring more flexibility of the RMB exchange rates and full liberalization of the 
financial markets among factors others is key for RMB internationalization and 
becoming entirely part of the international monetary system reform. Nevertheless, 
along with the desire to fulfill the objective of international monetary reform several 
reasons account for the RMB internationalization. For example, Cheung et al. (2011) 
stressed that RMB’s status does not match China’s positioning in the world economy, 
as the second-largest economy. Among other reasons mainly advanced in the 
literature, including the following: 
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1. RMB internationalization will help in the reduction of currency risk for both 
the exporter and importer so that the acceptance of RMB as trade settlement 
currency would promote international trade and investment, which is 
beneficial for both China and its global trading partners. 
2. RMB internationalization will reduce high exposure to dollar exchange rate 
volatility, given China’s position as the holder of foreign exchange rate 
reserves and the lion share of the stockpile reserve is in US dollar (the 
dominant international reserve currency). Therefore, China’s US dollar 
accumulation will likely reduce downward or reverse as RMB gains 
acceptance for global trade and investment. 
 
 Furthermore, Cheung et al. (2011), Ruan (2013), Yu (2012) and Ito (2011) 
emphasized arguments far from globalizing RMB as a store of value nor efforts build 
up a network of a financial hub in East Asia and beyond. They extend that the move 
is part of China’s strategy to rebalance the lingering skewed international balance 
sheet - namely large and rapidly increasing exposure to foreign exchange rate risk. 
Stressing that the exposure derives from the combination of China’s openness to direct 
investment from the rest of the world, current account surpluses, and lack of RMB 
internationalization. Furthermore, China like many advanced economies, at present it 
has a short position in its currency and a long position in other reserve currencies 
especially the US dollar (this accounts for inward direct investment and inward 
portfolio equity as RMB liabilities). Comparing China with Japan, the former now has 
a sizeable second source of its net foreign currency, with the persistently sizeable 
current account surpluses for a decade. The flows had cumulated into a stock known 
as the net international investment position, which is the difference between the 
nation’s external assets and its liabilities. The continuous surpluses in China’s current 
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account had built up and positioned the Chinese economy as a net creditor nation. 
 Cheung et al. (2011) added that the Chinese economy is converging with that 
of Japan at 40-50 percent GDP. In comparison, Japan’s massive reserves position 
racked up over a generation, while China’s standing witnessed a swift swing in a 
decade, moving from a net debtor of some 10% of GDP to a net creditor of 37% in 
2009. Besides, in the case of China, the rest of the world’s equity position and net 
investment in foreign currency, which is the sum of China’s long position in foreign 
currency. In 2009, the amount approximated to 60 percent of China’s GDP. The 
government absorbs the risk in the form of foreign exchange reserves financed by 
RMB liabilities (including reserves and Central Bank bills. The same authors argued 
that with RMB internationalization if some of China’s claims to the rest of the world 
become RMB denominated, in turn, this would reduce the long foreign currency 
position of China when it claims on the rest of the world are denominated in RMB. 
Again, using Japan as an example, Cheung et al. (2011) further maintained that the 
international use of creditor country’s currency could allow the rest of the world to 
share the creditor country’s currency risk. Significantly, modest internationalization 
of Japanese Yen permitted the rest of the world to share the foreign exchange exposure 
as the world uses yen denominate both assets and liabilities. Moreover, the claim of 
Japan to the rest of the world equivalent to the modest amount of 2% of its GDP. 
Considerably, the Chinese economy in its short lifespan as a strong creditor nation has 
piled up substantial foreign exchange exposure like that of Japan (see Cheung et al. 
2011, p. 47). However, in Japan case, most Japanese companies, like pension funds, 
and mutual funds received and held a stock of securities denominated in Yen, doubling 
its official reserve. Which is equivalent to one-third of the GDP, which is around 11.6 
percent, denominated in Japanese Yen. In comparison, the net international assets as 
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a share of its GDP are still small relative to that of Japan. However, it overall long 
position in foreign exchange is as large as that of Japanese economy or even more 
significant. The long position is attributable to a more significant share of GDP in 
foreign holdings of equities in China due to the massive amount of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows for almost two decades and lack of RMB 
internationalization. Therefore, the potential strategy seen to curb this challenge is 
RMB internationalization, mainly to ensure denomination of most of China’s external 
claims in RMB. The combination of these entire factors made the Chinese authorities 
to put a proactive strategy in place to ensure RMB internationalization.7 Cheung et al. 
(2011) refer this policy as “renminbization of China’s claim to the rest of the world.” 
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) sets to achieve the full convertibility of its 
currency through triple steps. First, RMB as a global trade currency, where business 
outside China are acquaintedwith using RMB for its payments and receipts of goods 
and services traded. Second, RMB as a global investment currency has the main 
objective is to ensure that RMB is freely investible, i.e., investors can be able to move 
their RMB-based holdings across the border, and global firms may require the 
conversion of their earning in RMB into other currencies.  Thirdly, RMB as a global 
reserve currency, with the increasing importance of China as economic leader in the 
arena of international trade, the government is determined to match its currency with 
its position (Li, 2013; Lai and Zhou, 2012 Kamps, 2006; and Eichengreen, 2011); 
2.2 Renminbi Swap Line and Currency Network of China 
                                                                
7Additionally, another key factor resides in the objective of international system rebalancing; available 
evidence reveals that at least 30 world’s central banks hold a portion of their reserves in RMB. 
Relatively, this is an indication of some level of acceptance of the RMB by number of Central Banks 
in the world, suggesting that RMB is effectively on the path of becoming a de facto reserve currency, 




 Renminbi (RMB) internationalization is receiving attention on 
commencement comparable to some of the China’s initiatives such as the Asian 
infrastructure investment bank (AIIB) and the one Belt, and one Road initiative 
scheme. The government actively engage in the efforts to internationalize its currency 
(RMB). Although the Chinese capital account is, still relatively closed, non-resident 
investors cannot have access to RMB in international markets (Lin and Cheung, 2016; 
Gao and Yu, 2009; Park, 2010; Yu, 2012; and Chen and Cheung, 2011). Therefore, 
the alternative way to increase and encourage the international trade flow is through 
the swap line agreements even without opening of the capital account. The main aim 
of the currency swap agreement is to solve the problem of illiquidity in the time of 
downturn. For instance, taking the remote example of Asian financial crisis, after the 
crisis many Asian countries, including China, embraced a currency swap agreement 
under the canopy of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). It follows that the United States 
entered a currency swap with several countries (such as Switzerland, Korea, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Singapore) to mainly provide liquidity in the form of US dollar to these 
countries. Most of the swaps are denominated in US dollars while others are in the 
local currencies (Liao and McDowell, 2015; Aizenman et al. 2011; Bowles and Wong, 
2013; Cohen, 2012; Mcguire and Peter, 2012). Going beyond the Asian regional 
cooperation, the currency swap line of China continuously raises to approximately 30 
countries since 2008 (see Table 1). Besides, In addition, the broader purpose is to 
facilitate bilateral trade and investment. 




Source: People’s Bank of China’s News Release. 
 Bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) is not an entirely a new phenomenon. For 
example, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Association of the South 
East Asian Nations plus the three largest East Asian economies – Japan, South Korea, 
and China signed the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) to guide against the future 
occurrence of liquidity shortage (see Aizenman et al. 2011). 8  The Chiang Mai 
Initiative is a regional network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) among its 
members affected by the Asian crisis by varying degree. In comparison, US Federal 
Reserve move to enter into the bilateral swap agreements displayed a preference for 
considering developed countries as BSA partners following the 2008-09 financial 
fallout. Mainly central banks of developed countries accounted for 10 out of the 14 
temporary BSA counterparts. After that, in October 2013, some of the temporary 
BSAs were converted into standing arrangements with five developed countries, 
namely the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, Swiss 
                                                                
8 The CMI initiative was link to IMF program, after its multilateralization and then converted into a 
single agreement in 2008. Furthermore, the CMI size now worth $240 billion in 2014 compared to 
the initial $120 billion. In comparison, bilateral currency swap agreements of China signed after the 




National Bank, and Bank of Canada (Detais, 2016 and Goldberg and Kenney, 2010). 
These countries possess a high degree of financial openness with less history of 
sovereign default; this is important for the US Federal Reserve to minimize credit 
risks. Unlike the Federal Reserve, the PBOC’s include many developing countries as 
BSA partners. Among the more than 30 useful BSAs, only six are with central banks 
of developed economies. No clear-cut evidence suggests that the decision of PBOC is 
not under the influence of geopolitical or institutional factors; somewhat in the quest 
for internationalization, the selection of China’s swap line agreement is as open as 
possible. For instance, several countries with default history are a signatory to China’s 
swap line, like Argentina. Even though, these countries may be keen to establish such 
kind of financial arrangements solely to improve their standing and guide against 
external shocks. Similarly, for such countries, Renminbi swap line is in their economic 
interest if China has fewer concerns over their sovereign default history (see 
Aizenman, 2011). Figure 3 shows the relative importance of its swap partners as a 
significant exports destination since 1970s.  
 Furthermore, the usage of RMB as trade and investment currency will help in 
the elimination of exchange rate risk both for Chinese firms and for their trading 
partners that requires funding for international investment. Liao and McDowell (2015) 
argued that economic motivations rather than geographical considerations drive the 
RMB internationalization. For example, trade and investment dependence concerns 
due to break off in credit market liquidity have motivated the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) to provide swap line to obtain liquidity for trade and investment. Ruan (2013), 
Aizenman (2011), and Ito (2011)) maintained that bilateral currency swap cooperation 
is mutually symbiotic mechanism that is benefit to both countries. First, it provides 
trade-financing insulation against international liquidity shocks. Secondly, it benefits 
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both partners reduced transaction costs that may arise in cross-border trade and 
investments. Bilateral currency swap is also an alternative means for lubricating and 
financing international trade.9  The initiative of bilateral currency swap agreements 
(BSAs) enable China and its trading partners to revert the over-dependence on US 
dollar for invoicing and settlement of trade. Therefore, PBOC’s initiative makes 
economic sense as they help to reduce the risk of abrupt shocks and shield the 
exporters against currency risk, by eliminating the costs of hedging against foreign 
exchange rate risks. As whole, this help to lower the transaction costs of trade and 
investments (Wilson, 2015; Yang and Han, 2013; and Bowles and Wang, 2013). 
 As discussed in Detais (2016) currency swaps is another new channel through 
which central bank inject the equivalent amount of swapped foreign currency into the 
domestic financial system, in effect, the funds will be borrowed by commercial banks 
and other business entities to settle for imports the collaborating country. Conversely, 
exporters in the partner countries receive the proceeds mainly denominated their 
domestic currency, which will also reduce the cost of fund transfer.  Furthermore, the 
central bank bilateral currency swaps are useful for managing the unintended 
consequences of capital markets break down, since some of the swap funds are 
channel into financial markets, at large this will elevate RMB’s potential to emerge as 
the viable reserve currency for global central banks. It is relevant to note that with the 
rapid growth rate of China and most of the economies in the Asian region, Renminbi’s 
prospect is likely to continue to manifest with greater acceptability than ever before 
(Eichengreen, 2011). The wide acceptability is an essential way to enhance the 
development of the Chinese capital markets. With the large and aging population of 
                                                                




China, this will also provide a higher yield as the populace finds a proximate capital 
investment at home and a new source of investment from global investors. Kwon 
(2015), Wilson (2015) and Cui, 2013 argued that Asia’s emerging economic 
dominance could be projected in the coming decades will see the more significant 
interaction between central banks both in the region and across the globe, especially 
if the Renminbi sustains a pivotal position as a unit of account in the special drawing 
rights (SDRs). Importantly, for the fully fledge internationalization to accrue to RMB 
in the international monetary system, Chinese authorities must consolidate its position 
in the international community by establishing both economic and political role 
globally (Liao and McDowell, 2015).  Figure 3 below depicts the average exports 
shares of China from 1970 to 2013 to its bilateral swap partners, and mirror exports 
shares of partners to China. Overall, we show that exports share from both directions 
exhibit an upward trend. In fact, this cursory signal reveals the increasing relevance 
of the role of Chinese swap agreements in the expansion of trade and investment in 




Figure 2: Geographical Location of China’s RMB Swap lines  
 
Source: People’s Bank of China’s News Release. 
 Significantly, another important factor that provides stimulus for China’s 
volume of trade growth was the accession of China into World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001.  Fundamentally, synthesis of these factors has beset and driven the 
emergence of China as a global player on a world economics scale (see Kwon, 2015; 
Bowles and Wang, 2013; Roubini, 2009; Lao and McDowell, 2015; McCauley, 2011; 
Cohen 2012). Therefore, China is becoming a global economic player by many 
measures. Besides, all these advances, the country’s strength is not parallel to its 
currency strength and internationalization, if the RMB does not play significant role 
in international trade and investment. In recent years, China has been making headway 
to strengthen its role and participation in the international monetary system, by 
exerting efforts to propagate the use of its currency, Renminbi (RMB). The green spot 
in Figure 2 depicts the geographical location where RMB usage is used as trade 
clearing currency through the bilateral swap agreement with the Peoples’ Bank of 
24 
 
China (PBOC) and some central banks in the world across continents. Moreover, 
Renminbi enters the special drawing rights (SDR) in November 2015 with a share of 
10.9%, which makes it among the most important currency in the unit, just behind the 
dollar and euro. Within the existing SDR arrangements with the IMF and quite some 
countries that are a signatory to the swap line. Central banks can draw Renminbi under 
swap agreements and can potentially convert fund drawn from swap funds into SDR 
and then into US dollars via a set of transactions (Love and Chen, 2015; Lucia, 2016; 
and David, 2016). Therefore, countries that are a signatory to the swap line with 
People’s Bank of China have access to US dollars. In a way, bypassing the restrictive 
Federal Reserve swap network, mainly to OECD countries and some emerging 
markets.10 The size PBOC’s swap line over eight years across continents amounts to 
more than 3 trillion renminbi ($500 billion). Among those countries that join PBOC’s 
swap line deals include some European countries such as Albania, Belarus, Iceland, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Russia, and Turkey. The Asian 
countries include Hong Kong, South Korea, Mongolia, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Qatar, and United Arab Emirate. 
Some countries in the South America include Argentina and Brazil. Again, countries 
from Australia and Oceania continent include New Zealand and Australia (Lin and 
Cheung, 2016).  
  
                                                                
10It is also an alternative to highly institutionalized and multinational source of finance, and one of 
these consequences could to generate boost to global liquidity and augmenting to world arsenal of 
international financial instruments outside the established western – controlled policies. Arguably, the 
significance could manifest in nearly 10 to 15 years.  
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Figure 3: Average Total Exports Shares of China and Bilateral Swap Partners 
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 Contemporarily, the Chinese economy is an excellent specimen of export-
powered growth, through learning by doing, reversing its status quo from autarkic 
fashion to opening up to foreign know how, and buffered by a complex and well 
tracked industrial policy.11 China marked two decades of growth from (1980-2000), a 
quantum leap of transformation from autarkic and drudgery agricultural economy to 
a more sophisticated industrial sector and rising service sector in one generation (see 
Song and Zilibotti, 2009). In the period under scrutiny, China has recorded rapid 
growth in international trade, current account/GDP surpluses since the 2000s, and this 
is consistent with massive reserve hoarding and sterilization of expanding its trade 
surpluses and inflow of financial investment (Aizenman and Lee, 2008). Arguably, 
(Aizenman, Jinjazak, and Zheng, 2015) stressed that these policies deliberately 
pursued by the Chinese authorities intend to delay and slow the real appreciation 
associated its rapid growth success. The Asian region had seen the proliferation and 
build-up of FX reserves unprecedentedly since after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. The Asia’s reserve swelled from US$202 billion in 1990 to US$3371 billion in 
2008, and the growth continues to gallop at 20% per year. It is important to note that 
China’s contribution to this buildup accounted for than 50% of the realized growth of 
1990-2008. In seeking to understand the extraordinary growth of Asia’s FX reserves 
in the post-Asian financial crisis. Aizenman et al. 2011 opined that the Asian’s crisis 
had a devastating impact socially and economically in the region. Even though five 
countries – Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand bore the weight of 
the shock, but the psychological impact of the crisis spread to the whole region. On 
the precise cause of the crisis, a considerable deal of controversy clouds discussion of 
academics and policy circle. However, the consensus was that of a shortage of 
                                                                
11Learning via experimental approach greatly help China to poster its rapid productivity growth. 
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international liquidity. Broadly speaking, the move to accumulate massive reserves 
and bilateral currency swapping highlights the precautionary self-insurance against 
the occurrence of another crisis. Aizenman et al. (2011), assess the prospective rise 
and impact of the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis that had seen the 
proliferation of the currency swap agreements between major central banks like the 
US Federal Reserve, PBOC, ECB, some Asian economies, and later rest of world. 
They show that currency swaps constitute one dimension of complimenting 
international reserves for effective insurance against unexpected shocks. Additionally, 
US Federal Reserve and ECB swap line served somewhat as a substitute to the foreign 
reserve accumulation for some emerging markets.  
 Alternatively, this piece of work seeks to explain the motive of PBOC’s 
currency swaps from mercantilist export promotion as a way of intensifying the 
continuous Chinese economy’s export-led drive towards growth. In Figure 3, depicts 
the computed the average trade shares of China’s exports and that of the 26 
counterparties to the bilateral swap agreements with People’s Bank of China from 
1948-2013. 12  Evidently, our analysis suggests that export markets are highly 
significant between China and most of the 26 counter-parties to the bilateral swap 
agreements (BSAs) over time. The relative trade shares depict a positive trend 
especially for the provider, further suggesting that swap lines primal motive perhaps 
resolves around the provider country’s self-interest, even though the benefits are 
substantially symbiotic for the recipient and provider country. 13  Comparatively, 
Aizenman et al. (2011) show that the recipients of swaps utilized it to reassure market 
                                                                
12 The remaining of the entire mirror trade shares of the rest of the counterparties of the bilateral swap 
agreement is shown in the appendix. 
13Buying foreign currencies to hold back domestic currencies is an effective measure to improve the 
external balance (competitiveness of a country) and hence exports promotion. This is referred to as 
mercantilist demand for reserves or seeking to accumulate foreign currency via swap lines, which 
contrast the demand for reserves associated with precautionary self-insurance. 
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and convert financial instability during economic downturn even when vast stockpiles 
of FX reserves prove abortive in the reassuring market. Our analysis also shows that 
formalizing and institutionalizing swap arrangements beyond the temporary anti-
crisis tool to long-term measure to dampen the liquidity support for both precautionary 
self-insurance and promotion of international trade on a world mercantile scale. The 
paper argued that even though swaps at large may contribute on a world scale to the 
public good, in reassuring global financial stability, most of the central banks 
providing the support of liquidity do so in their respective self-interests. Figure three, 
empirically depict strong evidence of trade especially after the deal, showing that 
counterparts are substantial export markets – this explains the continuous rise of the 
People's Bank of China’s extension of swap facility several countries. Similarly, it is 
discernable along this line of thought to weigh the inclusion of some countries like 
Argentina and Belarus among others. For example, some of these economies are 
relatively not highly considered for having strong macroeconomic fundamentals and 
sound fiscal management, their inclusion as recipients of swaps by the PBOC reveals 
the significance of quest for export markets (see Figure 3). Moreover, China’s 
significant role in international trade paved the way for RMB to possess an intrinsic 
value, although China’s level of financial development still lagged compared to the 
major financial centers, which explains the massive investment of China in the US 
financial markets. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that China’s wide area of 
swap network results from the credibility of PBOC. Apparently, it may not be more 
credible than other central banks in the emerging markets, despite its vast sum of 
hoarded reserves. – The dominance of China’s swap lines provides the impetus for 
RMB to emerge as a new reserve currency.    
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 Furthermore, another motive related to the precautionary self-insurance and 
mercantilist export promotion of holding reserves, however, different is the exchange 
rate stability. The relative stability of the exchange rate is a crucial macroeconomic 
fundamental that often most countries strive to monitor and buffer their economies in 
the event of unprecedented volatility. Therefore, building reserves and complimenting 
it in the form swap lines and currency network perhaps is a dimension of country’s 
strategic and systematic pattern to intervene in the foreign market with the sole aim 
of stabilizing the exchange rate. This motive is somewhat closely related to the 
mercantilist export promotion drive, for instance having a competitive exchange rate 
gives a country leverage to enhance its current account position through international 
trade and as such a country build ample amount of reserve it needs for precautionary 
purposes. It is difficult to create a dichotomy among the three motives for the 
accumulation of reserves and swap lines with mutual exclusivity theoretically and in 
terms of empirical parlance.  
2.3 Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
2.3.1 Currency Swap, Trade and Exchange Rate Volatility 
 The existence of swap lines as a hedging facility is one way of reducing the 
exchange rate uncertainty on international trade. Theoretical studies long established 
the expected impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade (see Allayannis, 
2001). The effect might negatively assert influence on trade depending on some 
factors such as the structure of production such as the small number of firms, risk 
preferences, presence or absence of forward contract markets or currency swap 
options, and degree of economic integration (see Auboin and Ruta, 2013; Kawai, 1986; 
Broll and Wessel, 2011; Wong, 2003). Goswami et al. (2004) theoretically show that 
high economic exposure determines firm’s preference to currency swaps. The 
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economic exposure is positive if the foreign currency denominated cash inflows 
negatively correlate with foreign exchange rates. Their theory suggests that currency 
swaps help global firms to achieve long-term financing and financial risk management 
goals. Theoretically, most studies underpinned the idea that an increase in exchange 
rate volatility leads to a decrease in international trade. For example, if economic 
agents are risk averse, a higher volatility of exchange rate increases uncertainty, and 
hence raises the cost of conducting international trade (see Doganlar, 2002; Ethier, 
1973; and Clark, 1973; Barkoulas, et al., 2002). McKenzie (1999) show that 
uncertainty will be greater in the absence of an adequate hedging instrument, 
indicating that the existence of a well-functioning forward market might lower 
exchange rate volatility downwards. The pioneering work of Ethier (1973) further 
supported the assertion that with perfect forward markets, and no other sources of 
uncertainty rather than exchange rate, the volume of trade is uninfluenced by 
exchange rate volatility. Moreover, Viane and Vries (1992) also reexamined the 
impact of rising volatility of the exchange rate on trade volume; their findings slightly 
contrast Ethier (1973). Showing that even when a forward market exists, the spot 
exchange rate volatility indirectly affects the volume of trade via its effect on the 
forward rate. In addition, they show that with an increase in the volatility of the 
exchange rate, the imports and exports might be different. It follows that in 
equilibrium forward rate is determinedby the total supply and demand for the forward 
currency. As a result, exports lose (benefit), and imports benefit (lose) when trade 
balance sign become positive (negative). Broll and Eckwert (1999) explored the 
theoretical likelihood of a positive association between exchange rate volatility and 
exports. The intuition behind this possibility is because an increase in exchange rate 
volatility open options to export to the world markets, implying that firms that are 
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more flexible can react to these changes and reallocate their exports destinations. Wei 
(1999) investigate the hedging hypothesis, i.e., an empirical puzzle in international 
finance, based on the notion that identifying the large and negative effect of exchange 
rate on trade is difficult due to the availability of forward and swap options. In testing 
the validity using data of over 1000 country pairs, the results show that there is no 
evidence in the data to support the validity of the hedging hypothesis. Moreover, 
country pairs with large trade potential, still, exchange rate volatility deters goods 
trade largely than that typically claim and documented in the literature. Wong (2003) 
show that hedging theorem holds if firms always find it optimal to export entire their 
output in the foreign markets. However, if firms are flexible by ex-post allocating their 
exports between the domestic and the international markets, and guide against foreign 
exchange risk exposure, implicitly using real hedging instrument introduces a convex 
component into the firm’s foreign exchange exposure. Adam-Muller (2000) examines 
the optimal production, hedging and export allocation of a risk averse international 
firms that exports to different foreign markets with different currencies and multiple 
exchange rate risks. In the first scenario, that only one forward market for a single 
currency exist. In this case, the export allocation to different markets is separable from 
the firm’s preference and the joint distribution of the exchange rates. In the second 
scenario, where hedging instruments and forward markets for each currency exist. In 
this case, production and exports allocation are separable. As result hedging with 
forward contracts, depend on risk premium and the joint distribution of the exchange 
rates. Brollet al. (2015) examine the behavior of competitive exporting firms that 
exports to two foreign countries in a state of multiple sources of exchange rate 
uncertainty. Showing that since firms cross hedge their exchange rate exposure if there 
is an only one forward market between the domestic currency and foreign country’s 
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currency. Therefore, firms optimally export to both foreign countries and the decision 
of firm’s production is independent of the firm risk attitude and the underlying 
exchange rate uncertainty. Further, the showing that the firms’ optimal forward 
position depends on whether the two random exchange rates correlate in the sense of 
expectation dependence.  
 Furthermore, the empirical literature revealed clear-cut evidence between 
exchange rate volatility and trade. Baum and Caglayan (2010) investigate the effect 
of exchange rate uncertainty, and international trade flows from the period of 1980-
1998 for a broad set of industrial economies. Their results show the absence of a 
significant relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade volume. They 
argued that the openness of capital market in the emerging countries tend to reduce 
the effect of exchange rate volatility on international trade as compared to the impact 
in the developing counterparts. Grier and Smallwood (2007) show relatively a modest 
evidence of negative impact of the exchange rate volatility on multilateral exports 
within the subsample of some developing countries and find little significant effects 
for some developed countries. Tenrenyo (2007) applies the gravity equation to 
analyze 87 developed and less developed countries in a panel data framework; the 
study does not find evidence pointing a significant link between exchange rate 
volatility on trade. Arizeet al. (2008) find a negative and statistically significant long-
run relationship in eight Latin American countries. Grier and Smallwood (2013) find 
evidence that real exchange rate uncertainty negatively affects trade for many less 
developed countries. The revealed evidence depicts unexpected impulse response of 
the real exchange rate on the growth of exports. Nevertheless, the empirical results 
also indicate asymmetric positive shocks that generate substantial negative response 





Figure 4: International Liquidity Swap Scheme 
 
Source: Adopted from Detais (2016). 
 Significantly, currency swap has two major uses, firstly, it enables the parties 
to secure a cheaper debt (i.e. to borrow at best available rates irrespective of currency 
and swapping debt in the desired currency via back to back loans). Secondly, swaps 
are effective mechanisms for hedging against exchange rate exposure and fluctuation. 
Moreover, currency swaps are cost effective ways to transform risk exposures and 
alter future cash flows of firms. Similarly, comparative advantage is the fundamental 
motivation for wide area swap – covered foreign currency borrowing like the central 
bank bilateral currency of route of China and United States that covered many 
countries with large volumes swap – covered borrowing. Suppose the borrowing cost 
differ across markets, issuers as firms or central banks are likely to ameliorate their 
overall financing cost initiating swaps agreement in a manner in each party signatories 
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to the swap financial contract has an incentive or comparative advantage using the 
funds and proceeds.14 
Table 1: China’s RMB Currency Swap line and Partner Countries 
Partner 
Economies 







South Korea RMB 180 bn/KRW 38,000 bn 12 Dec. 2008 Dec. 2011 3 
Hong Kong RMB 200 bn/HKD 227 bn 20 Jan. 2009 Jan. 2013 3 
Malaysia RMB 80 bn/MYR 40 bn 8 Feb. 2009 Feb. 2012 3 
Belarus RMB 20 bn/BYR 8,000 bn 11 Mar. 2009 Mar. 2012 3 
Indonesia RMB 100 bn/IDR 175,000 bn 23 Mar. 2009 Mar. 2012 3 
Argentina RMB 70 bn/ARS 38 bn 2 Apr. 2009 Apr. 2012 3 
Iceland RMB 3.5 bn 10 Jun. 2010 Jun. 2013 3 
Singapore RMB 150 bn/SGD 30 bn 23 Jul. 2010 Jul. 2013 3 
N Zealand RMB 25 bn/NZD 5bn 18 Apr. 2011 Apr. 2014 3 
Uzbekistan RMB 0.7 bn 19 Apr. 2011 Apr. 2014 3 
Mongolia RMB 5 bn 6 May 2011 May 2014 3 
Kazakhstan RMB 7 bn 13 Jun. 2011 Jun. 2014 3 
Thailand RMB 70 bn/THB 320 bn 22 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2014 3 
Pakistan RMB 10 bn/PKR 140 bn 23 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2014 3 
UAE RMB 35 bn/AED 20 bn 17 Jan. 2012 Jan. 2015 3 
Turkey RMB 10 bn/TRY 3 bn 21 Feb. 2012 Feb. 2015 3 
Australia RMB 200 bn/AUD 30 bn 22 Mar. 2012 Mar. 2015 3 
Ukraine RMB 15 bn/UAH 19 bn 26 Jun. 2012 Jun. 2015 3 
Brazil RMB 190 bn/BRL 60 bn 26 Mar. 2013 Mar. 2016 3 
England RMB 200 bn/GBP 20 bn 22 Jun. 2013 Jun. 2016 3 
Hungary RMB 10 bn/HUF 375 bn 9 Sep. 2013 Sep. 2016 3 
Albania RMB 2 bn/ALL 35.8 bn 12 Sep. 2013 Sep. 2016 3 
EU RMB 350 bn/EUR 45 bn 9 Oct. 2013 Oct. 2016 3 
Switzerland RMB 150 bn/CHF 21 bn 21 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2017 3 
Sri Lanka RMB 10 bn/LKR 225 bn 16 Sep. 2014 Sep. 2017 3 
Russia RMB 150 bn/RUB 815 bn 13 Oct. 2014 Oct. 2017 3 
Qatar RMB 35 bn/QAR 20.8 bn 3 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2017 3 
Canada RMB 200 bn/CAD 30 bn 8 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2017 3 
Source: People’s Bank of China news releases and Lin et al. (2016). 
                                                                
14For example, comparative advantage exists in financial market if similar risk is priced differently in 
different market, in this situation central banks and firms stand to gain from currency swapping. The 
benefit of swap more generally helps countries regulate their exposure to exchange rate uncertainty and 
interest rate risk. 
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 The swap agreement had seen a remarkable comeback, especially, in the 2000s 
when trading currency swaps increased for many world de facto currencies. In the 
heart of the global financial crisis of 2008, currency swap transactions were utilized 
by the United States’ Federal Reserve and central bank of developed and emerging 
countries. Where both parties exchange domestic currencies at the prevailing market 
exchange rate and reverse the swap at the same exchange rate, predetermined at a 
future date. Essentially, the liquidity swap was aimed at providing liquidity in U.S. 
dollars to foreign markets. It is important to note that the central banks’ liquidity swap 
and the plain vanilla currency swap are structurally the same. While plain vanilla 
currency swap is driven mainly by comparative advantage, the central bank liquidity 
swaps are emergency loans of U.S dollars to overseas markets. In contrast, the Peoples’ 
Banks of China (PBOCs’) motive is a multi-dimensional one, to serve both the aim of 
trade and investment promotion in addition to Renminbi internationalization 
framework which was a policy move to integrate the Chinese economy into the global 









THE DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data Description 
 Our dataset on bilateral trade data for 213 countries and standard gravity 
variables comes from Glick and Rose (2016), and the data span from 1990 – 2017. In 
the data set, trade data relies on the direction of trade statistics (DOTs), real GDP and 
population come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, augmented 
with the Penn World Table 7.1 as well as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Glick and Rose exploit CIA’s World Fact-book for some country-specific variables 
such as latitude, longitude, landlocked, island status, contiguous border, shared 
language, colonizers. Information on regional trade agreements originates from the 
World Trade Organization. Our definition of China’s RMB-swap is that Renminbi 
serves as a clearing trade currency between China and counterparties to the swap 
agreement or among whole signatories. The analysis covers 213 countries, out of 
which 26 countries are the counterparty to the China’s bilateral currency swap 
agreement (RMB-trade based policy). We show the lists of the signatories in Table1; 
we also indicate the size of the swap exchanged with the effective date in which the 
agreement came into force, inclusive the expiration date and duration of the bilateral 
currency swap, which is extendable.                               
3.2 Econometric Methodology: Structural Gravity Model 
 The application of Gravity model to bilateral interactions among the pair of 
countries, predicts trade between two economies as directly proportional to the 
product of their sizes and inversely proportional to the trade frictions between them. 
Early applications of this model resort to physical science analogy of the Newtonian 
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Law of Gravitation without formal economic foundations (see Tinbergen, 1962; 
Linnnemann, 1966; Aitken, 1973; and Sapir, 1981). In 1979, the formal theoretical 
economic foundations of gravity emanated, under the assumptions that place of origin 
differentiates goods as in Armington (1969) and that consumers preferences are 
homothetic, identical across countries, and approximated by a CES utility function. 
Anderson (1979) formally derives the fundamental foundation of economic gravity 
rooted in economic theory. Since then several studies surfaced (see Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2001; Eaton and Kortum, 2002) and later Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2003) refine and popularize the idea in Anderson (1979). One notable attribute 
common to all these models is the explicit role for price levels or some form 
multilateral resistance term, for example, Balwin and Taglioni (2007) argued that 
ignoring the multilateral resistance term is tantamount to committing a gold medal 
mistake in the estimation of the gravity equation.15 The framework of theoretical 
structural gravity system suggests the following;   
 








  (1) 
𝛱𝑖







  (2) 
 𝛲𝑗






  (3) 
 
                                                                
15An important departure from the analogy of Newtonian gravity model is the multilateral resistance 
terms (MTR), which captures general equilibrium forces in a structural gravity system. Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) show that the more a country is resistant to trade with a given country, the more 
it shall trade with others, including itself and this captures the general equilibrium effect.  
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 Equation (1) is the representation of the theoretical gravity system that derives 
trade flows between pair of countries, conveniently we can decompose the size 
term,𝑌𝑖𝐸𝑗 𝑌⁄ , and the trade cost term, (𝜏𝑖𝑗 (𝛱𝑖𝛲𝑗)⁄ )
1−𝜎
 
 Here the interpretation of the size term,𝑌𝑖𝐸𝑗 𝑌⁄ , denote the hypothetical level 
of frictionless trade between a pair of countries i and j without trade costs. 
 Mechanically, setting the bilateral frictions to equality ( 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 1), and re-
deriving the gravity model, will intuitively, imply a frictionless world where 
consumers face the same price for a few goods regardless of their physical location. 
Similarly, the expenditure share on goods from a country will be equal to the share of 
production trace to source destination country in the global economy (say 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝐸𝑖𝑗⁄ =
𝑌𝐼 𝑌⁄ ). In effect, the economics size term carries a very useful information in relation 
to country size and bilateral trade flows. For example, large producers will naturally 
export more almost all destinations; richest and biggest markets also import more 
from almost all sources; also, trade flows between i and j will be larger if the pair 
countries are similar in size. Similarly, the trade cost term, (𝜏𝑖𝑗 (𝛱𝑖𝛲𝑗)⁄ )
1−𝜎
captures 
the effect of trade costs that is the driving force of the realized and frictionless trade 
between a pair country. The literature divides the trade cost term into three 
components. First, the bilateral trade between a pair of country i and j, 𝜏𝑖𝑗, which is 
typically denoted by various historical, geographical variables. For example, bilateral 
distance, common border, language, colonizer, countries ever in colonial relationship 
and landlocked countries and trade policy variables regional trade agreement, (RTAs) 
between country pairs say i and j are the gravity controls in the literature. Secondly, 
the structural terms 𝛲𝑗 , denotes the inward multilateral resistance term, which 
represents importer j’s ease access of market. Thirdly, 𝛱𝑖, indicates the outward 
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multilateral resistance term that measures the exporter I’s ease of market access. 
Primarily, the multilateral resistance term are vehicles that translate into the initial 
analysis of partial equilibrium effects of trade policy at the bilateral level to measure 
the country specific effects on consumer and producer prices. The initial effects of 
trade costs on trade flows account for the direct effect, while the taking into the trade 
cost changes into prices, incomes and expenditure is capture using the general 
equilibrium (Head and Mayer 2014 and Yotov et al., 2016). The structural gravity is 
multiplicative in nature, therefore, log-linearizing equation (1) with error term 
expansion we obtain the estimating equation thus:  
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡  =  𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑗,𝑡   +   𝑌𝑖,𝑡  −   𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡   +   (1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝜏𝑖𝑗,𝑡   −    (1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝛲𝑗,𝑡   −
(1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝛱𝑖,𝑡   +   𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                                                                             (4) 
 
 This specification (4) is core to our analysis of central bank bilateral currency 
swap agreement, trade flows and various determinants of bilateral trade. Xij,t,indicates 
the bilateral trade between country i and j at time t. Which depends positively on 
Ej,tand Yi,t i.e., the importer expenditure and exporter income, and negatively on 
distance as a form of trade cost.The proxy of trade cost in the standard structural 
gravity system is(1 − σ) ln τij,t,  it incorporates all manner of a series of observables 
that approximate bilateral trade cost. Interchangeably, we replace (1 − σ)lnτij,t with 
lnΓ′ij,tas a measure of all sort of trade cost (a vector of control variables that represent 
the trade costs) in equation (5), these geographical and historical variables such as 
common border, language, colonial ties, countries that are an island, landlocked, and 
prevalence of regional agreements. While λ′𝑖𝑗,𝑡  (a dummy variable, 0/1 for swap 
status) which captures the central bank bilateral currency swap between China and 
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members signatory to the agreement. From equation (4) lnΡj,t and lnΠI,t  are 
unobservable, to obtain theoretically consistent estimates πI,t and χj,t  captures 
exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, which account for the outward and the 
inward multilateral resistance term, as well as other unobservable exporter-time and 
importer-time country specific attributes that influences trade. Constant term is not 
included in the presence of fixed effects.  
𝐼𝑛(𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡)   =  𝜋𝑖,𝑡   +   𝜒𝑗,𝑡   +    𝜌1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖   +  𝜌2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑗   +   𝜌3𝑙𝑛𝛤′𝑖𝑗,𝑡   +    𝜌4𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
   +  𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                                                                                                              (5) 
 
 While μij, in equation (6) captures the unobserved country-pair fixed effects, 
i.e., it controls bilateral country-pair unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant 
unobservable trade-related factors that influence trade. Of relevance to note, all the 
time-invariant regressor lumped into the pair-specific fixed effects, absorbing all sort 
of similarities that are constant over time among the trading partners.  
ln(𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡)   =   𝜋𝑖,𝑡   +   𝜒𝑗,𝑡   +   𝜇𝑖𝑗  +    𝜌1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖   +    𝜌2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑗   +   𝜌3𝑙𝑛𝛤
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡    +
𝜌4𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡     +   𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡       (6)       
 
 In addition, this makes our regression to rely on time series variation, and it 
compares the pair observations of each country before and after swap line accession 
to determine the 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡coefficient. In both equation (5) and (6), 𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡, captures intra-
𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡 trade creation. The inclusion of fixed effects specification and country-pair fixed 
effects represent a theory consistent structural gravity formulation to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Feenstra, 2004; Anderson 
and Yotov, 2011; Olivero and Yotov, 2012). In the context of estimating average 
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treatment effects of swap agreement on trade across swap member countries, the 
specification is in line with Baier and Bergstrand (2007) to yield unbiased coefficient 
estimates.16For robust estimation, we also consider the following PPML regression: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡   =   𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜋𝑖,𝑡   +   𝜒𝑗,𝑡   +     𝜇𝑖𝑗   +    𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖   +   𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑗    +   𝜌1𝑙𝑛𝛤
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡   +
  𝜌2𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ]  +  𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡         (7) 
 
 The preceded models applied OLS estimator in log linear form. Econometric 
theory suggests that pooled or cross section regression satisfy the classical 
assumptions. Hence, OLS is unbiased, consistent and efficient estimator. However, as 
discussed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) standard log linearization is 
inappropriate and infeasible. First, the dependent variable can be 0. Second, even if 
all the observations of the dependent variable are strictly positive, the expected value 
of the log-linearized error will overall the depend on the covariates and therefore OLS 
will be inconsistent (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p.644). Similarly, the error 
terms are heteroskedastic and therefore its variance depends on the exponential 
function of the independent variable. Therefore, the pattern of heteroscedasticity, 
makes all the higher moments of the conditional distribution of the error term to affect 
the consistency of the estimator. In a nutshell, log linearization process drives the 
inconsistent estimates because of the correlation of the error term with explanatory 
variables. 
 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) applied Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood estimator to estimate gravity model; they show that the PPML estimator 
                                                                
16Essentially, the omission of this control will make the 𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡coefficient to have upwards bias because 
they tend to pick up trade creation that is unrelated to 𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡 simply due to unobservable factors. 
Therefore, the introduction of country-pair fixed effects absorbs all the non-time varying variables that 





𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗represent a dummy taking values one and zero otherwise for common 
language. 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑁𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑗also represent a dummy equals unity and zero otherwise 
representing countries ever in colonial ties. 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑗is another dummy equals 
unity and zero otherwise for common nations in bilateral data. Similarly, 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑗 
represent a dummy equalto unity and zero otherwise for landlocked countries.  Finally, 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡and𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡  are both trade policy variables,  𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡  denotes the presence of 
regional trade agreement between a pair country at time t. While 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the variable 
that accounts for the bilateral RMB-trade policy i.e., bilateral currency swap 
agreements between China and its counterparts at time t. Where 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the random 
disturbance term (error). The key objective is to estimate the value 𝛼 as the unknown 
parameters, in the initial premise we start with the Pooled OLS, which is econometric 
equivalent to the line of best fit used to show the link between trade, economics sizes 
and trade costs. As an important econometric problem, it is suggestive that OLS 
minimizes the sum of squared error𝜖. Econometric theory provides three necessary 
andsufficient conditions for pooled OLS estimates of the gravity model to yield 
unbiased results: first, the errors 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 must have mean values zero and be uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables (orthogonality assumption). Second, the errors 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
must be drawn independently from a normal distribution with a given (fixed) variance 
(the homoscedasticity assumption). Thirdly, none of the explanatory variables is a 
linear combination of other explanatory variables (full rank assumption). Suppose all 
the three properties hold, the pooled OLS yield consistent, unbiased and efficient 
estimates of the gravity system within the class of a linear model.19 
                                                                
19 The consistency of our estimates denotes that the pooled OLS estimates converge to the population 
values as the sample size increases. Unbiasedness mean that the coefficient estimates do not 
systematically differ from the population values, though they are based on a sample rather than the full 
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4.1 Empirical Results 
 Table 2 present the results of intuitive gravity model using aggregate data. An 
interesting number feature is apparent from these estimates. First, it relatively fits well 
with R-squared of 0.51. This denotes that the explanatory variables account for over 
50 percent of the variation observed in our bilateral trade data. The explanatory 
increases as we add more variables to the model using panel data. Furthermore, the 
economic sizes depict a positive association with trade as expected. One percent 
increase in exporter or importer size term (GDP) tend to have an approximately unity 
impact elasticity on bilateral trade, and this effect is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. Similarly, the coefficient on distance is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent, an increase in distance reduces trade by 12%.   
  
                                                                
population. Also, by efficiency we mean there is no other linear unbiased estimator that produces 
smaller standard errors for the coefficients estimates.   
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Table 2:   Pooled OLS Intuitive Gravity Estimates 
 [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] 
     
Exporter Income 1.023*** 1.125*** 1.125*** 1.119*** 
 (0.00823) (0.00635) (0.00635) (0.00639) 
Importer Expenditure 0.768*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.835*** 
 (0.00807) (0.00647) (0.00647) (0.00651) 
Distance  -1.267*** -1.267*** -1.203*** 
  (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
Border  0.778*** 0.778*** 0.766*** 
  (0.0823) (0.0823) (0.0810) 
Colony  1.644*** 1.644*** 1.656*** 
  (0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0966) 
Island  0.358*** 0.358*** 0.331*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
Landlocked  -0.686*** -0.686*** -0.691*** 
  (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0280) 
Common language  0.727*** 0.727*** 0.716*** 
  (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0359) 
Common nation    -0.0506 
    (0.177) 
Regional    0.490*** 
    (0.0351) 
Currency swap    0.247 
    (0.196) 
     
Observations 635,137 635,137 635,137 635,137 
R-squared 0.432 0.547 0.547 0.548 
Notes: the standard errors are clustered by the country pair and reported in 
parenthesis. The p-values reads *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
   
 Further, a cursory look to the determinants of bilateral trade in our data, we 
find that most of the coefficients have the expected signs except for commonnation 
variable that seems to have a negative impact on trade. For example, the existence of 
common border, colonial ties show an increase in trade of 78% and 91% (𝑒0.76 −
1 and𝑒1.65 − 1) respectively. The status of country been an island and land locked 
countries is also relatively important, the former boosted trade by 51% while the later 
decreases trade by 50%. Similarly, countries who share common language relatively 
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trade more by (𝑒0.71 − 1 =  74%). Our regional trade dummy coefficient depicts a 
positive and economically largeimpact of (𝑒0.49 − 1 =  63%). Of relevance to note 
that our currency swap is positive though insignificant. To ensure that our results 
obtained using OLS estimator are robust, we also estimate the Poisson as the 
alternative gravity model. Similarly, the Poisson estimator has a few desirable 
properties for applied trade policy using gravity model. Firstly, it has the usual 
properties of nonlinear maximum likelihood estimators. Second, the model is also 
consistent with fixed effects estimations, which is particularly important for theory 
consistent gravity modelling that requires inclusion of fixed effects. Moreover, 
Poisson estimator includes observations for which observed trade is zero, while such 
observations simply dropped from log of gravity since the logarithm of zero is 
undefined. Therefore, the ability of Poisson to consider zero observations is desirable 
without any variation to the basic model. The importance is reiterated because 
dropping zero observations may increase the potential problem of sample selection 
bias, which remained an important issue of concern in empirical analysis (see Silva 
and Tenreyro, 2006). This desirable property of Poisson estimator suggests the use of 
Poisson results rather than Pooled OLS. In this case, we present both Poisson 
estimates and Pooled OLS for comparable purpose and robustness check. Hence, the 
choice between the two is empirical one, for example, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
conduct a test to determine the most efficient estimator between Poisson pseudo 
maximum likelihood and Pooled OLS estimator and find a significant and robust 




Table 3: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Intuitive Gravity Estimates 
 [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] 
     
Exporter Income 0.806*** 0.850*** 0.851*** 0.834*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0198) (0.0173) (0.0166) 
Importer Expenditure 0.813*** 0.853*** 0.853*** 0.841*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0218) (0.0210) 
Distance  -0.831*** -0.873*** -0.740*** 
  (0.0445) (0.0345) (0.0298) 
Border  0.606*** 0.429*** 0.415*** 
  (0.172) (0.117) (0.104) 
Colony  0.574*** 0.161 0.229** 
  (0.0771) (0.112) (0.102) 
Island  0.544*** 0.519*** 0.548*** 
  (0.0783) (0.0784) (0.0747) 
Landlocked   -0.355*** -0.332*** 
   (0.0615) (0.0611) 
Common language   0.642*** 0.592*** 
   (0.101) (0.0926) 
Common nation   0.0398 0.00337 
   (0.483) (0.492) 
Regional    0.475*** 
    (0.0488) 
Currency swap    0.634** 
    (0.270) 
     
Observations 635,137 635,137 635,137 635,137 
R-squared 0.322 0.595 0.676 0.727 
Notes: the standard errors are clustered by the country pair and reported in parenthesis. 
The p-values reads *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Comparatively, the PPML estimates derived from the specification (9) enlisted in 
column (4) of the table (3) points to an essential difference regarding significance and 
magnitude though signs are the same. Notably, Table 3 depicts the Poisson model, 
and it fits relatively well better than the previous OLS estimator. A quick comparison 
of the R-squared reveals the later around 72 percent, compared to 54 percent for the 
former. The difference in explanatory power suggests that an alternative estimator is 
crucial to pick up significant features of the data. Similarly, the coefficient estimates 
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under Poisson are statistically different compared with the Pooled OLS. For example, 
almost all the coefficients are smaller in absolute value, and this mainly reflects the 
probable impact of heteroskedasticity on the Pooled OLS estimates. Most of the 
covariates in table 3 are statistically significant with expected signs. The distance 
estimates are also statistically significant relatively at the conventional level and 
approximately equal to benchmark estimates of minus one as documented in Head 
and Mayer (2014). Thisconfirms that distance poses a significant impediment to 
bilateral trade. In addition, the impact of common border, language, nation and 
colonial ties on trade are positive and statistically significant consistent with the 
literature. Income and expenditure estimates are close to one as expected, positive and 
statistically significant predicted mainly by structural gravity equation. One key 
possible explanation that may account for the unit elasticity of income and 
expenditure covariates is dynamic forces in the panel set up (see Yotov et al., 2016; 
and Olivero and Yotov, 2012). Estimates of bilateral currency swap obtained from the 
specification (10) and (9) are reported in table 2 and the PPML counterpart in table 3 
respectively. The notable difference that stands out reveals a positive effect of the 
Pooled OLS results in table 2, but statistically insignificant. While the Poisson 
estimates in column (5) of table 3 reveala positive, economically substantive, and 
statistically significant impact of currency swap on trade. Thisimplies that countries 
that join China’s bilateral currency swap trade more by 87% (𝑒0.63 − 1) compared to 
the absence of the currency swap agreement.  
4.2 Addressing Potential Endogeneity Bias 
 In the estimation of the gravity model, we must give attention to the likely 
problem of endogeneity, more especially the inclusion of policy variable in the model. 
From an econometric consideration, the existence endogeneity violates the 
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orthogonality assumption of pooled OLS, by creating a correlation between the right-
hand variables and the error term. The potential sources of endogeneity bias of the 
right-hand side variable’s coefficient estimates fall under omitted variable bias, 
simultaneity bias, and measurement error (see Wooldridge, 2002), believing that these 
factors can severely be a potential source of bias caused by the RMB-trade policy 
(swap line).20Similarly, reverse causality can ensue as another source of this type 
econometric problem. For instance, the accession trade policy like the renminbi 
currency swap may be determined by the degree of country’s overall integration in 
the global markets. Similarly, open economies have incentives to subscribe more to 
liberal policies, in this case, one has to be cautious in drawing firm conclusion about 
the impact of such kind of policies on trade.Baier and Bergstrand (2004) empirically 
examine the economic determinants of RTAs and show that there is a robust cross-
sectional evidence that most countries select well their partners, say country pairs are 
signing RTAs to some extent share some economic traits capable of enhancing the 
benefit of RTAs. Indeed, it is reasonable to note that there remains large unobserved 
heterogeneity, for example, suppose exporting firms from a given country suffers 
from inadequate sources of financing their business activity, because international 
trade requires additional cost such as shipping, foreign exchange risk among others. 
Here the anticipated gains from bilateral currency swap between China its 
counterparts would be substantial, and therefore, governments of countries with this 
type of weak financial depth would be more likely to select into the swap line. 
Similarly, as shown in Aizenman (2011) countries use the swap line as a way of 
complimenting reserves to guide against the unforeseen contingency of illiquidity or 
                                                                
20This issue endogeneity of trade policy in the trade literature can be trace since (Trefler, 1993). 
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complimenting some fiscal spending in infrastructure since the swap funds are not 
restricted to trade financing. 
 In fact, these traits are unobservable to the econometrician, these factors may 
likely correlate with decision into Renminbi swap line. In this sense, swap line and 
goal of complimenting reserves of fiscal spending may exhibit a positive correlation 
in the cross-section of the data butcreate a negative error term ϵij,t, in the gravity 
equation, and the swap line coefficient may be underestimated. Also, assuming 
unobserved cultural or historical features shared between China and its swap 
counterparts increase concomitantly with trade flows and the likelihood of entering 
into a bilateral swap agreement, by reducing cost-related barriers compared to when 
this type of corporation does not exist, this will make the estimated coefficients to 
exhibit upward bias. Since we care about the consistency, efficiency, and unbiased-
ness of our coefficient estimates, it is important to note that failure to account for 
potential endogeneity of 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡, may bias our gravity estimates. Comparable to other 
trade policy analysis like currency unions (CUs), free trade agreements (FTAs), our 
approach of dealing with the problem follows that of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) to 
address some of the endogeneity in FTA regressions: they propose the use panel data 
with country-pair fixed effects and country-time fixed effects or using first differenced 
panel with country-and-time fixed effects. Showing that the inclusion of country-pair 
fixed effects or differencing the data removes the bias attributed to the omission of 
the unobserved variables affecting bilateral trade and the explaining variable 
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(𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡membership dummy) which also considers the endogeneity related to selection, 
since it’s mainly a cross-sectional issue.21 
Table 4: Structural Gravity Estimates  











      
Currency Swap 1.714*** 1.409*** 1.409*** 1.578*** 1.520*** 
 (0.198) (0.199) (0.199) (0.0612) (0.0747) 
 (0.0195)     
Currency Swapt−4     0.313*** 
 
 
    (0.0684) 
 
Observations 564,384 564,384 562,647 562,647 562,647 
R-squared 0.713 0.689 0.689 0.672 0.678 
Notes: the standard errors are clustered by the country pair and reported in parenthesis. 
The p-values reads *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 Table 4 reports the estimates of structural gravity model with some controls, 
column (2) depicted results when bilateral fixed effects were included, i.e., both 
exporter-time and importer-time respectively in the specification (6). To obtain theory 
consistent estimates, these terms are particularly relevantto account for both outward 
and inward multilateral resistant terms properly and more inclusively to absorb other 
                                                                
21 Using a cross section data, instrumental variable method is one of the recommended econometric 
approach to address the endogeneity problem. However, no exogenous, strong and reliable instrument 
are available. For example, (Magge, 2003; and Baier and Bergstrand 2004) were among the early 
studies that instruments with little success. Magge (2003) conclude, “We should be cautious in using 
gravity equation estimates to draw strong conclusions the effect of PTA on trade.” Similarly, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) surveyed and summarize most of the existing findings of IV studies, at best, they 
found mixed evidence in trying to isolate the effect of FTAs on trade flows. However, same authors 
argued that one could draw strong and reliable influence about the average treatment effect of FTAs 
on trade using panel data. Particularly using country-pair fixed effects and first differencing eliminates 
or account for the likely unobserved linkages between the endogenous trade policy covariates and the 
error in the gravity regression. Egger and Nigai (2015) and Agnosteva et al. (2014) show that the 
country-pair fixed effects will absorb all bilateral time invariant covariates and therefore, account for 
any unobservable time invariant trade cost components, they argued that pair-fixed effects are a better 




unobservable characteristics that are exporter and importer specific likely to influence 
bilateral trade. We noted earlier failure to account for the endogeneity of 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡might 
bias the gravity estimates. Column (3) and (4) reports results that are augmented by 
pair fixed effects in the gravity equation to control for endogeneity in line with the 
specification (6) via alternative estimators (OLS and the PPML). The estimated 
coefficient of the 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡 variable is statistically significant and positive as much large 
as 1.409 and 1.578 in absolute value for the pooled OLS and PPML estimation results 
respectively, though with a difference from the specification that imposes time fixed 
effect. Thissuggests that all else equal, currency swap formation leads to an average 
increase in trade of [exp(1.578)-1] = 3.80 more than three times with members, though 
the magnitude is reasonablylarge but empirically closer to other existing findings of 
other type of international agreements in the literature. Column 3 of table 5 depict the 
results of the restricted sample (1990 – 2013) of the structural gravity estimates, all 
else constant currency swap increase trade at least three times [exp(1.286)-1] = 3.61.  
4.3 Strict Exogeneity Test for Potential “Reverse Causality” Between Trade and 
Currency Swap  
 We set to test equation (6) for the possibility of reverse causality because 
obtaining a reliable estimate is our major concern within the gravity model.22 The 
trade policy 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡, may suffer from reverse causality type of endogeneity i.e., 
assuming, all else constant, a country might choose to liberalize its trade with a trading 
partner that is hitherto a significant partner. This is known as the natural trading 
partner hypothesis. Therefore, we tend to have feedback from trade to our trade policy 
variable (swap) which is opposite to prior expectation. Through the pair fixed effects, 





we further implement the strict exogeneity test of 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡by adding a new future level 
of swaps, 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1, to specification (6) (Wooldridge, 2002; and Baier and Bergstrand, 
2007). Suppose the swap line variable is exogenous to trade flows, the coefficient of 
the parameter associated to𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1, should be statistically and economically different 
from zero. If this is true, swap line is uncorrelated with the concurrent level of trade 
flow, which is suggestive of confirming the absence of this type endogeneity. 
ln(𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡)   =  𝜋𝐼,𝑡 +  𝜒𝑗,𝑡  + 𝜇𝑖𝑗   +   𝜌4𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡  +   𝜌5𝜆
′
𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1   +   𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡(10) 
  
 In column (5) of table 5 we show the results of specification (10) that considers 
reverse causality between trade and currency swap agreement (trade policy) through 
pair fixed effects. This assessment is implemented through strict exogeneity test of 





exogenous to trade flows the parameter associated with the future level of currency 
swap in specification (10) should not be different from zero. Our result from the strict 
exogeneity test depicts a value that is economically and statistically not different from 
zero, which confirms the absence of reverse causality in the results related to 
specification (10). Therefore, it means future changes in currency swap has no 
significant effect on trade flows. Similarly, our panel estimates in the first difference 
that uses exporter-time and importer-time and pair fixed effects were negative though 




4.4 Accounting for “Phasing in” Effect of Swap Line and Lagged Terms Trade 
Effects  
 We conjecture that swap line may exhibit phase in effect on trade in the 
manner of free trade agreements. For example, (Anderson and Yotov, 2011; and Baier 
and Bergstrand 2007) argued that free trade agreement has a strong phase in effect 
due to its institutional nature, and therefore capturing the lagged changes of FTA on 
trade provides more information about the impact. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show 
that the entire economic treatment effect is hardly measured wholly in the concurrent 
year of which FTA came into force, and typical FTA “phase in” over ten years. 
Moreover, this type of agreements tends to alter terms of trade, is well known in the 
large empirical literature on international economics; terms of trade changes tend to 
have lagged effects on trade volumes. For instance, FTA entered legally in 2000 may 
not yield impact on the trade until 2010. In accounting for the phase in effect of this 
type of agreement, three lagged terms for the bilateral swap agreements are imposed 
in equation (11) with four years interval. 








𝑖𝑗,𝑡−12 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
 (11) 
  
The motivation for the choice of alternative panel methodologies relied on conceptual 
and empirical grounds. We apply fixed effects estimation rather random effects 
estimations based on the following argument. Wooldridge (2002, p.252) show that in 
econometric parlance random effect is equivalent to assuming a zero correlation 
between the observed explanatory variable, say in our case the swap variable and the 
unobserved heterogeneity say 𝑣𝑖𝑗, and that a strong conditional mean independence 
assumption is required to fully justify the statistical inference. In most applied 
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papers𝑣𝑖𝑗 , or the individual random effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variable, which seems implausible in gravity equation. However, in the 
gravity equation the unobserved time invariant bilateral trade flows. Since the 
unobserved effect 𝑣𝑖𝑗 , are likely correlated with our policy variable (swap), therefore, 
bilateral fixed effects estimations best control for any unobservable effects in the 
gravity equation (see Baier and Bergtrand, 2007; Anderson and Yotov, 2011; Egger 
and Nigai, 2015 and Egger, 2003). Empirically, recent econometric investigation of 
the gravity equation using panel data revealed a striking evidence for the rejection of 
random effect gravity model in comparison to a fixed effects model, which applies 
the use of country-pair fixed effects. In addition, Wooldridge (2002, p.284) offer 
standard econometric discussions on the choice of fixed effect and first differencing 
estimations especially in the treatment of the endogeneity problem. Showing that the 
choice of fixed effects or first differencing hinges on the assumption of the 
idiosyncratic term, ϵij,t.  The fixed effectestimator is more efficient under the 
assumption that the error term ϵij,t are serially uncorrelated, when (T) exceed two. On 
the Other hand, first difference estimator is more efficient when ϵij,t, is assume follow 
a random walk (i.e., the difference in the error term follow a white noise,  ϵij,t − ϵij,t−1) 
when T > 2. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) shows first differencing panel data has some 
merits over fixed effects. For example, it is quite plausible and foreseeable that the 
unobserved effects in trade flows, and ϵij,t,  exhibit contemporaneous correlation 
overtime. Given the high serial correlation, the inefficiency of fixed effects 
exacerbates, as T gets larger. In this case, first differencing the data enhance the 
efficiency of our estimation. Similarly, using fixed effects is almost equivalent to 
differencing the data around the mean, and this is problematic, as Targets large in our 
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panel, because the data may tend to follow unit root process, and cause the problem 
of spurious regression. Using first differencing yields data that departs from the 
previous period of our panel, which is close to unit root process. Nevertheless, 
choosing between these methods is difficult, therefore, as a form of robustness check, 
reporting both methods will offer reassuring estimates.23 
 The results in Table 5 somewhat corroborates those obtained from Table 4. 
More so, the impact of phase-in agreement was realize as captured by  
Currency Swapt−4 variable in the second row of Table 4 and 5 respectively, which 
means that the bilateral currency swap agreement manifested a mild impact on trade 
[exp(0.3)-1 = 34%] four years from the RMB-swap inception. 
 










      
Currency swap 0.740*** 1.229** 3.078*** 0.740** 0.676*** 
 (0.0969) (0.612) (0.269) (0.0969) (0.116) 
      
Observations 22,980 22,984 22,984 22,980 22,980 
R-squared 0.671 0.619 0.643 0.611 0.622 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 It is important to note that the positive and highly significant effects of the 
currency swap (RMB-trade policy) found are relatively in accordance with the 
impacts of other kind of trade agreements like the Currency Union (CU). In studies 
such as Glick and Rose (2016) who found a fairly large impact currency union on 
trade in the magnitude of 114%. Earliest literature began with Rose (2001) that found 
triple effects CUs on trade,though this sound suspiciously large, and preceded 
                                                                
23Wooldridge (2003) recommends reporting results using both. However, if the number of periods is 
large enough; first differencing is likely to be more efficient especially when the error terms exhibit 
substantial positive serial correlation.  
62 
 
empirical findings even set out a more dampeningeffect. For example, Glick and Rose 
(2002) responded with a larger data sets, and still found that currency unions double 
trade even with the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects.24  Thom and Walsh (2002) 
took into consideration several CU exits and argued that omitted variable bias lingers, 
such as wars of independence and communist takeovers. Klein and Shambaugh (2006) 
found a striking evidence that hard currency pegs have a more significant impact on 
trade than currency unions and show that indirect pegs do not affect trade. Baeir and 
Bergstrand (2007) addressed econometrically the endogeneity of free trade 
agreements (FTAs), and further demonstrate that control function and instrumental 
variable techniques over time do not workreasonably well for endogeneity, but panel 
data does. Accounting econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs, they found yet 
another striking empirical evidence of quintupled impact of FTAs on trade flows. 
Similarly, accounting for phase-in effect on the average FTAs doubles members’ 
bilateral trade after ten years. Barro and Tenreyro (2007) relied on the use of some 
geographic instrumental variables technique and found that CUs increases trade up to 
14 folds. Baldwin (2006) discussed several reasons why the more significant impact 
of currency union on trade may likely be suspicious and concluded that on the average 
Euro increased trade in the magnitude of 5-10%. More so, Bun and Klaassen (2007) 
incorporate dynamic controls to shrink the high impact of currency union on trade, 
and the effect is still relatively substantial at 25%.  Campbell (2013) also apparently 
showed the impact of currency unions on trade to have declined over ten years. The 
findings were the sensitive to exclusion of the CU observations coterminous with 
                                                                
24The findings of Rose (2000) was so robust and remarkable, in 2005 Harvard’s Jeffrey Frankel called 
the large and significant impact of currency union on trade the most significant finding in international 
macroeconomics in the preceding 10 years. Rose himself has this to say “I have always maintained that 
the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large….” 
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some political events or missing data. Similarly, the paper included UK colony time 
trend, thus accounting for the negative pre-trend, one could find a point estimates of 
currency unions on trade that is negative and insignificant. The mixed findings in the 
literature of currency unions made Glick and Rose (2016) respond again with updated 
data set from 1997 to 2013 and considering some modifications such as switches of 
around 423 compared to 136 in Glick and Rose (2002).  
 Nonetheless, some level of doubt lingers, Nitsch (2005) found the absence 
impact for currency union entries on trade. Similarly, for dollarization episode, Klein 
(2005) found that their no strong evidence that dollarized countries of western 
hemisphere have seen an increase in trade with the United States. Also, Santos and 
Tenreyro (2009) showed that euro has no effect on trade, using meta-analysis 
Havranek (2010) found a great deal of publication bias for euro studies, and a low 
impact of 3.8% compared to old 60% for non-euro episodes. We allow for non-linear 
effects of λ′andattempt to capture the possibility that the effects of λ′ variable may 
change over time, results are based on the specification (11), and we impose three lags 
with four years interval up to 12 years of the currency swap agreement. At a glance, 
column (5) of table 4 shows the estimated coefficients λ′ at lag four. While lag eight 
and twelve were not different from zero, and we omit the values for brevity. Notably, 
the results suggest a relatively mild average treatment effects of λ′ over the first four 
years from the inception of the bilateral currency swap of China (RMB-trade policy). 
Hence, the effects 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡  maintain significance over four years after the 
commencement of the RMB-trade policy which explains that currency swap (RMB-





4.5 Trade-Diversion Effect of Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement 
 Our econometric specification that investigates trade diversion effect of RMB 
currency swap agreement of China follows Ghosh and Yamarik (2004), Dai, et al. 
(2014), Baier and Bergstrand (2007) that seek to identify the impact of FTAs on trade 
flows which generally based on gravity model. The approach fits the recent 
development in the application of empirical gravity to account for multilateral 
resistant term which had proven efficiency in the prediction of trade flows. The 
framework is given by: 
 








 ]  +  𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡(12) 
 
Here, ln(Xij,t), is the bilateral trade between partners i and j at time t. πi,t,is a set of 
timevarying exporter (destination) fixed effects. They also control for all 
unobservable inward multilateral resistances including all total expenditure in line 
with structural model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In similar vein, 
χj,t,indicates all set of time varying exporter (source) fixed effects, which also account 
for outward multilateral resistances and total shipments form the structural gravity 
model. Consequently, μij, represent a set country-pair fixed effects that follow Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), are utilized to address endogeneity of bilateral currency swap. 
While lnYi,  lnEj, and  lnΓ
′
ij,tcaptures the economic sizes and all trade cost related 
variables conventional considered within the intuitive gravity structure. To robustly 
confirm our empirical investigation on trade diversion and trade-creation effects we 
adopt both the intuitive and structural economic gravity as in specification (12) and 
(13) using the PPML estimator. 












 We include two set of zero-one dummy variables to depict whether two trading 
partners are join the RMB swap agreement in year t, 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑛
,or whether only one trading 
partner has joined, 𝜆′𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑝
. These dummies allow us to isolate. 















Currency Swap 1.974*** 1.681*** 1.681*** 1.823*** 1.775*** 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.203) (0.101) (0.118) 
TD_Swap 1.968*** 1.697*** 1.697*** 1.805*** 1.804*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0542) (0.0542) (0.0781) (0.0781) 
Currency Swapt−4     0.256*** 
     (0.0954) 
      
Observations 731,826 731,826 730,063 730,063 730,063 
R-squared 0.687 0.690 0.6541 0.711 0.685 
Notes: the standard errors are clustered by the country pair and reported in parenthesis. 
The p-values reads *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
three effects swaps may exert on the level of trade flows.25  In effect, a positive 




captures trade creation among the swap recipients, 
while trade diversion is suggestive of negative coefficient in λ′𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡
.Table B8in the 
appendix report the results of the intuitive gravity equation without country-pair fixed 
effects, this is to allow us to compare the alternative variation in specification 13 to 
gauge the robustness of the findings. The coefficients of the intuitive gravity relatively 
                                                                
25See Anderson (2001) for in depth review of the theoretical foundation of economic gravity. Our 
analysis follows the literature of FTAs for our empirical investigation of bilateral currency configured 
as a form of trade policy (Frankel 1997; Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2004; and Baier 
and Bargstrand, 20007). Recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) utilize a gravity set up with fixed 
effects and successfully account for the endogeneity of FTAs. They showed that on the average, FTAs 
doubles member countries trade with phase-in effect of ten years. Similarly, Anderson and Yotov (2011) 
use structural gravity model to estimate terms of trade and efficiency gains form FTAs in the world. 
The central objective of this paper is to obtain trade diversion and trade-creation effects of a newly 




have the expected signs as shown in Table 6 in the appendix. Equation (13) is used 
following the recommendation Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we estimate an 
alternative model using Poisson Pseudo Maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator to 
account for the pattern of heteroskedasticity imbedded in trade data. The gravity 
equation provides an avenue for revealed evidence of trade diversion through an ex-
post analysis of trade flow. Our empirical results confirm that RMB bilateral currency 
swap network is trade-creating, without evidence of trade diversion. Specifically, we 
find that RMB bilateral currency swap network rarely divert the trade signatories to 
the swap agreement away from the non-member countries. Specification 13 in Table 
7 maintains that bilateral currency swap have significant effects on trade creation, this 
is evidenced by the positive signs of both currency swap and TD_swapwith magnitude 
of [exp(1.775)-1] = 4.9and [exp(1.804)-1] = 5.07 respectively.26  
                                                                




FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MEASURES AND TRADE FLOWS IN THE 
LIGHT OF CHINA’S CENTRAL BANK BILATERAL CURRENCY SWAP 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The spread of Central Bank foreign currency swap since the financial crisis of 
2007 has received substantial recognition around the global economy amongst Central 
Banks (Aizenman et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016; Destais, 2016; Aizenman et al., 2008; 
Kwon, 2015; Liao and McDowell, 2015; and Aizenman et al., 2010). The agreement 
allows a Central Bank in one country to exchange currency, usually its domestic 
currency, for a determined amount of foreign currency from the Peoples’ Bank of 
China (PBOC). While the recipient Central Bank offer lending facility to its domestic 
banks from the foreign currency obtained from the provider (Peoples’ Bank of China 
(PBOC)) on its own predetermined terms and conditions and risk. Swaps involving 
the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBOC) were one of the most important and rapidly 
growing swap networks as a response to the 2007 global financial crisis (Lin et al., 
2016 and Lai, E. L., and Yu, X. 2015). It is not yet clear to what extent this sort of 
interaction of between currency swap and trade is driven by the financial development 
of both the recipient and provider country, while it is equally relevant to understand 
financial development and trade within the currency swap network. Similarly, a large 
empirical literature has established the importance of financial development for 
growth, trade performance and equity of economies, at the same time fragile and 
overleveraged financial system perhaps brings about major crisis as experienced in 
2007 (Cihák M., Demirgüç-Kunt A., Feyen E. and Levine R. 2013). First, our 
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empirical investigation seeks to assess the extent to which the mixture of financial 
institutions and markets exerts influence on trade. In the bid to examine whether too 
much or little finance drives the bilateral currency swap agreement, we visually 
inspect the graphical plots of financial development index for the 27 RMB currency 
swap recipients in both advanced and emerging economies. The data depicts that their 
financial structure differs markedly (see Figure 3).27 Therefore, the assessment of the 
depth (size), access (activity), and efficiency of the financial system is fundamental in 
shedding light on what lies behind the bilateral currency swap agreement, trade and 
overall financial development.28  Secondly, currency swaps usage provides buffer 
against financial crisis in recent time. Which allows countries that subscribe to the 
arrangement to boost liquidity access in their financial systems. Therefore, it is 
important to assess financial development of these economies in terms of the 
fundamental functions of the financial system: (1) producing and processing 
information about possible investments and allocation of capital; (2) monitoring 
individuals and firms in the exertion of corporate governance; (3) facilitation of trade 
and risk management and diversification; (4) pooling and mobilizing savings; and (5) 
the degree with which exchange of goods, services and financial instruments is carried 
out with ease (Cihák, et al., 2013 and Svirydzenka, 2016). Moreover, financial 
institutions and markets across the globe differ markedly in the way they provide these 
vital financial services. In this manner, it will be relevant to understand and shed light 
on the underlying state of the economies that subscribe the cross-currency swap line 
(RMB swap line) since 2008 as a form of international financial derivative. Thus, the 
Peoples’ Bank of Chinas’ (PBOC’s) RMB swap line and the counterparties 
                                                                
27The proper assessment and understanding of the financial systemsare at the core of a robust analysis 
of macroeconomic fundamentals (see Svirydzenka, 2016). 
28This informs the question do financial institutions and markets development matter for trade? 
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(signatories) to the agreement will be the focal point of our empirical investigation, in 
terms of financial development and trade openness. 
 This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study which tackles the 
issue of financial development and trade in the light of Central Bank bilateral currency 
swap network by highlighting the role of financial institutions and market size (depth), 
activity (access), and efficiency. In addition, we seek to overcome the drawback in 
major empirical work that largely focus on ratio of private credit to GDP as a key 
proxy of financial development (see Kiendrebeogo, 2012; Arcand, Berkes, and 
Panizza, 2011 and Cavallo and Scartascini, 2012). Recently, Cihák M., Demirgüç-
Kunt A., Feyen E. and Levine R. (2013), Svirydzenka (2016) introduces and expanded 
version of financial development and recent trend in the database structure of 
development in financial institutions and markets across countries. The database 
provides measures of size, access, and efficiency of financial institution (such as banks 
and insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds) and financial markets 
(including stock markets, bond markets, and derivative markets) exert a powerful 
influence on trade and investment, growth and economic development, poverty 
alleviation, and economic stability (Levine, 2004 and Cihák et al., 2012). These new 
measures of financial development more comprehensively capture differences in the 
domestic financial system across countries and time.29 Thus, we seek to enhance our 
understanding on the relationship between trade and financial development in the light 
                                                                
29World and IMF database provides statistics on size, activity, and efficiency of banks and non-banks, 
equity markets and bonds markets across abroad range of countries. More so, it contains many 
indicators of financial globalization that include statistics on international bond issues, international 
loans offshore deposits and remittance flows. The database is drawn on a wide array of primary sources 
that cover several dimensions of the financial system(http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance). 
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of Chinas’ bilateral swap network in different countries with diverse of financial 
system within the framework of panel data.30 
5.2 Literature Review 
 In both theoretical and empirical literature financial development and the 
degree of international trade openness are among key variables the economic growth 
literature highlights as being highly connected with growth performance across 
countries (e.g. Beck et al., 2002; 2000; Beck 2002; Demetriades and Andrianova, 
2004; Darrat et al., 2006; Ductor and Grechyna, 2015; Levine, 2003; Guariglia and 
Ponchet 2008 and Levine, 1997). An important source of financial development 
documented in the small but growing literature is trade openness. The related literature 
focuses on two variable relation between trade openness and financial development 
as in “Braun and Raddaiz, 2005; Do and Levchenko, 2004; Mishikin, 2009; and Beck, 
2002”. Trade openness greatly differs in the world’s most open and least open 
countries. For example, Argentina, one of the relatively least open economies 
witnessed a trade volume of some 20% as a percentage of GDP compared to Singapore 
that had around 440% over the period of 1971 – 2010. For example, the average 
financial development as traditionally measured by the domestic credit private sector 
(% of GDP) is apparently more than 22 times higher in the most financially developed 
country like Japan in comparison to least developed such as Ghana (see Kiendrebeogo, 
2012). 
 Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggests that empirical findings based on the two-
variable relationship are likely to be misleading and invariably incomplete. 
Furthermore, the Rajan and Zingales studies suggested three variable relationship 
                                                                
30We depart from the realization that financial development affects trade patterns, the paper poses the 
question: will external finance through RMB bilateral currency swap matter for international trade. 
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among financial development, trade openness and financial openness. Particularly, 
they maintained that trade openness without financial openness may not yield higher 
financial development and they verified the hypothesis using data for 24 industrialized 
countries from the span of 1913 – 1999. Rajan and Zingales (2003) utilizes the interest 
group theory to benchmark their findings. Their results argued that Interest groups, 
particularly industrial and financial incumbents perhaps stand to lose from financial 
development. Since financial development provides new opportunities for new entrant 
firms into the market, this propels competition and erodes the incumbents’ interests. 
They argued that financial development will be weaker when the economy is open to 
trade and finance. 
 Baltagi et al. (2009) verifies the Rajan Zingales’s (2003) hypothetical assertion 
using data drawn for both developing and industrialized countries. They show the 
interactive effects of trade and financial openness on financial development in 
investigating the dual openness hypothesis. The interaction between trade openness, 
financial openness and trade can be used to investigate the marginal effect of 
increasing trade (financial) openness on financial development conditional on 
financial (trade) openness.  
 In addition, the financial system is considered as an endowment and therefore 
disparities across country lead to different levels of trade performance. With identical 
technology and factor endowments between countries, comparative cost varies when 
countries differ in their respective institution of credit enforcement (see Kiendrebeogo, 
2012). Since financial services provided by the endogenous financial systems are 
unique across countries, and as such the pattern of industrial specialization is 
influenced by the level of financial intermediation. Recently, theoretical 
developments on the relationship between finance and international trade patterns 
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underpins the relevance of external finance in production (see for example Beck, 2002; 
Manova, 2006; Matsuyama, 2005; and Antras and Caballero, 2009). Similarly, many 
studies find that international trade is largely propelled by financial development 
(Manova, 2006; Becker and Greenberg, 2007; and Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005). 
Recently a growing body of literature underscore that the demand for a well-
developed financial center is higher in countries with industrial structures that heavily 
depends on external finance. In contrast, demand for external finance tends to be lower 
in countries that specialize in goods that do not require external finance (Huang and 
Temple, 2005; Klein and Olivei, 2008; and Baltagi et al., 2009).   
 Furthermore, in this strand of empirical literature, except for Kiendrebeogo, 
(2012) and Ju and Wei (2011), less emphasis has been placed on the relevance of 
institutions in relation to finance and trade. Ju and Wei (2011) develop a general 
equilibrium framework and show that finance is passive in countries with relatively 
high-quality institutions and seems to be an important source of comparative 
advantage for countries with low-quality institutions. Kiendrebeogo, (2012) argued 
that countries with high quality institutions makes transaction in financial and goods 
markets better cleared owing to better information and increased competition. 
Similarly, when shareholders and property rights are well secured firms tend to have 
improved levels of governance and greater efficiency in the allocation of productive 
resources. Thus, higher quality of institutions might enhance perceived positive 
impact of financial development on international trade flows (Huang and Temple, 
2005; Klein and Olivei, 2008). 
 More so, a recent expanding literature stresses the impact of financial markets 
and institutions on economic development and allocation of productive economic 
activities (Levine, 1997; Baltagi et al., 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). The 
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studies show that a well-functioning financial system constitutes a potential 
mechanism for economic growth. Especially, where information related to profitable 
projects, diversifying risks, lesser liquidity risks, rationing the allocation of resources 
towards more productive utilization, resource mobilization and corporate monitoring. 
In addition, a well-functioning financial system enhances capital formation and 
efficiency in the allocation, promotion of resources, and consequently higher 
economic growth (see Hondroyiannis et al., 2005; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 
1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; and Beck and Levine, 
2004). Finance constraints prevent less developed countries from taking full 
advantage of technology transfer and that leads to divergent growth rate. Less 
developed countries with underdeveloped financial system are trapped into a vicious 
circle, where deficient financial development leads to low economic performance and 
in turn more deficient financial development (Aghion et al., 2005 and Fung, 2009).  
 In contrast, economies with a well-developed financial system tend to have a 
faster growth and consequently finance is not only pro-growth but also pro-poor 
economies suggesting that financial development can serve well the less developed 
economies to catch up with the rest of the world (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009; 
Baltagi et al., 2009; Niroomand et al., 2014; and Menyah et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
the theory of endogenous growth as articulated by Greenwood and Javanovic (1990) 
and Bencivenga and Bruce (1991) among others maintained that financial 
development is a vital factor in strengthening long run growth given that finance helps 
in fostering growth via efficient intertemporal allocation of resources, technological 
innovation and capital accumulation.31 Similarly, cross country evidence establishes 
                                                                
31Moreover, several empirical and theoretical studies analyzed finance growth nexus and provides 
more supportive evidence. For example, the theoretical model in Blackburn and Hung (1998) and 
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the coexistence of positive long run and negative short run relationship between trade 
flows and financial development as in Loayaza and Ranciere (2006) and Kim (2010). 
 The negative short run impact was linked to financial fragility and the positive 
effect to long run impacts of financial liberalization. In addition, the study further 
investigates the dual role of financial liberalization effects on heterogenous long and 
short run responses of trade openness to financial development. Supposing that 
financial intermediation affects trade openness this perhaps offer one mechanism 
through which the impact of financial development exerts influences on long run 
growth and short run fluctuation of economic activities. Levine (2004) stressed that 
financial development is accompanied by the enhancement of production ex ante 
information on possible investment opportunities, pooling savings, mobilization and 
exchange of goods and services for efficient utilization of resources and this influence 
trade flows and translates into growth. 
5.3 Data Measurement and Stylized Facts 
 This section describes the data employed in the empirical analysis. We 
consider six different measures of financial development namely, financial 
institutions size (depth) (FID), access (activity) (FIA), and efficiency (FIE) and 
financial markets size (depth) (FMD) access (activity) (FMA), and efficiency (FME). 
The six sub-indices measure how deep, accessible, and efficient financial markets and 
institutions are overall across countries and time. In addition, these sub-indices are 
aggregated into a higher-level sub-indices FI and FM, which captures how developed 
financial institutions and markets are across the globe. Overall, FI and FM sub-indices 
are aggregated into the overall measure of financial development (FD index). We 
                                                                




compile data from IMF database for the analyses of the effects of trade openness on 
these different measures of financial development in 27 countries that signed China’s 
currency swap network over the span of 1980 to 2013 obtained from IMF’s 
international financial statistics database. Similarly, we use the respective economic 
sizes (GDP) and per capita income of these economies. Trade openness (TO) depict 
the degree to which countries allow trade with other countries measured by the ratio 
of total trade (i.e., exports plus imports) to the nominal GDP in each country. In the 
data set, trade data relies on the direction of trade statistics (DOTs), real GDP come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
5.4 Measures of Financial Development 
 The debate about financial development and trade-cum growth is yet unsettled. 
One central concern relates to the question whether there is too much financial 
development, or too little. Also, can economists measure it well? Arcand, Berkes, and 
Panizza (2011), used the private credit to GDP to examine whether there is too much 
finance; and Cavallo and Scartascini (2012) pointed out that several countries still 
have too little finance. Čihák et al. (2012) argued that the commonly used measures 
of financial development are poor proxies of the functioning of the financial system. 
Traditionally, the researchers often focused on the ratio of private credit to GDP in 
measuring financial development. For example, suppose one visit a doctor for a 
medical check-up usually involves one being weighed. Weight could provide a useful 
information that may indicate something about the persons’ eating habit, exercise, and 
other behaviors. However, this is not enough basis to assess the overall persons’ 
medical state, health and wellbeing. Normally, Doctors resort to measure pulse, 
temperature and a series of other vital medical examination to well establish the 
person health. Although this seems fine, however, looking only at the ratio of private 
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credit to GDP does not provide adequate and sufficient yardstick for the assessment 
of financial development. But doing so, would be equivalent to the analogy of 
“weighing in” at a Doctor’s office at first glance. The ratio of private credit to GDP is 
an essential form of credit available and an important category of financial of service. 
 The ratio of private credit to GDP also captures the size of banks’ loan book 
relative to the economic size (output), yet this does not say anything about the 
financial sector and its stability. However, focusing only on one characteristic 
(financial depth) would mean missing out some vital aspect of financial system. 
Apparently, a large amount of credit may not tally with the broader use of financial 
sizes, since the credit spread can be skewed among the largest firms and wealthy 
entrepreneurs (Cihák, et al., 2013 and Svirydzenka, 2016). Figure 2 shows the use of 
formal accounts been imperfectly correlated with the common measure of financial 
depth. For instance, Vietnam has a very high domestic credit to the private sector 
corresponding to 125% of GDP, but only 21% of adults possess formal account. 
Conversely, an economy may have relatively modest financial depth (private credit to 
GDP at 56%) like Czech Republic but have high financial access i.e. relatively high 
account penetration amounting to (81% adults have access to finance). Therefore, this 
suggested that financial depth and financial access or inclusion are distinct 
characteristics and dimensions of financial development (Cihák, et al., 2013). Similar 
vein, a financial system can be deep without inclusivity and providing access to all. 
More so, figure 2 also indicates the absence of significant correlation between 
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Most often researchers lack solid measures of the degree to which financial system 
perform its functions. Beck et al. (2010), Cihák, et al. (2013), World Bank (2012) and 
Svirydzenka (2016) introduced financial development and incorporated in the both 
IMF and World Bank database structure, which presents the expanded and updated 
trends in structure and development of financial institution and markets across time 
and countries. The database provides new multi-dimensional measure of financial 
development that comprises size (depth) of financial institutions and markets, degree 
of which individuals do use financial services (access), and efficiency of financial 
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transactions (efficiency) of the financial system (see Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, 
and Levine 2013). All the newly constructed dimensions of the financial development 
measured both financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies and 
financial markets such as bond and stock markets take account of the overall financial 
system.  
Table 1: 3 x 2 Matrix of Financial System Characteristics 
 
Financial Institutions  Financial Markets  
Depth Private credit to GDP  
Pension fund to GDP  
Mutual fund to GDP 
Insurance premiums, (life  
and non-life to GDP 
Gross value-added of the 
financial sector to GDP   
Stock market capitalization 
plus outstanding domestic 
private debt securities to GDP 
Private debt securities to GDP  
Public debt securities to GDP  
International debt securities to GDP  
Stock market capitalization to GDP  
Stocks traded to GDP   
Access Accounts per thousand 
adults (commercial banks) 
Branches per 100,000 adults 
(commercial banks)  
% of people with a bank 
account  
% of firms with line of credit 
(all firms)  
% of firms with line of credit 
(small firms)  
Percent of market capitalization 
outside of top 10 largest companies  
Percent of value traded outside of 
top 10 traded companies  
Government bond yields (3 
month and 10 years) Ratio of 
domestic to total debt securities  
Ratio of private to total debt 
securities (domestic) Ratio of new 
corporate bond issues to GDP  
Efficiency Net interest margin  
Lending-deposits spread  
Non-interest income to total 
income   
Overhead costs (% of total 
assets)  
Profitability (return on assets, 
return on equity) Boone 
indicator (or Herfindahl or H-
statistics)   
Turnover ratio 
(turnover/capitalization) for stock 
market  
Price synchronicity (co-movement)  
Private information trading  
Price impact  
Liquidity/transaction costs  
Quoted bid-ask spread for 
government bonds  
Turnover of bonds (private, public) 
on securities exchange Settlement 
efficiency  
Source: Calculations based on the Global Financial Development Database and 




 The matrix above in table 1 contains a subset measures of financial 
development for the dimensions defined the 3x2 matrix. The measures were 
highlighted in bold. The financial institution depth sub-index used the standard 
banking sector depth i.e. private credit to GDP captures the domestic private credit to 
the real sector by deposit money banks to GDP and then add indicators for other non-
bank financial institutions: the assets of mutual fund and pension funds industries and 
the size of insurance premium (life and non-life). Financial institution access is 
proxied by the accounts per thousand adults i.e. number of depositors with 
commercial banks per 1,000 adults for each type of institution, computed as the 
(reported number of depositors) *1000/adult population is each country. While 
financial institution efficiency of intermediating savings to investment is measured by 
the net interest margin (the accounting value of banks’ net interest revenue as of its 
average interest bearing (total earnings) assets and lending deposit spread; which 
captures operational efficiency measures, such as non-interest income to total income 
and overhead costs to total assets; and measure of profitability such as return on assets 
and return on equity.   
 The financial markets depth indicator relies on stock market and debt market 
development. The depth sub-index includes the size of the stock market i.e. stock 
market capitalization plus outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP 
defined as the value of listed shares to GDP plus amount of outstanding domestic 
private debt securities to GDP. While financial markets access is measured by the 
percentage of market capitalization outside the top 10 largest companies. The 
financial markets efficiency measure is captured by turnover ratio 
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(turnover/capitalization) for stock markets is defined by the ratio of the value of total 
shares traded to market capitalization (see for example, Svirydzenka, 2016)32.  
 Čihák et al. (2013) shows that financial system across the world exhibits a 
striking and huge disparity. They argued that even if the financial systems were to be 
rescaled by the corresponding economic size (i.e. by their GDP), the deepest financial 
system is some 110 times bigger than the smallest (least deep) ones. For instance, 
Denmark has 99.7% of adults were covered by bank accounts, in comparison 
Turkemenistan only 0.4% have access to bank accounts (this shows a huge disparity). 
Interestingly, Denmark is also a country with the highest turnover/capitalization ratio 
in the securities markets at, 538 while most countries stood at a ratio below 1. This is 
enough to demonstrate the huge degree of unevenness in the size of financial system. 
Similarly, the cartogram in Figure 2 depicts the unevenness of development in of 
financial system around the world. For instance, Russia’s financial system far exceed 
that of China, and Germany’s alone is bigger than the combined financial systems of 
the entire sub-Saharan Africa, indeed, the disparities are huge.  
5.5 Empirical Evidence  
The econometric model aims to examine the effect of financial development on trade 
flows in the light bilateral currency swap line of China. We seek to investigate the 
general relationship between financial development and trade, the following panel 
regressions àla structural gravity in line with Head and Mayer (2014) as follows: 
 
                                                                
32For example, Do and Levchenko (2004) theoretically show that each country’s financial system is an 
endogenous outcome of the level at which entrepreneurs demand for external finance. Similarly, when 
a poor and rich country open to international trade, poorer countries tend to import financially 
dependent good, as against producing it domestically, and by implication demand for external finance 
decrease and that deteriorates the domestic financial system. Indeed, the relevance of financial 
development in strengthening long run growth and reduction of output volatility has received 
substantial attention literature (see Levine, 2004; Cavallo and Scartascini, 2012; Arcand, Berkes, and 
Panizza, 2011; Manova, 2006; Becker and Greenberg, 2007).  
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∅𝑛𝑖 ,    (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖  = ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑛 is exporter income 𝑋𝑛  = ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑖  is importer expenditure on all 
source destination, Ω𝑖and Φ𝑛are “multilateral resistance” term defined as follows: 
 










The key and apparent feature of structural gravity is its multiplicative form. After 
taking logs, this denotes that the effect of multilateral resistance term can be 
captured by exporter and importer fixed effects. While ∅𝑛𝑖 captures a vector of 
bilateral trade costs variables, which includes RTAs and bilateral currency swaps: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺 +  𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖 +  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛 +  𝑙𝑛∅𝑛𝑖.    (3) 
 
Moreover, another key characteristic of the structural gravity is that trade flows 
between n and i is affected by third countries, only through Ω𝑖 and Φ𝑛terms, that are 
specific to n and i respectively. Once armed withmeasures of income and expenditure 
for each country and bilateral trade costs for all country pairs, those terms can be 
solved easily. In what follows we incorporate the disaggregated measures of financial 
development to feature into the structural gravity set up. 
 
ln𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛  +  𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑛,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
∗ 𝜆′𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +   𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾𝑛𝑖+𝜌𝑖  +  𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (4) 
 
 
 Where 𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the measure of bilateral trade between country I and n. 
𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑛,𝑡 denotes financial institution access for both country I and n 
respectively, i.e. degree to which firms can and do use financial services.We use the 
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percentage of firms with lines of credit to measure access. The 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖factor represents 
“capabilities" of exporter i as a supplier to all destinations.  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛 capturesall 
characteristics of destination market n that promote imports from all sources, in order 
words the respective exporter income and importer expenditure of country i and 
n. 33𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑛,𝑡 captures the financial institution depth is measured by the 
standard banking sector depth proxy (private credit to GDP), which is defined as 
domestic private credit to real sector by deposit money banks excluding credits issued 
by central banks, and credit issued to government agencies and public enterprises. 
𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡and𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑛,𝑡  denotes the financial institution efficiency measures the banking 
sector efficiency in intermediating savings to investment, as proxied by the net interest 
margin (an equivalent of an accounting value of banks’ net interest revenue as a share 
of its average interest – bearing assets) and lending – deposit spread. The index is 
integrated to profitability measures as return on assets and equity, and operational 
efficiency measures as a non – interest income to total income and overhead cost to 
total assets. 𝜆′𝑛𝑖,𝑡, is a dummy variable that captures central bank bilateral currency 
swap of China (Renminbi swap line) signed by both Advanced and Emerging 
economies to exchange principal and interest payments in two different currencies at 
fixed interval.34 During the life of the cross-currency swap each offers interest in the 
currency of the principal received. While at the maturity of the swap, both parties 
make exchange of the principal amount back to back. 35  The 𝐹𝐼𝐷 ∗ 𝜆′𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , is an 
                                                                
33 (See Head and Maye, 2014) 
34 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛾𝑛𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(5) 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖   +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛  +  𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑛,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛𝑖 +
𝜌𝑖 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(6) 
35The exchange of the notional amount is aimed at boosting liquidity, and eliminates the uncertainty 
associated to foreign exchange fluctuation, and therefore hedge fully exchange rate risks. Moreover, 
the cross-currency swap is an over the counter international financial derivative in a form of agreement. 
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interaction term between financial institution depth and the currency swap variable to 
investigate how deep financial institutions with the existence of the bilateral currency 
swap line. 𝛾𝑛𝑖 , captures the country pair fixed effects, 𝜌𝑖,  denotes country i fixed 
effects and 𝜇𝑛, denotes country n fixed effects.
36 
 
5.6 Empirical Results 
The estimate equations (1) to (6) for countries that signed the RMB bilateral currency 
swap line. Overall, the alternative measures of financial development have if anything 
Table 2 depicts the estimation results for the gravity equation with disaggregated 
measures of financial development index across the countries that are signatories to 
the bilateral currency swap line. Our data for financial development is divided into 
two: the financial development of China as swap provider (which we called financial 
development in the origin country) and the recipient of China’s RMB swap line 
(destination countries). The RMB currency swap network include some Advance 
economies, Emerging markets, and developing countries. All things been equal 
exporter income and importer income predicted a positive impact on trade in line with 
the conventional trade gravity equation literature. Furthermore, the results show that 
the estimated parameters of the disaggregated measures of financial development are 
statistically significant at 1 percent level, although the magnitude of each component 
of financial development relatively differ. First, Currency swap results suggests a high 
impact on trade. Also, the results in Table 2 depicts positive effect on trade for both 
                                                                
This type of currency swap is used to take advantage of comparative advantages. For instance, suppose 
a Chinese firm is looking to acquire New Zealand dollar and a New Zealand firm is seeking to acquire 
Chinese Renminbi, these two firms could engage into a swap. This is due to the fact New Zealand firms 
are likely to have better access to New Zealand debt market and could get a more favorable term on a 
New Zealand dollar than if Chinese firms went in directly to the New Zealand debt market itself, the 
situation is for China if New Zealand if firms require Renminbi liquidity (Detais, 2016 and Khurshedi, 
2012). 
36(see Zhang and Lu, 2015; Svirydzenka, 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 2012 and Cihák, et al., 2013). 
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the swap provider (financial development in origin country) and signatories (financial 
development in the destination country). Our empirical model utilizes data on 
financial development for the sample of sample 27 countries that signed China’s swap 
line. The key effect that our model illustrates is that swap and alternative measures of 
financial development affects trade differently. 37  For example, swap-financial 
development interaction term is negative and significant at 1% level. Row 5 and 7 
indicates full set of swap interaction terms paired with financial institution and 
markets sub-indices that include access, depth, and efficiency. This allow the effect 
of other regressors on trade to be affected differentially for countries with high and 
low level of financial development. The results indicate that RMB currency swap 
matter for trade differentially based on countries level of financial development. It is 
evident and well documented in the literature that differences in financial 
development amongst countries are substantial and these differences are key 
determinants of trade patterns. We also discern that negative impact of our financial 
development and swap interaction on trade should be attributed to disparity in terms 
of financial development a cross China’s swap line partners with varying level of 
financial development. 
                                                                
37
The extend of financial access, depth and efficiency of a country’s financial system determines the local demand 
and supply for external finance currency swap lines. Therefore, the impact on swap on trade is expected to be 
differential across countries. Suppose trade results to increase specialization in financially dependent commodities, 
that leads to growth of the financial system. Conversely, countries that relies on the imports of financially 
dependent commodities rather than produce them domestically, the financial system weaken because of trade 
opening, ceteris paribus. 
86 
 
Table 2: Currency swap and Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 FIAI F1DI F1EI FMAI FMDI FMEI 
ExporterIncome 0.900*** 0.993*** 1.030*** 1.044*** 1.022*** 1.087*** 
 (0.111) (0.105) (0.0999) (0.106) (0.102) (0.106) 
       
Importer Income 0.880*** 0.991*** 1.092*** 1.047*** 1.058*** 1.067*** 
 (0.0895) (0.0848) (0.0877) (0.0890) (0.0903) (0.0910) 
       
FinDev_Destination  0.394*** 0.303*** 0.363*** 0.0778*** 0.0820*** 0.00338 
  (0.0540) (0.0545) (0.0954) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0194) 
       
FinDev_Origin 0.161** 0.0364 0.131 -0.0107 0.0127 -0.0358* 
 (0.0724) (0.0648) (0.0856) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0190) 
       
FinDev_Destination#Swap 0.0317 -0.233** 0.969*** -0.0868 -0.225*** -0.158*** 
  (0.155) (0.0992) (0.296) (0.0824) (0.0645) (0.0505) 
       
FinDev_Origin#Swap -0.0246 -1.514* -14.61 0.313 -0.749 0 
 (0.147) (0.865) (9.404) (0.326) (0.645) (0) 
       
Currency Swap 0.695*** 0.889*** 0.889*** 0.897*** 0.805*** 0.903*** 
 (0.117) (0.102) (0.103) (0.117) (0.103) (0.104) 
       
Observations 15,300 15,300 15,300 14,565 15,300 13,582 
R-squared 0.671 0.616 0.673 0.611 0.652 0.613 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Overall, results further suggest that financial access, depth and efficiency has different 
impacts on trade both in China and its trading partners that are in the renminbi swap 
line. We also note that the negative coefficients of the interaction enter with negative 
results, which means that low level of financial development is likely to drive 
currency swap line. This is the case when the global financial crisis deepens, many 
countries flexibly embrace the swap line to either substitute or compliment reserves 
and use it for self-insurance motive. Broadly, swaps can also substitute or compliment 
reserve apart from its lubricative usage for trade, which is a safety verve in case of 
unexpected shortages in international liquidity. Although, there could be a limit to 
which swap line can be use, however, the usage is determined by the recipient’s level 
of financial development and the credibility of the provider. Another evidence 
suggests that swap lines are motivated essentially by self-interest of the provider 
(China), but in fact the benefits are substantial for recipient countries. For instance, a 
provider like China, swaps are useful in safeguarding the economic interest they have 
in countries they extend the swap lines. We believe that the interests may take 
different dimension for provider – e.g. significant export share or market in the swap 
destinations. For recipient countries swaps can foster financial stability especially 
when reserves cannot reassure markets during the financial crisis mainly for countries 
with low level of financial development and weak macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Therefore, it is possible that swaps possess mutual benefits that is not mainly resort to 
in the period of crisis, but also in good times. Swap lines can be formalized or 
institutionalize from a temporary anti-crisis measure to a long-term financial tool to 




Moreover, our empirical evidence reaffirms the relevance of both financial institutions 
and markets access, depth and efficiency for trade as positively depicted row 3 and 4 
of Table 2. Notably, large declines in the access and depth index reflects the volatility 
of returns by financial institutions in many countries and most financial markets. 
Figure A2 in the appendix also show that overall financial development has decline 
in recent times and to some extend that translates to other sub-indices, such as access 
and depth to finance and reduction in efficiency, especially, in financial markets. 
Disparities in financial system during the global crisis in many low- and medium-
income countries incentivize countries to resort to swaps during the liquidity shock. 
On the average financial institutions rebounded faster than financial markets, with 
improvement in depth and efficiency after the crisis.38 Another implication of the 
positive impact of financial institutions and market access, depth and efficiency on 
trade openness of China indicates high financial requirement for China and its trading 
partners. More so, industrial incumbents have an incentive to face competition in 
financial markets and demand for more external finance like swaps. This will push for 









                                                                
38 Many European countries exhibit a high level of financial institution depth. But United States and Korea 








 The central objective of this thesis was devoted to answering the question: Do 
bilateral currency swap agreements (RMB-trade policy of China) increases 
international trade of signatories to this emerging international trade agreement. 
Interestingly, the key motivation was to explore the novelty of documenting empirical 
evidence using gravity equation to estimate the average treatment effect of currency 
swaps on trade flows, rarely due to the absence of well documented empirical 
evidence in the literature. Therefore, this is seemingly important in the light of the 
proliferation of currency swap arrangement with a myriad of central banks across the 
globe, particularly those agreements that are contingent with the of motive trade 
expansion of which China’s swap line remain an excellent specimen to date in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. In achieving this goal, our empirical 
analysis also relies on the on large panel data of over 200 countries, spanning from 
1948 – 2013, and the general theoretical foundation of the gravity equation that is 
consistent with the econometric technique of estimating the average treatment effects 
of trade policy. The outcome of our empirical findings reveals an apparently large 
impact of bilateral currency swaps on trade flows. Succinctly, on the average, the 
estimates suggest that bilateral currency swap increases counterparts trade more than 
three times [exp(1.578)-1] = 3.80. Comparably, our intuitive gravity estimate shows 
[exp(0.63)-1] = 87% increase. An important caveat we hold is that currency swap 
might be different from another form of international trade agreements, such as the 
currency unions, currency peg, and dollarization, and indeed they have a different 
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impact on trade. In a similar vein, we also acknowledged that different econometric 
technique delivers different results. Our analysis relies on a panel approach which 
accounts for country-pair fixed effects solely to circumvent the embedded 
endogeneity in trade policy analysis, and phase in effects of the bilateral currency 
swap agreement, which has important implication for future significance of swaps on 
trade. 
 The magnitude of the measured effects of the findings might skeptically rise 
concerns merelyweighing the effects to have been too large to conceive. However, we 
square the results with other forms of international trade agreements in the literature 
to gauge a possibility that lies in between. For example, Glick and Rose (2016) found 
a fairlylarge impact currency union on trade in the magnitude of 114%. Earliest 
literature began with Rose (2000) that found triple effects CUs on tradethoughthis 
sound suspiciously large, and subsequent empirical finding even set out a more 
dampeningeffect. Baeir and Bergstrand (2007) addressed econometrically the 
endogeneity of free trade agreements (FTAs), and further demonstrate that control 
function and instrumental variable techniques over time do not workfairly well for 
addressing endogeneity bias, but panel data does. Accounting econometrically the 
endogeneity of FTAs, they for found yet another striking empirical evidence of the 
quintupled impact of FTAs on trade flows. In addition, Barro and Tenreyro (2007) 
relied on the use of some geographic instrumental variables technique and found that 
CUs increases trade up to 14 folds. Baldwin (2006) discussed several reasons why the 
larger impact of currency union on trade may likely be suspicious and concluded that 
on the average Euro increased trade in the magnitude of 5-10%. While Bun and 
Klaassen (2007) incorporate dynamic controls to shrink the high impact of currency 
union on trade, and the effect is still relatively substantial at 25%. Another empirical 
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finding that relative differs away from other studies on currency unions was 
evidencedin Campbell (2013) who apparently showed the impact of currency unions 
on trade to have declined over ten years. The findings were sensitive to the exclusion 
of the CU observations coterminous with some political events or missing data. 
Similarly, the paper included UK colony time trend, thus accounting for the negative 
pre-trend, one could find a point estimates of currency unions on trade that are 
negative and insignificant. Although the results are quantifiably remarkable, we 
believe they are relatively reasonable in the light of why various international trade 
policies appeared to have a varied impact on trade flows. However, though we have 
addressed the (multilateral resistance) terms of a given country pair using the 
exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, which technically accounts for outward 
and inward multilateral resistances. We have not address general equilibrium 
“comparative statics” effects of bilateral currency swaps on two members’ trade nor 
the effects of the agreement on non-members’ trade and the possible welfare 
implication of currency swaps. These possible limitations are left for future research. 
Our centrifugal focus in this study has mainly been to explore a novelty that the 
provides policymakers and academics alike an unbiased estimate of the average 
treatment effect of currency swaps on trade flows of signatories to this emerging 
international trade agreement. Similarly, we provide empirical evidence that currency 
swap isimportant for trade especially for countries with relatively low level of 
financial development. It is well documented that the differences in development 
amongst countries are substantial, and such differences are important in the 
determination of trade pattern. The level of financial development was proxied by the 
interaction term of disaggregated measure of financial development such access, 
depth, and efficiency each interacted with swaps. We provide empirical evidence that 
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differential level of financial development can be a key determinant of whether a 
country can use swap lines for international trade or not. In rich countries, strong 
financial system promote trade, the opposite is the case in poorer ones. Perhaps, 
empirical tests on the influence of financial system and on trade remain on the research 






We further incorporate variables, to investigate whether financial markets 
development matter for trade flows? In seeking to answer this question we specify a 
modified version of equation (1), (2), and (3), as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛   +  𝛽3𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡+  𝛽4𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡  + 
𝛽6𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑖,𝑡  +𝛽7𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛,𝑡  +  𝛾𝑛𝑖+𝜌𝑖  +  𝜇𝑛  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (1) 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛  + 𝛽3𝐹𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4𝐹𝑀𝐷𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
∗ 𝜆′𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝑀𝐷𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾𝑛𝑖+𝜌𝑖  +  𝜇𝑛  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(2) 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4𝐹𝑀𝐸𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
∗ 𝜆′𝑛𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝐹𝑀𝐸𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜆
′
𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑛𝑖+𝜌𝑖 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(3) 
 
Financial market access, it measured the percentage of market capitalization outside 


























1948 924 112  112 924 0.0058092  
1949 924 112  112 924 0.0015473  
1950 924 112  112 924 0.0017187  
1951 924 112  112 924 0.0011142  
1952 924 112  112 924 0.0018494  
1953 924 112  112 924 0.0025622  
1954 924 112  112 924 0.0027585  
1955 924 112  112 924 0.0028856  
1956 924 112  112 924 0.0035802  
1957 924 112  112 924 0.0038726  
1958 924 112  112 924 0.008408  
1959 924 112  112 924 0.0072166  
1960 924 112  112 924 0.0087221  
1961 924 112 0.167092 112 924 0.0033953  
1962 924 112  112 924 0.0021794  
1963 924 112  112 924 0.0031411  
1964 924 112  112 924 0.0040062  
1965 924 112  112 924 0.0054146  
1966 924 112  112 924 0.0064248  
1967 924 112  112 924 0.0075575  
1968 924 112  112 924 0.0045628  
1969 924 112  112 924 0.0074924  
1970 924 112  112 924 0.0055736  
1971 924 112  112 924 0.0031296  
1972 924 112  112 924 0.0032232  
1973 924 112  112 924 0.0068311  
1974 924 112  112 924 0.0043461  
1975 924 112  112 924 0.0040741  
1976 924 112  112 924 0.0027247  
1977 924 112  112 924 0.0019634  
1978 924 112 0.042447 112 924 0.0026058  
1979 924 112 0.038593 112 924 0.0052839  
1980 924 112 0.03331 112 924 0.0036007  
1981 924 112 0.019234 112 924 0.0024844  
1982 924 112 0.014085 112 924 0.0018511  
1983 924 112 0.0272 112 924 0.0026728  
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1984 924 112 0.013271 112 924 0.0045369  
1985 924 112 0.013103 112 924 0.0051096  
1986 924 112 0.045932 112 924 0.0074213  
1987 924 112 0.0135 112 924 0.005228  
1988 924 112 0.013871 112 924 0.0050827  
1989 924 112 0.012229 112 924 0.0044924  
1990 924 112 0.01074 112 924 0.0044602  
1991 924 112 0.010196 112 924 0.0031274  
1992 924 112 0.01096 112 924 0.0039979  
1993 924 112 0.021394 112 924 0.0065098  
1994 924 112 0.020357 112 924 0.0065241  
1995 924 112 0.019136 112 924 0.0056846  
1996 924 112 0.021566 112 924 0.0046794  
1997 924 112 0.021286 112 924 0.0059701  
1998 924 112 0.025759 112 924 0.0060988  
1999 924 112 0.02555 112 924 0.0073547  
2000 924 112 0.025846 112 924 0.0079001  
2001 924 112 0.025934 112 924 0.0095134  
2002 924 112 0.025261 112 924 0.0083756  
2003 924 112 0.025221 112 924 0.0105726  
2004 924 112 0.025829 112 924 0.0131518  
2005 924 112 0.025466 112 924 0.0130031  
2006 924 112 0.025493 112 924 0.0136099  



















2008 924 112 0.025737 112 924 0.0193528  
2009 924 112 0.026517 112 924 0.0231004  
2010 924 112 0.025104 112 924 0.0214324  
2011 924 112 0.023727 112 924 0.0213049  
2012 924 112 0.023032 112 924 0.0231462  
2013 924 112 0.023509 112 924 0.0213999  
 




















1948 924 146  146 924 0.0155374  
1949 924 146  146 924 0.0165739  
1950 924 146  146 924 0.0201494  
1951 924 146  146 924 0.0244686  
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1952 924 146  146 924 0.0167848  
1953 924 146  146 924 0.022493  
1954 924 146  146 924 0.0193818  
1955 924 146  146 924 0.0185548  
1956 924 146  146 924 0.0250071  
1957 924 146  146 924 0.0282791  
1958 924 146  146 924 0  
1959 924 146  146 924 0  
1960 924 146  146 924 0.0043117  
1961 924 146 0.018306 146 924 0.0026015  
1962 924 146  146 924 0.001623  
1963 924 146  146 924 0.0016164  
1964 924 146  146 924 0.0040206  
1965 924 146  146 924 0.0061829  
1966 924 146  146 924 0.0064965  
1967 924 146  146 924 0.0060843  
1968 924 146  146 924 0.0048721  
1969 924 146  146 924 0.0031359  
1970 924 146  146 924 0.0040487  
1971 924 146  146 924 0.0029476  
1972 924 146  146 924 0.002845  
1973 924 146  146 924 0.0043796  
1974 924 146  146 924 0.0046306  
1975 924 146  146 924 0.0043828  
1976 924 146  146 924 0.0035075  
1977 924 146  146 924 0.0032387  
1978 924 146 0.01185 146 924 0.0040247  
1979 924 146 0.013643 146 924 0.0047239  
1980 924 146 0.012138 146 924 0.0047174  
1981 924 146 0.005484 146 924 0.00456  
1982 924 146 0.004954 146 924 0.0049447  
1983 924 146 0.003687 146 924 0.0048802  
1984 924 146 0.00419 146 924 0.0047791  
1985 924 146 0.005527 146 924 0.0089809  
1986 924 146 0.005781 146 924 0.0111789  
1987 924 146 0.004794 146 924 0.0096473  
1988 924 146 0.004265 146 924 0.0081319  
1989 924 146 0.003458 146 924 0.0075073  
1990 924 146 0.002657 146 924 0.00475  
1991 924 146 0.00237 146 924 0.0053963  
1992 924 146 0.001895 146 924 0.0068379  
1993 924 146 0.003094 146 924 0.010291  
1994 924 146 0.003015 146 924 0.0089818  
1995 924 146 0.002836 146 924 0.0088918  






















1948 924 156  156 924 0.0113015  
1949 924 156  156 924 0.0047718  
1950 924 156  156 924 0.0006338  
1951 924 156  156 924 0.0182839  
1952 924 156  156 924 0.0002496  
1953 924 156  156 924 0  
1954 924 156  156 924 0.0000249  
1955 924 156  156 924 0.0002286  
1956 924 156  156 924 0.0005092  
1957 924 156  156 924 0.0002934  
1958 924 156  156 924 0.0014409  
1959 924 156  156 924 0.0003156  
1960 924 156  156 924 0.0016615  
1961 924 156 0.006811 156 924 0.0210144  
1962 924 156  156 924 0.0231909  
1963 924 156  156 924 0.0150596  
1964 924 156  156 924 0.0164682  
1997 924 146 0.003436 146 924 0.0088131  
1998 924 146 0.003526 146 924 0.0073793  
1999 924 146 0.003534 146 924 0.0082734  
2000 924 146 0.003064 146 924 0.0104445  
2001 924 146 0.002495 146 924 0.0121776  
2002 924 146 0.002001 146 924 0.0146438  
2003 924 146 0.001962 146 924 0.017826  
2004 924 146 0.002609 146 924 0.0205693  
2005 924 146 0.002624 146 924 0.0214682  
2006 924 146 0.002658 146 924 0.0223801  




















2008 924 146 0.002792 146 924 0.0286008  
2009 924 146 0.002259 146 924 0.0296942  
2010 924 146 0.001967 146 924 0.0371801  
2011 924 146 0.001998 146 924 0.0429697  
2012 924 146 0.001746 146 924 0.0373084  
2013 924 146 0.001629 146 924 0.0416496  
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1965 924 156  156 924 0.012026  
1966 924 156  156 924 0.0179392  
1967 924 156  156 924 0.0080244  
1968 924 156  156 924 0.0120513  
1969 924 156  156 924 0.0082454  
1970 924 156  156 924 0.0084685  
1971 924 156  156 924 0.011448  
1972 924 156  156 924 0.0130763  
1973 924 156  156 924 0.0114446  
1974 924 156  156 924 0.0137986  
1975 924 156  156 924 0.0116279  
1976 924 156  156 924 0.0051651  
1977 924 156  156 924 0.0083253  
1978 924 156 0.010864 156 924 0.0095823  
1979 924 156 0.011693 156 924 0.0092151  
1980 924 156 0.008119 156 924 0.0115793  
1981 924 156 0.008496 156 924 0.0112608  
1982 924 156 0.00785 156 924 0.0148326  
1983 924 156 0.009426 156 924 0.0176607  
1984 924 156 0.010388 156 924 0.0111378  
1985 924 156 0.008536 156 924 0.0107107  
1986 924 156 0.00981 156 924 0.0089098  
1987 924 156 0.010369 156 924 0.0115882  
1988 924 156 0.008208 156 924 0.0190127  
1989 924 156 0.007927 156 924 0.0083982  
1990 924 156 0.007163 156 924 0.0104947  
1991 924 156 0.007778 156 924 0.0124966  
1992 924 156 0.007759 156 924 0.0137369  
1993 924 156 0.013282 156 924 0.0092969  
1994 924 156 0.011777 156 924 0.0098743  
1995 924 156 0.010511 156 924 0.0121352  
1996 924 156 0.010896 156 924 0.0103804  
1997 924 156 0.010618 156 924 0.0073376  
1998 924 156 0.011812 156 924 0.0061567  
1999 924 156 0.012739 156 924 0.0070724  
2000 924 156 0.012935 156 924 0.0089026  
2001 924 156 0.012801 156 924 0.0101672  
2002 924 156 0.013493 156 924 0.0101276  
2003 924 156 0.013126 156 924 0.0118739  
2004 924 156 0.014082 156 924 0.0160004  
2005 924 156 0.015639 156 924 0.0165715  
2006 924 156 0.016377 156 924 0.0177786  





















2008 924 156 0.015544 156 924 0.0218153  
2009 924 156 0.014981 156 924 0.0309681  
2010 924 156 0.014377 156 924 0.0333618  
2011 924 156 0.013581 156 924 0.0377076  
2012 924 156 0.013988 156 924 0.0427426  
2013 924 156 0.013475 156 924 0.0436106  
 

















1948 924 176  176 924 0.0016694  
1949 924 176  176 924 0  
1950 924 176  176 924 0  
1951 924 176  176 924 0  
1952 924 176  176 924 0  
1953 924 176  176 924 0  
1954 924 176  176 924 0  
1955 924 176  176 924 0  
1956 924 176  176 924 0  
1957 924 176  176 924 0  
1958 924 176  176 924 0  
1959 924 176  176 924 0  
1960 924 176  176 924 0  
1961 924 176 0 176 924 0  
1962 924 176  176 924 0  
1963 924 176  176 924 0  
1964 924 176  176 924 0  
1965 924 176  176 924 0  
1966 924 176  176 924 0  
1967 924 176  176 924 0  
1968 924 176  176 924 0  
1969 924 176  176 924 0  
1970 924 176  176 924 0  
1971 924 176  176 924 0  
1972 924 176  176 924 0.005822  
1973 924 176  176 924 0.004736  
1974 924 176  176 924 0.0004588  
1975 924 176  176 924 0.0364904  
1976 924 176  176 924 0  
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1977 924 176  176 924 0.0204889  
1978 924 176 0 176 924 0.0171921  
1979 924 176 0 176 924 0  
1980 924 176 4.73E-05 176 924 0  
1981 924 176 3.73E-05 176 924 0  
1982 924 176 4.12E-05 176 924 0.0010563  
1983 924 176 4.98E-05 176 924 0  
1984 924 176 4.44E-05 176 924 0  
1985 924 176 0.000022 176 924 2.45E-06  
1986 924 176 2.56E-05 176 924 0.0000319  
1987 924 176 4.31E-05 176 924 0.0001356  
1988 924 176 0.000021 176 924 0.0034037  
1989 924 176 1.51E-05 176 924 0.0008696  
1990 924 176 1.96E-05 176 924 0.000171  
1991 924 176 2.27E-05 176 924 0.0000278  
1992 924 176 1.77E-05 176 924 0.0000672  
1993 924 176 4.38E-05 176 924 0.0000936  
1994 924 176 1.91E-05 176 924 0.0002411  
1995 924 176 2.94E-05 176 924 0.0014196  
1996 924 176 2.42E-05 176 924 0.0005723  
1997 924 176 2.62E-05 176 924 0.0040682  
1998 924 176 2.97E-05 176 924 0.0041777  
1999 924 176 3.51E-05 176 924 0.0025131  
2000 924 176 7.21E-05 176 924 0.0059285  
2001 924 176 0.00013 176 924 0.0044945  
2002 924 176 0.000058 176 924 0.0065422  
2003 924 176 0.000106 176 924 0.0073438  
2004 924 176 7.93E-05 176 924 0.0055485  
2005 924 176 0.0001 176 924 0.0090405  
2006 924 176 0.000082 176 924 0.0112296  


















2008 924 176 6.64E-05 176 924 0.021306  
2009 924 176 0.000046 176 924 0.0248649  
2010 924 176 0.000046 176 924 0.0061394  
2011 924 176 4.04E-05 176 924 0.0088388  
2012 924 176 4.75E-05 176 924 0.0120794  





















1948 924 186  186 924 0 
1949 924 186  186 924 0 
1950 924 186  186 924 0 
1951 924 186  186 924 0 
1952 924 186  186 924 0.0002794 
1953 924 186  186 924 0 
1954 924 186  186 924 0 
1955 924 186  186 924 0 
1956 924 186  186 924 0 
1957 924 186  186 924 0 
1958 924 186  186 924 0 
1959 924 186  186 924 0 
1960 924 186  186 924 0 
1961 924 186 0 186 924 0 
1962 924 186  186 924 0 
1963 924 186  186 924 0 
1964 924 186  186 924 0 
1965 924 186  186 924 0.005102 
1966 924 186  186 924 0 
1967 924 186  186 924 0.0011503 
1968 924 186  186 924 0.0020198 
1969 924 186  186 924 0.0001868 
1970 924 186  186 924 0.0015013 
1971 924 186  186 924 0.0034147 
1972 924 186  186 924 0.0213826 
1973 924 186  186 924 0.0233634 
1974 924 186  186 924 0.01089 
1975 924 186  186 924 0.0011363 
1976 924 186  186 924 0.0011976 
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1977 924 186  186 924 0.0032545 
1978 924 186 0 186 924 0.0066497 
1979 924 186 0 186 924 0.0041806 
1980 924 186 0 186 924 0.0007004 
1981 924 186 6.06E-05 186 924 0.0037621 
1982 924 186 7.32E-05 186 924 0.0030432 
1983 924 186 0.000168 186 924 0.0030102 
1984 924 186 9.27E-05 186 924 0.0056195 
1985 924 186 0.002555 186 924 0.0042313 
1986 924 186 0.002262 186 924 0.0160154 
1987 924 186 0.001863 186 924 0.010125 
1988 924 186 0.0019 186 924 0.0193653 
1989 924 186 0.00109 186 924 0.0059975 
1990 924 186 0.000793 186 924 0.0112778 
1991 924 186 0.000776 186 924 0.001502 
1992 924 186 0.000818 186 924 0.010654 
1993 924 186 0.001838 186 924 0.0342943 
1994 924 186 0.001555 186 924 0.0202317 
1995 924 186 0.002953 186 924 0.0031103 
1996 924 186 0.002753 186 924 0.0030225 
1997 924 186 0.003383 186 924 0.0017819 
1998 924 186 0.003662 186 924 0.0014681 
1999 924 186 0.003333 186 924 0.0014481 
2000 924 186 0.004415 186 924 0.003671 
2001 924 186 0.002584 186 924 0.0068115 
2002 924 186 0.003414 186 924 0.008001 
2003 924 186 0.004812 186 924 0.011296 
2004 924 186 0.004867 186 924 0.0065547 
2005 924 186 0.005704 186 924 0.0079155 
2006 924 186 0.00771 186 924 0.0085605 
2007 924 186 0.008783 186 924 0.0102154 


















2008 924 186 0.00756 186 924 0.0114147 
2009 924 186 0.007067 186 924 0.0162597 
2010 924 186 0.007743 186 924 0.0205875 
2011 924 186 0.008401 186 924 0.0188813 
2012 924 186 0.007759 186 924 0.0190767 
2013 924 186 0.008194 186 924 0.0244275 
 













1948 924 193  193 924 0.0051554 
1949 924 193  193 924 0.0015673 
1950 924 193  193 924 0.001197 
1951 924 193  193 924 0.0005147 
1952 924 193  193 924 0.0003106 
1953 924 193  193 924 0.0025765 
1954 924 193  193 924 0.0020325 
1955 924 193  193 924 0.0037706 
1956 924 193  193 924 0.0056368 
1957 924 193  193 924 0.0098063 
1958 924 193  193 924 0.0170569 
1959 924 193  193 924 0.0159496 
1960 924 193  193 924 0.0118519 
1961 924 193 0.015113 193 924 0.0703851 
1962 924 193  193 924 0.0429494 
1963 924 193  193 924 0.0747854 
1964 924 193  193 924 0.05229 
1965 924 193  193 924 0.0573839 
1966 924 193  193 924 0.0268471 
1967 924 193  193 924 0.0564804 
1968 924 193  193 924 0.0257039 
1969 924 193  193 924 0.0287272 
1970 924 193  193 924 0.0275639 
1971 924 193  193 924 0.0053535 
1972 924 193  193 924 0.0072657 
1973 924 193  193 924 0.014758 
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1974 924 193  193 924 0.0297146 
1975 924 193  193 924 0.0281298 
1976 924 193  193 924 0.0203804 
1977 924 193  193 924 0.0350819 
1978 924 193 0.013477 193 924 0.0343003 
1979 924 193 0.01258 193 924 0.0426313 
1980 924 193 0.013213 193 924 0.0370862 
1981 924 193 0.00809 193 924 0.030293 
1982 924 193 0.010224 193 924 0.0401861 
1983 924 193 0.008208 193 924 0.0203973 
1984 924 193 0.008807 193 924 0.0325974 
1985 924 193 0.006715 193 924 0.0404587 
1986 924 193 0.006682 193 924 0.0497701 
1987 924 193 0.00755 193 924 0.0424319 
1988 924 193 0.007607 193 924 0.0278085 
1989 924 193 0.008147 193 924 0.0269296 
1990 924 193 0.007577 193 924 0.0261376 
1991 924 193 0.007766 193 924 0.0298299 
1992 924 193 0.007847 193 924 0.0347159 
1993 924 193 0.011875 193 924 0.0389012 
1994 924 193 0.012546 193 924 0.0465481 
1995 924 193 0.011152 193 924 0.0464598 
1996 924 193 0.01128 193 924 0.053871 
1997 924 193 0.011443 193 924 0.0503085 
1998 924 193 0.01301 193 924 0.0461674 
1999 924 193 0.014161 193 924 0.0513436 
2000 924 193 0.014044 193 924 0.062151 
2001 924 193 0.013656 193 924 0.0667631 
2002 924 193 0.014385 193 924 0.0746025 
2003 924 193 0.014593 193 924 0.0888922 
2004 924 193 0.015246 193 924 0.0975037 
2005 924 193 0.014844 193 924 0.1216677 
2006 924 193 0.014379 193 924 0.1299071 
2007 924 193 0.015079 193 924 0.1492094 
2008 924 193 0.015868 193 924 0.1536463 
2009 924 193 0.017516 193 924 0.227983 
2010 924 193 0.017627 193 924 0.2629287 
2011 924 193 0.018238 193 924 0.2864797 
2012 924 193 0.018793 193 924 0.3076813 


























1948 924 196  196 924 0 
1949 924 196  196 924 0 
1950 924 196  196 924 0 
1951 924 196  196 924 0 
1952 924 196  196 924 0 
1953 924 196  196 924 0 
1954 924 196  196 924 0 
1955 924 196  196 924 0.0005602 
1956 924 196  196 924 0.0005232 
1957 924 196  196 924 0.0022304 
1958 924 196  196 924 0.0038877 
1959 924 196  196 924 0 
1960 924 196  196 924 0 
1961 924 196 0.002554 196 924 0.0047194 
1962 924 196  196 924 0 
1963 924 196  196 924 0.005672 
1964 924 196  196 924 0.0063404 
1965 924 196  196 924 0.0073608 
1966 924 196  196 924 0.0070158 
1967 924 196  196 924 0.0114384 
1968 924 196  196 924 0.0062413 
1969 924 196  196 924 0.004951 
1970 924 196  196 924 0.0039536 
1971 924 196  196 924 0.0006881 
1972 924 196  196 924 0.0018186 
1973 924 196  196 924 0.0035982 
1974 924 196  196 924 0.0117836 
1975 924 196  196 924 0.0072206 
1976 924 196  196 924 0.0091117 
1977 924 196  196 924 0.012146 
1978 924 196 0 196 924 0.0179503 
1979 924 196 0 196 924 0.0196926 
1980 924 196 0.00179 196 924 0.0309226 
1981 924 196 0.001329 196 924 0.0228561 
1982 924 196 0.001455 196 924 0.0201252 
1983 924 196 0.001137 196 924 0.0215825 
1984 924 196 0.001234 196 924 0.0240886 
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1985 924 196 0.001158 196 924 0.0251385 
1986 924 196 0.000895 196 924 0.0368269 
1987 924 196 0.001124 196 924 0.0277664 
1988 924 196 0.000827 196 924 0.0481962 
1989 924 196 0.000763 196 924 0.0206685 
1990 924 196 0.000837 196 924 0.0103652 
1991 924 196 0.000919 196 924 0.0175951 
1992 924 196 0.001039 196 924 0.021939 
1993 924 196 0.001453 196 924 0.0213631 
1994 924 196 0.001586 196 924 0.0298547 
1995 924 196 0.001592 196 924 0.0269429 
1996 924 196 0.00156 196 924 0.0269168 
1997 924 196 0.001324 196 924 0.0292924 
1998 924 196 0.001528 196 924 0.0305394 
1999 924 196 0.001795 196 924 0.0281017 
2000 924 196 0.001705 196 924 0.0311811 
2001 924 196 0.001664 196 924 0.0418727 
2002 924 196 0.001869 196 924 0.0481188 
2003 924 196 0.00187 196 924 0.050365 
2004 924 196 0.001859 196 924 0.0593 
2005 924 196 0.001816 196 924 0.0531544 
2006 924 196 0.00171 196 924 0.0567087 
2007 924 196 0.00181 196 924 0.055635 
 
 



















2008 924 196 0.001787 196 924 0.0608585 
2009 924 196 0.001768 196 924 0.0960073 
2010 924 196 0.001789 196 924 0.1160612 
2011 924 196 0.00201 196 924 0.1306495 
2012 924 196 0.001929 196 924 0.1559109 
2013 924 196 0.001907 196 924 0.215362 
 
















1948 924 213  213 924 0 
1949 924 213  213 924  
1950 924 213  213 924  
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1951 924 213  213 924  
1952 924 213  213 924 0 
1953 924 213  213 924 0 
1954 924 213  213 924 0 
1955 924 213  213 924 0.0007586 
1956 924 213  213 924 0.000855 
1957 924 213  213 924 0.0007249 
1958 924 213  213 924 0 
1959 924 213  213 924 0 
1960 924 213  213 924 0.0013915 
1961 924 213 0.000426 213 924 0.0043846 
1962 924 213  213 924 0.0213274 
1963 924 213  213 924 0.0022727 
1964 924 213  213 924 0.0651047 
1965 924 213  213 924 0.0561368 
1966 924 213  213 924 0.0527473 
1967 924 213  213 924 0.0044387 
1968 924 213  213 924 0.0005127 
1969 924 213  213 924 0.0001987 
1970 924 213  213 924 0.0014261 
1971 924 213  213 924 0.0037523 
1972 924 213  213 924 0.0013309 
1973 924 213  213 924 0.0049895 
1974 924 213  213 924 0.0231131 
1975 924 213  213 924 0.0072749 
1976 924 213  213 924 0.0007041 
1977 924 213  213 924 0.0155291 
1978 924 213 0.000264 213 924 0.0097094 
1979 924 213 0.001306 213 924 0.0248413 
1980 924 213 0.001785 213 924 0.0236152 
1981 924 213 0.001147 213 924 0.0100923 
1982 924 213 0.000252 213 924 0.0179598 
1983 924 213 0.000181 213 924 0.063997 
1984 924 213 0.000157 213 924 0.0092632 
1985 924 213 0.00011 213 924 0.0371522 
1986 924 213 0.000316 213 924 0.0369125 
1987 924 213 0.000241 213 924 0.0418805 
1988 924 213 0.000133 213 924 0.0401155 
1989 924 213 0.000172 213 924 0.0429852 
1990 924 213 0.000215 213 924 0.0195846 
1991 924 213 0.000725 213 924 0.0207958 
1992 924 213 0.001475 213 924 0.0106586 
108 
 
1993 924 213 0.002742 213 924 0.0125281 
1994 924 213 0.002455 213 924 0.0142304 
1995 924 213 0.001876 213 924 0.014894 
1996 924 213 0.002269 213 924 0.0257799 
1997 924 213 0.002592 213 924 0.0356385 
1998 924 213 0.003056 213 924 0.0270656 
1999 924 213 0.002597 213 924 0.0222776 
2000 924 213 0.0025 213 924 0.0308642 
2001 924 213 0.002194 213 924 0.0430505 
2002 924 213 0.000581 213 924 0.0430972 
2003 924 213 0.001042 213 924 0.0842844 
2004 924 213 0.00147 213 924 0.0771884 
2005 924 213 0.001778 213 924 0.0806426 
2006 924 213 0.002114 213 924 0.0761838 
















2008 924 213 0.003596 213 924 0.0928456 
2009 924 213 0.002954 213 924 0.0671258 
2010 924 213 0.003961 213 924 0.0878719 
2011 924 213 0.004574 213 924 0.0750414 
2012 924 213 0.003918 213 924 0.0654385 
2013 924 213 0.004038 213 924 0.07292 
 
















1948 924 453  453 924  
1949 924 453  453 924  
1950 924 453  453 924  
1951 924 453  453 924  
1952 924 453  453 924  
1953 924 453  453 924  
1954 924 453  453 924  
1955 924 453  453 924  
1956 924 453  453 924  
1957 924 453  453 924  
1958 924 453  453 924  
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1959 924 453  453 924  
1960 924 453  453 924  
1961 924 453 0 453 924  
1962 924 453  453 924  
1963 924 453  453 924  
1964 924 453  453 924  
1965 924 453  453 924  
1966 924 453  453 924  
1967 924 453  453 924  
1968 924 453  453 924  
1969 924 453  453 924  
1970 924 453  453 924  
1971 924 453  453 924  
1972 924 453  453 924 0 
1973 924 453  453 924 0 
1974 924 453  453 924  
1975 924 453  453 924  
1976 924 453  453 924 0.0035222 
1977 924 453  453 924  
1978 924 453 0 453 924 0 
1979 924 453 0 453 924 0.0039247 
1980 924 453 0 453 924 0.0080099 
1981 924 453 0.000396 453 924 0.0022494 
1982 924 453 0.000366 453 924 0.0022494 
1983 924 453 0.000263 453 924 0.0022494 
1984 924 453 0.000246 453 924 0.0022494 
1985 924 453 0.000136 453 924 0.0022494 
1986 924 453 0.000153 453 924 0.0125522 
1987 924 453 0.000239 453 924 0.0103368 
1988 924 453 0.000149 453 924 0.0216823 
1989 924 453 9.68E-05 453 924 0.016602 
1990 924 453 9.41E-05 453 924 0.0072377 
1991 924 453 8.96E-05 453 924 0.0237424 
1992 924 453 9.87E-05 453 924 0.0183169 
1993 924 453 0.000121 453 924 0.0120636 
1994 924 453 0.000088 453 924 0.0145035 
1995 924 453 6.53E-05 453 924 0.0235493 
1996 924 453 0.000141 453 924 0.0107175 
1997 924 453 8.32E-05 453 924 0.0203761 
1998 924 453 9.02E-05 453 924 0.0088127 
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1999 924 453 0.000146 453 924 0.0094995 
2000 924 453 0.000128 453 924 0.0303313 
2001 924 453 0.000121 453 924 0.0302136 
2002 924 453 0.000155 453 924 0.0111719 
2003 924 453 0.000144 453 924 0.0207831 
2004 924 453 0.000179 453 924 0.0123367 
2005 924 453 0.000273 453 924 0.017203 
2006 924 453 0.000461 453 924 0.0133538 
















2008 924 453 0.000766 453 924 0.011721 
2009 924 453 0.00074 453 924 0.0304115 
2010 924 453 0.000557 453 924 0.0373145 
2011 924 453 0.000645 453 924 0.0443637 
2012 924 453 0.0006 453 924 0.060572 
2013 924 453 0.000789 453 924 0.0696754 
 





















1948 924 466  466 924  
1949 924 466  466 924  
1950 924 466  466 924  
1951 924 466  466 924  
1952 924 466  466 924  
1953 924 466  466 924  
1954 924 466  466 924  
1955 924 466  466 924  
1956 924 466  466 924  
1957 924 466  466 924  
1958 924 466  466 924  
1959 924 466  466 924  
1960 924 466  466 924  
1961 924 466 0 466 924  
1962 924 466  466 924  
1963 924 466  466 924  
1964 924 466  466 924  
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1965 924 466  466 924  
1966 924 466  466 924  
1967 924 466  466 924  
1968 924 466  466 924  
1969 924 466  466 924  
1970 924 466  466 924  
1971 924 466  466 924  
1972 924 466  466 924  
1973 924 466  466 924  
1974 924 466  466 924  
1975 924 466  466 924  
1976 924 466  466 924 0 
1977 924 466  466 924 0 
1978 924 466 0 466 924 0 
1979 924 466 0 466 924 0 
1980 924 466 0 466 924 0 
1981 924 466 0.002182 466 924 0 
1982 924 466 0.003628 466 924 0 
1983 924 466 0.003098 466 924 0 
1984 924 466 0.002528 466 924 0 
1985 924 466 0.002335 466 924 0 
1986 924 466 0.002866 466 924 0.0009472 
1987 924 466 0.003124 466 924 0.0023768 
1988 924 466 0.003886 466 924 0.0061045 
1989 924 466 0.004704 466 924 0.0034448 
1990 924 466 0.003987 466 924 0.0019962 
1991 924 466 0.005718 466 924 0.0030477 
1992 924 466 0.006449 466 924 0.0030326 
1993 924 466 0.007891 466 924 0.0053882 
1994 924 466 0.007268 466 924 0.0018735 
1995 924 466 0.007551 466 924 0.0053919 
1996 924 466 0.007264 466 924 0.0026323 
1997 924 466 0.007249 466 924 0.0029041 
1998 924 466 0.007161 466 924 0.0070009 
1999 924 466 0.00756 466 924 0.0074177 
2000 924 466 0.008514 466 924 0.0108789 
2001 924 466 0.009099 466 924 0.0123602 
2002 924 466 0.010819 466 924 0.0126473 
2003 924 466 0.011738 466 924 0.0166804 
2004 924 466 0.011803 466 924 0.0201322 
2005 924 466 0.011715 466 924 0.0226069 
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2006 924 466 0.012042 466 924 0.0255257 
2007 924 466 0.014274 466 924 0.0242193 
 
 





















2008 924 466 0.016809 466 924 0.0255947 
2009 924 466 0.015799 466 924 0.0233263 
2010 924 466 0.013749 466 924 0.0267593 
2011 924 466 0.014425 466 924 0.0363494 
2012 924 466 0.014719 466 924 0.0443426 
2013 924 466 0.015413 466 924 0.0509536 
 
















Share of Sri 
Lanka’s 
Exports 
1948 924 524  524 924 0 
1949 924 524  524 924 0.0014728 
1950 924 524  524 924 0 
1951 924 524  524 924 0.02 
1952 924 524  524 924 0.0895265 
1953 924 524  524 924 0.1650959 
1954 924 524  524 924 0.1287019 
1955 924 524  524 924 0.0662166 
1956 924 524  524 924 0.1115642 
1957 924 524  524 924 0.106152 
1958 924 524  524 924 0.0473287 
1959 924 524  524 924 0.0551234 
1960 924 524  524 924 0.0795097 
1961 924 524 0.014049 524 924 0.0576923 
1962 924 524  524 924 0.0878845 
1963 924 524  524 924 0.0682627 
1964 924 524  524 924 0.0762359 
1965 924 524  524 924 0.1043956 
1966 924 524  524 924 0.1259762 
1967 924 524  524 924 0.1060249 
1968 924 524  524 924 0.1146966 
1969 924 524  524 924 0.1458952 
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1970 924 524  524 924 0.1433174 
1971 924 524  524 924 0.1174113 
1972 924 524  524 924 0.1412574 
1973 924 524  524 924 0.1671528 
1974 924 524  524 924 0.0896488 
1975 924 524  524 924 0.1382822 
1976 924 524  524 924 0.1149588 
1977 924 524  524 924 0.0761405 
1978 924 524 0.006154 524 924 0.0764329 
1979 924 524 0.007656 524 924 0.0621485 
1980 924 524 0.003593 524 924 0.0559181 
1981 924 524 0.001436 524 924 0.0492358 
1982 924 524 0.001706 524 924 0.0093089 
1983 924 524 0.001046 524 924 0.016328 
1984 924 524 0.001194 524 924 0.0147187 
1985 924 524 0.002228 524 924 0.0144729 
1986 924 524 0.00239 524 924 0.0151786 
1987 924 524 0.001282 524 924 0.0128122 
1988 924 524 0.001429 524 924 0.0168214 
1989 924 524 0.001332 524 924 0.0023977 
1990 924 524 0.001535 524 924 0.001754 
1991 924 524 0.001655 524 924 0.0023758 
1992 924 524 0.001234 524 924 0.0006194 
1993 924 524 0.00152 524 924 0.0010954 
1994 924 524 0.001228 524 924 0.0006402 
1995 924 524 0.00164 524 924 0.0008058 
1996 924 524 0.001291 524 924 0.003009 
1997 924 524 0.001368 524 924 0.0018506 
1998 924 524 0.001626 524 924 0.0020203 
1999 924 524 0.001356 524 924 0.0007974 
2000 924 524 0.001825 524 924 0.0009987 
2001 924 524 0.00151 524 924 0.0011025 
2002 924 524 0.001058 524 924 0.0028197 
2003 924 524 0.001175 524 924 0.0034384 
2004 924 524 0.0012 524 924 0.003955 
2005 924 524 0.001263 524 924 0.0049786 
2006 924 524 0.001169 524 924 0.0041006 




















Share of Sri 
Lanka’s 
Exports 
2008 924 524 0.001159 524 924 0.0058448 
2009 924 524 0.001331 524 924 0.0078813 
2010 924 524 0.001292 524 924 0.0086253 
2011 924 524 0.001608 524 924 0.0100397 
2012 924 524 0.001498 524 924 0.0117793 
2013 924 524 0.001586 524 924 0.0174329 
 




















1948 924 532  532 924 0.2475456 
1949 924 532  532 924 0.3542889 
1950 924 532  532 924 0.5133027 
1951 924 532  532 924 0.5268613 
1952 924 532  532 924 0.2617952 
1953 924 532  532 924 0.2778594 
1954 924 532  532 924 0.2427253 
1955 924 532  532 924 0.1043992 
1956 924 532  532 924 0.0575714 
1957 924 532  532 924  
1958 924 532  532 924 1 
1959 924 532  532 924 0.4158004 
1960 924 532  532 924 0.037234 
1961 924 532 0.348233 532 924 0.0305978 
1962 924 532  532 924 0.0233542 
1963 924 532  532 924 0.0168678 
1964 924 532  532 924 0.0118803 
1965 924 532  532 924 0.0124156 
1966 924 532  532 924 0.0094046 
1967 924 532  532 924 0.0056505 
1968 924 532  532 924 0.0043691 
1969 924 532  532 924 0.0028733 
1970 924 532  532 924 0.0043414 
1971 924 532  532 924 0.0037565 
1972 924 532  532 924 0.0055698 
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1973 924 532  532 924 0.0110136 
1974 924 532  532 924 0.010294 
1975 924 532  532 924 0.0058177 
1976 924 532  532 924 0.0036709 
1977 924 532  532 924 0.0047722 
1978 924 532 0.290233 532 924 0.0057123 
1979 924 532 0.268219 532 924 0.0263878 
1980 924 532 0.257239 532 924 0.0660934 
1981 924 532 0.24539 532 924 0.0932798 
1982 924 532 0.236991 532 924 0.0963943 
1983 924 532 0.262566 532 924 0.1179335 
1984 924 532 0.265591 532 924 0.1840843 
1985 924 532 0.261992 532 924 0.2683767 
1986 924 532 0.312402 532 924 0.2206242 
1987 924 532 0.349289 532 924 0.2422288 
1988 924 532 0.383784 532 924 0.2811604 
1989 924 532 0.421962 532 924 0.2685554 
1990 924 532 0.439556 532 924 0.2596799 
1991 924 532 0.450384 532 924 0.2840486 
1992 924 532 0.445577 532 924 0.3090333 
1993 924 532 0.244805 532 924 0.3337558 
1994 924 532 0.272883 532 924 0.3371651 
1995 924 532 0.246872 532 924 0.3430244 
1996 924 532 0.221807 532 924 0.3520886 
1997 924 532 0.244008 532 924 0.3584445 
1998 924 532 0.215646 532 924 0.3535717 
1999 924 532 0.193181 532 924 0.3422291 
2000 924 532 0.182349 532 924 0.3543709 
2001 924 532 0.177706 532 924 0.3783558 
2002 924 532 0.183312 532 924 0.4023314 
2003 924 532 0.177763 532 924 0.4372471 
2004 924 532 0.174414 532 924 0.4514666 
2005 924 532 0.167022 532 924 0.4606308 
2006 924 532 0.164018 532 924 0.4802987 
2007 924 532 0.154405 532 924 0.4967288 
2008 924 532 0.136087 532 924 0.4948626 
2009 924 532 0.140933 532 924 0.5232499 
2010 924 532 0.141264 532 924 0.5396678 
2011 924 532 0.144172 532 924 0.5374305 
2012 924 532 0.161073 532 924 0.5542297 




















1948 924 536  536 924 0.0057595 
1949 924 536  536 924 0 
1950 924 536  536 924 0 
1951 924 536  536 924 0.0001272 
1952 924 536  536 924 0 
1953 924 536  536 924 0 
1954 924 536  536 924 0.0046327 
1955 924 536  536 924 0.0096225 
1956 924 536  536 924 0.0181733 
1957 924 536  536 924 0.0399029 
1958 924 536  536 924  
1959 924 536  536 924  
1960 924 536  536 924 0 
1961 924 536 0 536 924 0.0485657 
1962 924 536  536 924 0.0537584 
1963 924 536  536 924 0.0661338 
1964 924 536  536 924 0.078579 
1965 924 536  536 924 0.064537 
1966 924 536  536 924 0.0146718 
1967 924 536  536 924 0.0010897 
1968 924 536  536 924 0 
1969 924 536  536 924 0 
1970 924 536  536 924 0 
1971 924 536  536 924 0 
1972 924 536  536 924 0 
1973 924 536  536 924 0.0001354 
1974 924 536  536 924 0 
1975 924 536  536 924 0 
1976 924 536  536 924 0 
1977 924 536  536 924 0 
1978 924 536 2.29E-05 536 924 0 
1979 924 536 0 536 924 0 
1980 924 536 0.001217 536 924 4.64E-06 
1981 924 536 0.002537 536 924 0.0003555 
1982 924 536 0.002091 536 924 0.0006382 
1983 924 536 0.002201 536 924 0.001291 
1984 924 536 0.002839 536 924 0.0003588 
1985 924 536 0.004545 536 924 0.0046248 
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1986 924 536 0.004557 536 924 0.0095992 
1987 924 536 0.004776 536 924 0.0205765 
1988 924 536 0.004972 536 924 0.0261052 
1989 924 536 0.004291 536 924 0.0251206 
1990 924 536 0.006484 536 924 0.0336595 
1991 924 536 0.006743 536 924 0.0424532 
1992 924 536 0.0056 536 924 0.0429176 
1993 924 536 0.007692 536 924 0.0355531 
1994 924 536 0.008867 536 924 0.0344744 
1995 924 536 0.00986 536 924 0.0400244 
1996 924 536 0.009629 536 924 0.0429042 
1997 924 536 0.010274 536 924 0.0439207 
1998 924 536 0.006514 536 924 0.039645 
1999 924 536 0.009316 536 924 0.0428408 
2000 924 536 0.012541 536 924 0.04636 
2001 924 536 0.010881 536 924 0.0407137 
2002 924 536 0.010741 536 924 0.0527569 
2003 924 536 0.010441 536 924 0.0646761 
2004 924 536 0.010792 536 924 0.0670177 
2005 924 536 0.011226 536 924 0.0800985 
2006 924 536 0.009979 536 924 0.0851397 
















2008 924 536 0.01228 536 924 0.0869672 
2009 924 536 0.012498 536 924 0.1017056 
2010 924 536 0.014226 536 924 0.1026544 
2011 924 536 0.015736 536 924 0.1165502 
2012 924 536 0.017066 536 924 0.1178718 
2013 924 536 0.01705 536 924 0.1279438 
 
















1948 924 542  542 924  
1949 924 542  542 924 0 
1950 924 542  542 924  
1951 924 542  542 924  
1952 924 542  542 924  
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1953 924 542  542 924  
1954 924 542  542 924  
1955 924 542  542 924 0 
1956 924 542  542 924 0 
1957 924 542  542 924 0 
1958 924 542  542 924 0 
1959 924 542  542 924 0 
1960 924 542  542 924 0 
1961 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1962 924 542  542 924 0 
1963 924 542  542 924 0 
1964 924 542  542 924 0 
1965 924 542  542 924 0 
1966 924 542  542 924 0 
1967 924 542  542 924 0 
1968 924 542  542 924 0 
1969 924 542  542 924 0 
1970 924 542  542 924 0 
1971 924 542  542 924 0 
1972 924 542  542 924 0 
1973 924 542  542 924 0 
1974 924 542  542 924 0 
1975 924 542  542 924 0 
1976 924 542  542 924 0 
1977 924 542  542 924 0 
1978 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1979 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1980 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1981 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1982 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1983 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1984 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1985 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1986 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1987 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1988 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1989 924 542 0 542 924 0 
1990 924 542 0.007002 542 924 0 
1991 924 542 0.030533 542 924 0.0143977 
1992 924 542 0.028955 542 924 0.0361432 
1993 924 542 0.031728 542 924 0.0646502 
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1994 924 542 0.036895 542 924 0.0666959 
1995 924 542 0.045858 542 924 0.0757011 
1996 924 542 0.05074 542 924 0.0909675 
1997 924 542 0.050897 542 924 0.1033733 
1998 924 542 0.034841 542 924 0.0941388 
1999 924 542 0.040887 542 924 0.1000035 
2000 924 542 0.046253 542 924 0.1129277 
2001 924 542 0.047938 542 924 0.1267448 
2002 924 542 0.048609 542 924 0.1533991 
2003 924 542 0.046828 542 924 0.1894301 
2004 924 542 0.047964 542 924 0.2050213 
2005 924 542 0.047109 542 924 0.2277645 
2006 924 542 0.047019 542 924 0.2235174 
















2008 924 542 0.05272 542 924 0.2254598 
2009 924 542 0.045468 542 924 0.2530846 
2010 924 542 0.044548 542 924 0.2637615 
2011 924 542 0.044603 542 924 0.2539205 
2012 924 542 0.043619 542 924 0.2544784 
2013 924 542 0.042078 542 924 0.2723156 
 
















1948 924 548  548 924  
1949 924 548  548 924  
1950 924 548  548 924  
1951 924 548  548 924  
1952 924 548  548 924  
1953 924 548  548 924  
1954 924 548  548 924  
1955 924 548  548 924  
1956 924 548  548 924  
1957 924 548  548 924  
1958 924 548  548 924  
1959 924 548  548 924  
1960 924 548  548 924  
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1961 924 548 0 548 924  
1962 924 548  548 924  
1963 924 548  548 924  
1964 924 548  548 924  
1965 924 548  548 924  
1966 924 548  548 924  
1967 924 548  548 924 0.0054913 
1968 924 548  548 924 0.0187868 
1969 924 548  548 924 0.0277138 
1970 924 548  548 924 0.0131324 
1971 924 548  548 924 0.011305 
1972 924 548  548 924 0.0159947 
1973 924 548  548 924 0.0274567 
1974 924 548  548 924 0.0208017 
1975 924 548  548 924 0.0139822 
1976 924 548  548 924 0.0086206 
1977 924 548  548 924 0.0200611 
1978 924 548 0.018703 548 924 0.0152168 
1979 924 548 0.013813 548 924 0.0167217 
1980 924 548 0.010897 548 924 0.0170572 
1981 924 548 0.008887 548 924 0.0076946 
1982 924 548 0.008289 548 924 0.0094207 
1983 924 548 0.008425 548 924 0.0113793 
1984 924 548 0.007884 548 924 0.0101787 
1985 924 548 0.006821 548 924 0.0107073 
1986 924 548 0.006481 548 924 0.0119802 
1987 924 548 0.006466 548 924 0.0160518 
1988 924 548 0.006494 548 924 0.0202813 
1989 924 548 0.006782 548 924 0.0196586 
1990 924 548 0.005989 548 924 0.0215167 
1991 924 548 0.007398 548 924 0.0191092 
1992 924 548 0.007667 548 924 0.0196308 
1993 924 548 0.007812 548 924 0.0264326 
1994 924 548 0.009423 548 924 0.033919 
1995 924 548 0.008784 548 924 0.026583 
1996 924 548 0.009263 548 924 0.0251051 
1997 924 548 0.010703 548 924 0.0245587 
1998 924 548 0.008865 548 924 0.0283061 
1999 924 548 0.008764 548 924 0.0287329 
2000 924 548 0.010506 548 924 0.0320785 
2001 924 548 0.012318 548 924 0.045002 
2002 924 548 0.015595 548 924 0.0584638 
2003 924 548 0.01431 548 924 0.067316 
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2004 924 548 0.013945 548 924 0.0691668 
2005 924 548 0.014244 548 924 0.0678997 
2006 924 548 0.014288 548 924 0.0745489 

















2008 924 548 0.015254 548 924 0.0979314 
2009 924 548 0.016644 548 924 0.1254121 
2010 924 548 0.015419 548 924 0.1295179 
2011 924 548 0.015008 548 924 0.1358025 
2012 924 548 0.018178 548 924 0.1304691 
2013 924 548 0.021199 548 924 0.1385633 
 
















1948 924 564  564 924 0.0161028 
1949 924 564  564 924 0.0140751 
1950 924 564  564 924 0.0160725 
1951 924 564  564 924 0.0622338 
1952 924 564  564 924 0.1648957 
1953 924 564  564 924 0.0172662 
1954 924 564  564 924 0.0787568 
1955 924 564  564 924 0.0823377 
1956 924 564  564 924 0.0475194 
1957 924 564  564 924 0.0284858 
1958 924 564  564 924 0.025824 
1959 924 564  564 924 0.0022414 
1960 924 564  564 924 0.0388758 
1961 924 564 0.006811 564 924 0.0261506 
1962 924 564  564 924 0.0064213 
1963 924 564  564 924 0.0285651 
1964 924 564  564 924 0.0842744 
1965 924 564  564 924 0.085002 
1966 924 564  564 924 0.0522842 
1967 924 564  564 924 0.0598202 
1968 924 564  564 924 0.0380824 
1969 924 564  564 924 0.0448688 
1970 924 564  564 924 0.0564619 
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1971 924 564  564 924 0.0467631 
1972 924 564  564 924 0.0260185 
1973 924 564  564 924 0.0143122 
1974 924 564  564 924 0.0103446 
1975 924 564  564 924 0.0131283 
1976 924 564  564 924 0.0147595 
1977 924 564  564 924 0.015027 
1978 924 564 0.010234 564 924 0.0207182 
1979 924 564 0.009816 564 924 0.012245 
1980 924 564 0.008261 564 924 0.0849519 
1981 924 564 0.009834 564 924 0.0955442 
1982 924 564 0.009291 564 924 0.0614203 
1983 924 564 0.010137 564 924 0.0485052 
1984 924 564 0.010525 564 924 0.0160709 
1985 924 564 0.006792 564 924 0.0217151 
1986 924 564 0.006612 564 924 0.0043749 
1987 924 564 0.007621 564 924 0.0060673 
1988 924 564 0.006946 564 924 0.0118406 
1989 924 564 0.007087 564 924 0.0379767 
1990 924 564 0.007927 564 924 0.0125764 
1991 924 564 0.008382 564 924 0.0098488 
1992 924 564 0.00655 564 924 0.0076953 
1993 924 564 0.008345 564 924 0.0090335 
1994 924 564 0.005108 564 924 0.0077459 
1995 924 564 0.005409 564 924 0.0155534 
1996 924 564 0.004203 564 924 0.0134364 
1997 924 564 0.003858 564 924 0.0174953 
1998 924 564 0.002917 564 924 0.01843 
1999 924 564 0.00304 564 924 0.0216234 
2000 924 564 0.002746 564 924 0.0268563 
2001 924 564 0.002744 564 924 0.0319672 
2002 924 564 0.003895 564 924 0.0240248 
2003 924 564 0.004322 564 924 0.0218914 
2004 924 564 0.004252 564 924 0.0226747 
2005 924 564 0.004592 564 924 0.027243 
2006 924 564 0.004475 564 924 0.0561993 













2008 924 564 0.004274 564 924 0.0428365 
2009 924 564 0.004677 564 924 0.0566667 
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2010 924 564 0.00449 564 924 0.0755298 
2011 924 564 0.004539 564 924 0.0774346 
2012 924 564 0.004618 564 924 0.1143209 
2013 924 564 0.005084 564 924 0.1128554 
 
















1948 924 576  576 924  
1949 924 576  576 924  
1950 924 576  576 924  
1951 924 576  576 924  
1952 924 576  576 924  
1953 924 576  576 924  
1954 924 576  576 924  
1955 924 576  576 924  
1956 924 576  576 924  
1957 924 576  576 924  
1958 924 576  576 924  
1959 924 576  576 924  
1960 924 576  576 924 0 
1961 924 576 0 576 924  
1962 924 576  576 924 0 
1963 924 576  576 924 0 
1964 924 576  576 924  
1965 924 576  576 924  
1966 924 576  576 924  
1967 924 576  576 924  
1968 924 576  576 924 0.0212674 
1969 924 576  576 924 0.0380081 
1970 924 576  576 924 0.0151371 
1971 924 576  576 924 0.0090081 
1972 924 576  576 924 0.0096864 
1973 924 576  576 924 0.0150472 
1974 924 576  576 924 0.0091933 
1975 924 576  576 924 0.0078724 
1976 924 576  576 924 0.0061132 
1977 924 576  576 924 0.0075237 
1978 924 576 0.028409 576 924 0.0059377 
1979 924 576 0.023894 576 924 0.012358 
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1980 924 576 0.024872 576 924 0.0164896 
1981 924 576 0.030658 576 924 0.0088292 
1982 924 576 0.029634 576 924 0.0119218 
1983 924 576 0.025678 576 924 0.0101052 
1984 924 576 0.048742 576 924 0.0104166 
1985 924 576 0.07562 576 924 0.0151076 
1986 924 576 0.038873 576 924 0.026561 
1987 924 576 0.033568 576 924 0.0270118 
1988 924 576 0.031428 576 924 0.0319376 
1989 924 576 0.032579 576 924 0.0281338 
1990 924 576 0.032617 576 924 0.016054 
1991 924 576 0.028227 576 924 0.0153659 
1992 924 576 0.024123 576 924 0.0187097 
1993 924 576 0.0249 576 924 0.0271908 
1994 924 576 0.02161 576 924 0.022814 
1995 924 576 0.023997 576 924 0.0243581 
1996 924 576 0.0253 576 924 0.0282752 
1997 924 576 0.024074 576 924 0.0339084 
1998 924 576 0.02169 576 924 0.0387239 
1999 924 576 0.023576 576 924 0.0359615 
2000 924 576 0.023598 576 924 0.0415365 
2001 924 576 0.022145 576 924 0.0462248 
2002 924 576 0.021843 576 924 0.0578299 
2003 924 576 0.020665 576 924 0.0663642 
2004 924 576 0.021896 576 924 0.0811254 
2005 924 576 0.022425 576 924 0.0898946 
2006 924 576 0.024469 576 924 0.1013442 


















2008 924 576 0.023059 576 924 0.0951565 
2009 924 576 0.025506 576 924 0.1015231 
2010 924 576 0.020932 576 924 0.1081961 
2011 924 576 0.018986 576 924 0.1102792 
2012 924 576 0.020067 576 924 0.1125056 





















1948 924 578  578 924  
1949 924 578  578 924  
1950 924 578  578 924  
1951 924 578  578 924  
1952 924 578  578 924  
1953 924 578  578 924  
1954 924 578  578 924  
1955 924 578  578 924  
1956 924 578  578 924 0.0053405 
1957 924 578  578 924 0.0132797 
1958 924 578  578 924 0.0121473 
1959 924 578  578 924 0 
1960 924 578  578 924 0.0014899 
1961 924 578 0 578 924 0 
1962 924 578  578 924 0 
1963 924 578  578 924 0.0010658 
1964 924 578  578 924 0 
1965 924 578  578 924 0 
1966 924 578  578 924 0 
1967 924 578  578 924 0 
1968 924 578  578 924 0 
1969 924 578  578 924 0 
1970 924 578  578 924 0 
1971 924 578  578 924 0 
1972 924 578  578 924 0 
1973 924 578  578 924 0 
1974 924 578  578 924 0.0000877 
1975 924 578  578 924 0.0089118 
1976 924 578  578 924 0.0212518 
1977 924 578  578 924 0.0306185 
1978 924 578 0.008079 578 924 0.0190532 
1979 924 578 0.017077 578 924 0.0147114 
1980 924 578 0.018407 578 924 0.0192817 
1981 924 578 0.010645 578 924 0.0268539 
1982 924 578 0.007699 578 924 0.0447665 
1983 924 578 0.00881 578 924 0.0170933 
1984 924 578 0.010102 578 924 0.025096 
1985 924 578 0.004263 578 924 0.0388 
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1986 924 578 0.005084 578 924 0.0316167 
1987 924 578 0.007638 578 924 0.0340629 
1988 924 578 0.010769 578 924 0.0304015 
1989 924 578 0.009625 578 924 0.0273826 
1990 924 578 0.013827 578 924 0.0118853 
1991 924 578 0.011882 578 924 0.0119824 
1992 924 578 0.010625 578 924 0.0123151 
1993 924 578 0.008321 578 924 0.0120188 
1994 924 578 0.009776 578 924 0.0212566 
1995 924 578 0.012015 578 924 0.0305699 
1996 924 578 0.008488 578 924 0.0354518 
1997 924 578 0.008368 578 924 0.0320798 
1998 924 578 0.006504 578 924 0.0346691 
1999 924 578 0.007518 578 924 0.0335311 
2000 924 578 0.009189 578 924 0.0423867 
2001 924 578 0.009567 578 924 0.0453594 
2002 924 578 0.009275 578 924 0.0537611 
2003 924 578 0.00892 578 924 0.0736074 
2004 924 578 0.010004 578 924 0.0760131 
2005 924 578 0.010489 578 924 0.0850075 
2006 924 578 0.010302 578 924 0.0930913 














2008 924 578 0.011072 578 924 0.0931303 
2009 924 578 0.011296 578 924 0.1079881 
2010 924 578 0.01279 578 924 0.1135511 
2011 924 578 0.013823 578 924 0.1206805 
2012 924 578 0.015539 578 924 0.1198525 
2013 924 578 0.015107 578 924 0.1219844 
 
















1948 924 913  913 924  
1949 924 913  913 924  
1950 924 913  913 924  
1951 924 913  913 924  
1952 924 913  913 924  
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1953 924 913  913 924  
1954 924 913  913 924  
1955 924 913  913 924  
1956 924 913  913 924  
1957 924 913  913 924  
1958 924 913  913 924  
1959 924 913  913 924  
1960 924 913  913 924  
1961 924 913 0 913 924  
1962 924 913  913 924  
1963 924 913  913 924  
1964 924 913  913 924  
1965 924 913  913 924  
1966 924 913  913 924  
1967 924 913  913 924  
1968 924 913  913 924  
1969 924 913  913 924  
1970 924 913  913 924  
1971 924 913  913 924  
1972 924 913  913 924  
1973 924 913  913 924  
1974 924 913  913 924  
1975 924 913  913 924  
1976 924 913  913 924  
1977 924 913  913 924  
1978 924 913 0 913 924  
1979 924 913 0 913 924  
1980 924 913 0 913 924  
1981 924 913 0 913 924  
1982 924 913 0 913 924  
1983 924 913 0 913 924  
1984 924 913 0 913 924  
1985 924 913 0 913 924  
1986 924 913 0 913 924  
1987 924 913 0 913 924  
1988 924 913 0 913 924  
1989 924 913 0 913 924  
1990 924 913 0 913 924  
1991 924 913 0 913 924  
1992 924 913 0.000107 913 924 0.0083196 
1993 924 913 0.000222 913 924 0.0145477 
1994 924 913 7.98E-05 913 924 0.016197 
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1995 924 913 6.86E-05 913 924 0.0034517 
1996 924 913 6.38E-05 913 924 0.0131023 
1997 924 913 9.39E-05 913 924 0.0097926 
1998 924 913 3.59E-05 913 924 0.0141296 
1999 924 913 2.79E-05 913 924 0.0288529 
2000 924 913 0.000168 913 924 0.018738 
2001 924 913 3.35E-05 913 924 0.0193442 
2002 924 913 5.08E-05 913 924 0.027329 
2003 924 913 7.51E-05 913 924 0.0164228 
2004 924 913 0.000112 913 924 0.0207184 
2005 924 913 0.000109 913 924 0.0271445 
2006 924 913 0.000228 913 924 0.0203287 
















2008 924 913 0.000258 913 924 0.0188737 
2009 924 913 0.000238 913 924 0.0081979 
2010 924 913 0.000515 913 924 0.019066 
2011 924 913 0.000379 913 924 0.0155418 
2012 924 913 0.000458 913 924 0.0095661 
2013 924 913 0.000402 913 924 0.0126085 
 
















1948 924 914  914 924  
1949 924 914  914 924  
1950 924 914  914 924  
1951 924 914  914 924  
1952 924 914  914 924  
1953 924 914  914 924  
1954 924 914  914 924  
1955 924 914  914 924  
1956 924 914  914 924  
1957 924 914  914 924  
1958 924 914  914 924  
1959 924 914  914 924  
1960 924 914  914 924  
1961 924 914 0 914 924  
1962 924 914  914 924  
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1963 924 914  914 924  
1964 924 914  914 924  
1965 924 914  914 924  
1966 924 914  914 924  
1967 924 914  914 924  
1968 924 914  914 924  
1969 924 914  914 924  
1970 924 914  914 924  
1971 924 914  914 924  
1972 924 914  914 924  
1973 924 914  914 924  
1974 924 914  914 924  
1975 924 914  914 924  
1976 924 914  914 924  
1977 924 914  914 924  
1978 924 914 0.002281 914 924  
1979 924 914 0 914 924  
1980 924 914 0 914 924  
1981 924 914 4.66E-06 914 924 0 
1982 924 914 0 914 924 0.0150544 
1983 924 914 0.000181 914 924 0.0280041 
1984 924 914 0.000113 914 924 0.0073456 
1985 924 914 0.000356 914 924 0.0256739 
1986 924 914 0.000278 914 924 0.0416301 
1987 924 914 0.000386 914 924 0.0750561 
1988 924 914 0.000739 914 924 0.0760236 
1989 924 914 0.000296 914 924 0.0707938 
1990 924 914 0.000429 914 924 0.0568669 
1991 924 914 0.000203 914 924 0.0168484 
1992 924 914 1.89E-05 914 924 0.0016264 
1993 924 914 0.000108 914 924 0.0006163 
1994 924 914 0.000088 914 924 0.000779 
1995 924 914 0.000139 914 924 0.0082425 
1996 924 914 4.92E-05 914 924 0 
1997 924 914 0.000037 914 924 0 
1998 924 914 4.91E-05 914 924 0 
1999 924 914 5.45E-05 914 924 0 
2000 924 914 5.87E-05 914 924 0 
2001 924 914 6.17E-05 914 924 0 
2002 924 914 5.86E-05 914 924 0.0000194 
2003 924 914 0.000075 914 924 0.0035494 
2004 924 914 0.00011 914 924 0.0010075 
2005 924 914 0.000112 914 924 0.0051224 
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2006 924 914 6.97E-05 914 924 0.0120401 

















2008 924 914 0.000137 914 924 0.0288496 
2009 924 914 0.000176 914 924 0.0485792 
2010 924 914 0.000129 914 924 0.0561795 
2011 924 914 0.000151 914 924 0.0256416 
2012 924 914 0.000171 914 924 0.0274701 
2013 924 914 0.000149 914 924 0.0982751 
 
















1948 924 916  916 924  
1949 924 916  916 924  
1950 924 916  916 924  
1951 924 916  916 924  
1952 924 916  916 924  
1953 924 916  916 924  
1954 924 916  916 924  
1955 924 916  916 924  
1956 924 916  916 924  
1957 924 916  916 924  
1958 924 916  916 924  
1959 924 916  916 924  
1960 924 916  916 924  
1961 924 916 0 916 924  
1962 924 916  916 924  
1963 924 916  916 924  
1964 924 916  916 924  
1965 924 916  916 924  
1966 924 916  916 924  
1967 924 916  916 924  
1968 924 916  916 924  
1969 924 916  916 924  
1970 924 916  916 924  
1971 924 916  916 924  
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1972 924 916  916 924  
1973 924 916  916 924  
1974 924 916  916 924  
1975 924 916  916 924  
1976 924 916  916 924  
1977 924 916  916 924  
1978 924 916 0 916 924  
1979 924 916 0 916 924  
1980 924 916 0 916 924  
1981 924 916 0 916 924  
1982 924 916 0 916 924  
1983 924 916 0 916 924  
1984 924 916 0 916 924  
1985 924 916 0 916 924  
1986 924 916 0 916 924  
1987 924 916 0 916 924  
1988 924 916 0 916 924  
1989 924 916 0 916 924  
1990 924 916 0 916 924  
1991 924 916 0 916 924  
1992 924 916 0.002642 916 924 0.5302172 
1993 924 916 0.001905 916 924 0.2177345 
1994 924 916 0.001169 916 924 0.0462322 
1995 924 916 0.000517 916 924 0.0567389 
1996 924 916 0.000642 916 924 0.0779443 
1997 924 916 0.000527 916 924 0.0684499 
1998 924 916 0.001139 916 924 0.0703899 
1999 924 916 0.002589 916 924 0.090937 
2000 924 916 0.002452 916 924 0.0867561 
2001 924 916 0.001253 916 924 0.0805018 
2002 924 916 0.001884 916 924 0.1076921 
2003 924 916 0.003648 916 924 0.1343749 
2004 924 916 0.003816 916 924 0.101823 
2005 924 916 0.00523 916 924 0.0888375 
2006 924 916 0.005014 916 924 0.0942003 
















2008 924 916 0.007005 916 924 0.1081184 
2009 924 916 0.006569 916 924 0.137271 
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2010 924 916 0.006007 916 924 0.1790393 
2011 924 916 0.005143 916 924 0.2034315 
2012 924 916 0.005475 916 924 0.1929648 
2013 924 916 0.005788 916 924 0.2374301 
 
















1948 924 922  922 924  
1949 924 922  922 924  
1950 924 922  922 924  
1951 924 922  922 924  
1952 924 922  922 924  
1953 924 922  922 924  
1954 924 922  922 924  
1955 924 922  922 924  
1956 924 922  922 924  
1957 924 922  922 924  
1958 924 922  922 924  
1959 924 922  922 924  
1960 924 922  922 924  
1961 924 922 0 922 924  
1962 924 922  922 924  
1963 924 922  922 924  
1964 924 922  922 924  
1965 924 922  922 924  
1966 924 922  922 924  
1967 924 922  922 924  
1968 924 922  922 924  
1969 924 922  922 924  
1970 924 922  922 924  
1971 924 922  922 924  
1972 924 922  922 924  
1973 924 922  922 924  
1974 924 922  922 924  
1975 924 922  922 924  
1976 924 922  922 924  
1977 924 922  922 924  
1978 924 922 0 922 924  
1979 924 922 0 922 924  
1980 924 922 0 922 924  
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1981 924 922 0 922 924  
1982 924 922 0 922 924  
1983 924 922 0 922 924  
1984 924 922 0 922 924  
1985 924 922 0 922 924  
1986 924 922 0 922 924  
1987 924 922 0 922 924  
1988 924 922 0 922 924  
1989 924 922 0 922 924  
1990 924 922 0 922 924  
1991 924 922 0 922 924  
1992 924 922 0.027757 922 924 0.0687732 
1993 924 922 0.029859 922 924 0.070476 
1994 924 922 0.013304 922 924 0.0453831 
1995 924 922 0.01148 922 924 0.0445757 
1996 924 922 0.011413 922 924 0.0564949 
1997 924 922 0.011336 922 924 0.0476101 
1998 924 922 0.010191 922 924 0.0449802 
1999 924 922 0.007842 922 924 0.0488459 
2000 924 922 0.009147 922 924 0.0511012 
2001 924 922 0.010374 922 924 0.0491548 
2002 924 922 0.011038 922 924 0.0647277 
2003 924 922 0.014061 922 924 0.0626396 
2004 924 922 0.015644 922 924 0.0611663 
2005 924 922 0.017722 922 924 0.0553345 
2006 924 922 0.016703 922 924 0.0547325 
















2008 924 922 0.023549 922 924 0.046069 
2009 924 922 0.014849 922 924 0.0686448 
2010 924 922 0.019158 922 924 0.0616222 
2011 924 922 0.020916 922 924 0.0787873 
2012 924 922 0.021934 922 924 0.068795 





















1948 924 926  926 924  
1949 924 926  926 924  
1950 924 926  926 924  
1951 924 926  926 924  
1952 924 926  926 924  
1953 924 926  926 924  
1954 924 926  926 924  
1955 924 926  926 924  
1956 924 926  926 924  
1957 924 926  926 924  
1958 924 926  926 924  
1959 924 926  926 924  
1960 924 926  926 924  
1961 924 926 0 926 924  
1962 924 926  926 924  
1963 924 926  926 924  
1964 924 926  926 924  
1965 924 926  926 924  
1966 924 926  926 924  
1967 924 926  926 924  
1968 924 926  926 924  
1969 924 926  926 924  
1970 924 926  926 924  
1971 924 926  926 924  
1972 924 926  926 924  
1973 924 926  926 924  
1974 924 926  926 924  
1975 924 926  926 924  
1976 924 926  926 924  
1977 924 926  926 924  
1978 924 926 0 926 924  
1979 924 926 0 926 924  
1980 924 926 0 926 924  
1981 924 926 0 926 924  
1982 924 926 0 926 924  
1983 924 926 0 926 924  
1984 924 926 0 926 924  
1985 924 926 0 926 924  
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1986 924 926 0 926 924  
1987 924 926 0 926 924  
1988 924 926 0 926 924  
1989 924 926 0 926 924  
1990 924 926 0 926 924  
1991 924 926 0 926 924  
1992 924 926 0.001061 926 924 0.0826498 
1993 924 926 0.001047 926 924 0.1119867 
1994 924 926 0.000797 926 924 0.0577188 
1995 924 926 0.000506 926 924 0.0361313 
1996 924 926 0.000395 926 924 0.0541014 
1997 924 926 0.000563 926 924 0.0802014 
1998 924 926 0.000501 926 924 0.0597579 
1999 924 926 0.000424 926 924 0.0645281 
2000 924 926 0.000559 926 924 0.0443446 
2001 924 926 0.000947 926 924 0.034019 
2002 924 926 0.001654 926 924 0.0398486 
2003 924 926 0.002165 926 924 0.0441342 
2004 924 926 0.002487 926 924 0.0257669 
2005 924 926 0.003343 926 924 0.021175 
2006 924 926 0.003929 926 924 0.0145106 
















2008 924 926 0.005335 926 924 0.0083678 
2009 924 926 0.003055 926 924 0.0367172 
2010 924 926 0.003602 926 924 0.0260036 
2011 924 926 0.003846 926 924 0.0322261 
2012 924 926 0.003645 926 924 0.0260972 
2013 924 926 0.003619 926 924 0.043552 
 
















1948 924 927  927 924  
1949 924 927  927 924  
1950 924 927  927 924  
1951 924 927  927 924  
1952 924 927  927 924  
1953 924 927  927 924  
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1954 924 927  927 924  
1955 924 927  927 924  
1956 924 927  927 924  
1957 924 927  927 924  
1958 924 927  927 924  
1959 924 927  927 924  
1960 924 927  927 924  
1961 924 927 0 927 924  
1962 924 927  927 924  
1963 924 927  927 924  
1964 924 927  927 924  
1965 924 927  927 924  
1966 924 927  927 924  
1967 924 927  927 924  
1968 924 927  927 924  
1969 924 927  927 924  
1970 924 927  927 924  
1971 924 927  927 924  
1972 924 927  927 924  
1973 924 927  927 924  
1974 924 927  927 924  
1975 924 927  927 924  
1976 924 927  927 924  
1977 924 927  927 924  
1978 924 927 0 927 924  
1979 924 927 0 927 924  
1980 924 927 0 927 924  
1981 924 927 0 927 924  
1982 924 927 0 927 924  
1983 924 927 0 927 924  
1984 924 927 0 927 924  
1985 924 927 0 927 924  
1986 924 927 0 927 924  
1987 924 927 0 927 924  
1988 924 927 0 927 924  
1989 924 927 0 927 924  
1990 924 927 0 927 924  
1991 924 927 0 927 924  
1992 924 927 0.000458 927 924 0.0817804 
1993 924 927 0.000475 927 924 0.0154621 
1994 924 927 0.000434 927 924 0.0382534 
1995 924 927 0.000326 927 924 0.0237588 
1996 924 927 0.000257 927 924 0.0528108 
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1997 924 927 0.000343 927 924 0.0443191 
1998 924 927 0.000322 927 924 0.0129325 
1999 924 927 0.000143 927 924 0.0060867 
2000 924 927 0.000162 927 924 0.0050699 
2001 924 927 0.000194 927 924 0.0033284 
2002 924 927 0.000327 927 924 0.0161754 
2003 924 927 0.000342 927 924 0.0908011 
2004 924 927 0.000298 927 924 0.1346008 
2005 924 927 0.000309 927 924 0.1135321 
2006 924 927 0.000429 927 924 0.0978908 
















2008 924 927 0.000911 927 924 0.0399909 
2009 924 927 0.001322 927 924 0.0663347 
2010 924 927 0.000763 927 924 0.2123668 
2011 924 927 0.000731 927 924 0.1305393 
2012 924 927 0.000888 927 924 0.1887927 
2013 924 927 0.001206 927 924 0.2815441 
 
















1948 924 944  944 924 0 
1949 924 944  944 924  
1950 924 944  944 924  
1951 924 944  944 924  
1952 924 944  944 924  
1953 924 944  944 924  
1954 924 944  944 924  
1955 924 944  944 924 0.0626287 
1956 924 944  944 924 0.0659597 
1957 924 944  944 924 0.0623674 
1958 924 944  944 924  
1959 924 944  944 924  
1960 924 944  944 924 0 
1961 924 944 0 944 924 0 
1962 924 944  944 924  
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1963 924 944  944 924  
1964 924 944  944 924  
1965 924 944  944 924  
1966 924 944  944 924  
1967 924 944  944 924  
1968 924 944  944 924 0.0077124 
1969 924 944  944 924 0.0050083 
1970 924 944  944 924 0.0079593 
1971 924 944  944 924 0.0109663 
1972 924 944  944 924 0.0101824 
1973 924 944  944 924 0.0090304 
1974 924 944  944 924 0.0048097 
1975 924 944  944 924 0.0070006 
1976 924 944  944 924 0.008401 
1977 924 944  944 924 0.0056988 
1978 924 944 0.006601 944 924 0.0092024 
1979 924 944 0.004972 944 924 0.0089255 
1980 924 944 0.002937 944 924 0.006609 
1981 924 944 0.001898 944 924 0.0040081 
1982 924 944 0.001194 944 924 0.0040811 
1983 924 944 0.001277 944 924 0.0056191 
1984 924 944 0.001516 944 924 0.0082315 
1985 924 944 0.002998 944 924 0.0137981 
1986 924 944 0.004423 944 924 0.0193755 
1987 924 944 0.004898 944 924 0.0101411 
1988 924 944 0.002868 944 924 0.0190682 
1989 924 944 0.001619 944 924 0.0126499 
1990 924 944 0.000382 944 924 0.0088546 
1991 924 944 0.000283 944 924 0.0016502 
1992 924 944 0.000535 944 924 0.0017261 
1993 924 944 0.001831 944 924 0.0079761 
1994 924 944 0.003285 944 924 0.0011432 
1995 924 944 0.002232 944 924 0.0018119 
1996 924 944 0.001475 944 924 0 
1997 924 944 0.001651 944 924 0.00083 
1998 924 944 0.002185 944 924 0.0008244 
1999 924 944 0.002883 944 924 0.0028556 
2000 924 944 0.003675 944 924 0.001453 
2001 924 944 0.003942 944 924 0.0036422 
2002 924 944 0.00454 944 924 0.0045056 
2003 924 944 0.005328 944 924 0.0041804 
2004 924 944 0.004575 944 924 0.0071341 
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2005 924 944 0.003347 944 924 0.0065583 
2006 924 944 0.00347 944 924 0.0103866 
2007 924 944 0.004203 944 924 0.0109288 
 
 















2008 924 944 0.004348 944 924 0.0105044 
2009 924 944 0.004532 944 924 0.0151394 
2010 924 944 0.00422 944 924 0.012819 
2011 924 944 0.00366 944 924 0.0121192 
2012 924 944 0.002858 944 924 0.0116416 
2013 924 944 0.002628 944 924 0.0121125 
 

















1948 924 948  948 924   
1949 924 948  948 924   
1950 924 948  948 924   
1951 924 948  948 924   
1952 924 948  948 924   
1953 924 948  948 924   
1954 924 948  948 924   
1955 924 948  948 924   
1956 924 948  948 924   
1957 924 948  948 924   
1958 924 948  948 924   
1959 924 948  948 924   
1960 924 948  948 924   
1961 924 948 0 948 924   
1962 924 948  948 924   
1963 924 948  948 924   
1964 924 948  948 924   
1965 924 948  948 924   
1966 924 948  948 924   
1967 924 948  948 924   
1968 924 948  948 924   
1969 924 948  948 924   
1970 924 948  948 924   
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1971 924 948  948 924   
1972 924 948  948 924   
1973 924 948  948 924   
1974 924 948  948 924   
1975 924 948  948 924   
1976 924 948  948 924   
1977 924 948  948 924   
1978 924 948 0 948 924   
1979 924 948 0 948 924   
1980 924 948 0.000207 948 924   
1981 924 948 0.000117 948 924 0.0424628  
1982 924 948 0.000101 948 924 0.0409641  
1983 924 948 9.97E-05 948 924 0.0591016  
1984 924 948 8.07E-05 948 924 0.0389955  
1985 924 948 0.000165 948 924 0.0250988  
1986 924 948 0.0003 948 924 0.048836  
1987 924 948 0.000513 948 924 0.0490661  
1988 924 948 0.000354 948 924 0.0740417  
1989 924 948 0.000382 948 924 0.0660239  
1990 924 948 0.000457 948 924 0.1135418  
1991 924 948 0.000364 948 924 0.2707197  
1992 924 948 0.00161 948 924 0.1786818  
1993 924 948 0.000905 948 924 0.314152  
1994 924 948 0.000361 948 924 0.2055602  
1995 924 948 0.000432 948 924 0.1643106  
1996 924 948 0.000488 948 924 0.1910266  
1997 924 948 0.000355 948 924 0.2272758  
1998 924 948 0.000348 948 924 0.2990361  
1999 924 948 0.00036 948 924 0.5709181  
2000 924 948 0.000453 948 924 0.498423  
2001 924 948 0.000469 948 924 0.3996546  
2002 924 948 0.000439 948 924 0.4209348  
2003 924 948 0.000363 948 924 0.4656371  
2004 924 948 0.000403 948 924 0.4755801  
2005 924 948 0.000428 948 924 0.4824912  
2006 924 948 0.000458 948 924 0.6806551  

















2008 924 948 0.000647 948 924 0.6454706  
2009 924 948 0.000897 948 924 0.7387176  
2010 924 948 0.000938 948 924 0.8164393  
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2011 924 948 0.00147 948 924 0.8585488  
2012 924 948 0.00132 948 924 0.8895966  
2013 924 948 0.00113 948 924 0.9041635  
 

















1948 924 223  223 924 0.0025376  
1949 924 223  223 924 0  
1950 924 223  223 924 0.0018743  
1951 924 223  223 924 0.0007488  
1952 924 223  223 924 0  
1953 924 223  223 924 0.0005894  
1954 924 223  223 924 0.0016717  
1955 924 223  223 924 0.0032376  
1956 924 223  223 924 0.0004737  
1957 924 223  223 924 0  
1958 924 223  223 924 0.0060396  
1959 924 223  223 924 0  
1960 924 223  223 924 0.0003937  
1961 924 223 0 223 924 0.0001428  
1962 924 223  223 924 0  
1963 924 223  223 924 0.0001422  
1964 924 223  223 924 0.0001401  
1965 924 223  223 924 0.000251  
1966 924 223  223 924 0.0006325  
1967 924 223  223 924 0  
1968 924 223  223 924 0.0002128  
1969 924 223  223 924 0  
1970 924 223  223 924 0.0004904  
1971 924 223  223 924 0  
1972 924 223  223 924 0.0159054  
1973 924 223  223 924 0.0106674  
1974 924 223  223 924 0.002403  
1975 924 223  223 924 0.0097331  
1976 924 223  223 924 0.0008984  
1977 924 223  223 924 0.013525  
1978 924 223 0.000917 223 924 0.0103476  
1979 924 223 0.007535 223 924 0.0078553  
1980 924 223 0.014572 223 924 0.0036483  
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1981 924 223 0.015905 223 924 0.0045436  
1982 924 223 0.017219 223 924 0.0043724  
1983 924 223 0.016356 223 924 0.0127129  
1984 924 223 0.015376 223 924 0.0170164  
1985 924 223 0.015573 223 924 0.0325739  
1986 924 223 0.008165 223 924 0.0235144  
1987 924 223 0.006172 223 924 0.0140045  
1988 924 223 0.001505 223 924 0.0223702  
1989 924 223 0.001626 223 924 0.0195026  
1990 924 223 0.001697 223 924 0.0124892  
1991 924 223 0.000953 223 924 0.007383  
1992 924 223 0.000769 223 924 0.0127453  
1993 924 223 0.002132 223 924 0.0206738  
1994 924 223 0.003056 223 924 0.019323  
1995 924 223 0.005205 223 924 0.026306  
1996 924 223 0.005177 223 924 0.0238159  
1997 924 223 0.005886 223 924 0.0213209  
1998 924 223 0.006036 223 924 0.0189225  
1999 924 223 0.004588 223 924 0.0149326  
2000 924 223 0.005012 223 924 0.020645  
2001 924 223 0.00521 223 924 0.0346298  
2002 924 223 0.004596 223 924 0.0443156  
2003 924 223 0.004998 223 924 0.0653236  
2004 924 223 0.006339 223 924 0.0589882  
2005 924 223 0.006478 223 924 0.0603697  
2006 924 223 0.007788 223 924 0.0625464  
2007 924 223 0.009532 223 924 0.0687802  

















2008 924 223 0.013393 223 924 0.0857221  
2009 924 223 0.011974 223 924 0.1279285  
2010 924 223 0.015838 223 924 0.1570806  
2011 924 223 0.017134 223 924 0.178426  
2012 924 223 0.016635 223 924 0.1756277  






Table B1: Exports imports and trade Intensity and the Signing of Bilateral 
Currency Agreement 
Pooled OLS Gravity Estimates 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
    
Exporter Income 1.119*** 1.088*** 0.959*** 
 (0.00639) (0.00614) (0.00500) 
Importer Expenditure 0.835*** 0.893*** 0.959*** 
 (0.00651) (0.00626) (0.00499) 
Distance -1.203*** -1.166*** -1.192*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0179) (0.0150) 
Border 0.766*** 0.634*** 0.723*** 
 (0.0810) (0.0798) (0.0737) 
Colony 1.656*** 1.668*** 1.547*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0916) (0.0838) 
Island 0.331*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0291) (0.0239) 
Landlocked -0.691*** -0.643*** -0.707*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0222) 
Common language 0.716*** 0.763*** 0.775*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0350) (0.0288) 
Common nation -0.0506 0.0737 0.272*** 
 (0.177) (0.106) (0.0822) 
Regional 0.490*** 0.469*** 0.433*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0349) (0.0296) 
Swap 0.247 0.440*** 0.531*** 
 (0.196) (0.152) (0.172) 
    
Observations 635,137 657,835 853,918 
R-squared 0.548 0.561 0.606 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table B2: Exports imports and trade Intensity and the Signing of Bilateral 
Currency Agreement 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Gravity Estimates 
    
       Column1 Column2 Column3 
    
Exporter Income 0.834*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0160) 
Importer Expenditure 0.841*** 0.857*** 0.848*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0218) (0.0159) 
Distance -0.740*** -0.718*** -0.731*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0250) 
Border 0.415*** 0.386*** 0.398*** 
 (0.104) (0.107) (0.0990) 
Colony 0.229** 0.272** 0.263*** 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.0967) 
Island 0.548*** 0.525*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0735) (0.0624) 
Landlocked -0.332*** -0.300*** -0.321*** 
 (0.0611) (0.0579) (0.0515) 
Common Language 0.592*** 0.522*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0926) (0.0925) (0.0860) 
Common nation 0.00337 0.0600 0.0939 
 (0.492) (0.336) (0.0905) 
Regional 0.475*** 0.406*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0519) (0.0448) 
Swap 0.634** 0.500** 0.497*** 
 (0.270) (0.228) (0.179) 
    
Observations 635,137 657,835 853,918 
R-squared 0.727 0.708 0.777 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
















Swap 0.664*** 0.467** 0.467** 0.838*** 0.777*** 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.0365) (0.0491) 
Swap_lag4     0.341*** 
     (0.0537) 
      
Observations 288,873 288,873 287,538 287,538 287,538 




Table B4: Structural Gravity Estimates Restricted to 130 Countries from 1979 















Swap 1.469*** 1.067*** 1.067*** 1.571*** 1.514*** 
 (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) (0.0588) (0.0724) 
Swap_lag4     0.313*** 
     (0.0695) 
      
Observations 343,090 343,090 342,586 342,586 342,586 
R-squared 0.633 0.635 0.5600 0.533 0.653 
 
 
Table B5: Structural Gravity Estimates Restricted to 130 Countries from 1990 
















      
Swap 1.090*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 1.281*** 1.218*** 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.0735) (0.0862) 
Swap_lag4     0.337*** 
     (0.0451) 
      
Observations 276,574 276,574 276,027 276,027 276,027 
R-squared 0.673 0.645 0.660 0.632 0.681 
 
 
Table B6: Structural Gravity Estimates Restricted to 130 Countries from 2000 















Swap 0.537*** 0.308* 0.308* 0.833*** 0.772*** 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.0350) (0.0476) 
Swap_lag4     0.341*** 
     (0.0543) 
Observations 180,361 180,361 179,856 179,856 179,856 









Table B7: Heckman Sample Selection and Poisson Estimator 
 Heckman (1)   
 Regression Selection PPML 
    
Distance -0.735*** -0.217*** -0.440*** 
 (0.0247) (0.00157) (0.118) 
Border 1.181*** -0.0174** 1.749*** 
 (0.0308) (0.00863) (0.360) 
Colony 3.598*** 0.911*** 0.741*** 
 (0.0913) (0.0120) (0.260) 
Island -1.435*** -0.408*** -0.483*** 
 (0.0466) (0.00210) (0.127) 
Landl -1.522*** -0.482*** -1.227*** 
 (0.0539) (0.00225) (0.134) 
Comlang -0.395*** 0.156*** -0.135 
 (0.0213) (0.00307) (0.211) 
RTA 0.0474*** 0.0498*** 0.00661 
 (0.00432) (0.000370) (0.00743) 
Swap 5.972*** 6.832 3.413*** 
 (0.679) (5,113) (0.512) 
TD_Swap 5.149*** 1.247*** 1.636*** 
 (0.310) (0.122) (0.478) 
Lambda 0.341**   
 (0.153)   
Comctry   -0.751** 
   (0.315) 
    
Observations 1,526,756 1,526,756 415,446 






Table B8: Trade Diversion Effect of Chinas’ Bilateral Currency Swap 
 
 PPML [1] PPML [2] PPML [3] PPML [4] 
     
Exporter Income 0.806*** 0.857*** 0.854*** 0.829*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0198) (0.0174) (0.0163) 
ImporterExpen 0.813*** 0.859*** 0.857*** 0.840*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0208) 
Distance  -0.834*** -0.873*** -0.740*** 
  (0.0443) (0.0345) (0.0300) 
Border  0.590*** 0.428*** 0.411*** 
  (0.173) (0.118) (0.105) 
Colony  0.590*** 0.182 0.231** 
  (0.0782) (0.117) (0.102) 
Island  0.537*** 0.516*** 0.549*** 
  (0.0776) (0.0779) (0.0748) 
Landlocked   -0.348*** -0.334*** 
   (0.0609) (0.0611) 
Common language   0.623*** 0.596*** 
   (0.106) (0.0926) 
Common nation   0.0629 -0.0100 
   (0.483) (0.500) 
Regional    0.484*** 
    (0.0487) 
Currency swap    0.649** 
    (0.271) 
TD_Swap    0.216 
    (0.201) 
Common Colony  0.595*** 0.328  
  (0.203) (0.236)  
Constant -36.43*** -32.72*** -32.31*** -32.35*** 
 (0.988) (0.873) (0.830) (0.778) 
     
Observations 635,137 635,137 635,137 635,137 





















      
Currency swap 0.740*** 1.229** 3.078*** 0.740** 0.676*** 
 (0.0969) (0.612) (0.269) (0.0969) (0.116) 
      
Observations 22,980 22,984 22,984 22,980 22,980 
R-squared 0.671 0.619 0.643 0.611 0.622 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Robustness Check: Structural Gravity Estimates  











Currency Swap 1.258*** 0.986*** 0.986*** 1.286*** 1.223*** 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.0751) (0.0876) 
Currency Swapt−4     0.337*** 
Observations 444,290 444,290 442,584 442,584 442,584 





   
Figure A 
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Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
Figure A3: Financial depth, stability and inclusion 
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Hong Kong the global Offshore Renminbi Business Hub 
Renminbi Trade Settlement 
Hong Kong is the global hub for trade settlement in renminbi, serving both local and 
overseas banks and companies. in the First ten months of 2015, Renminbi trade 
settlement handled by banks in Hong Kong grew over 10% year on year to RMB 5.7 
trillion Yuan. Over the same period some RMB 5.9 trillion yuan of Mainland China's 





How the renminbi trade settlement scheme works  
• All trade and other current account transactions between Mainland China and 
other parts of the world can be settled in Renminbi.  
• For purchases of goods from mainland China:  
o An Offshore company can make renminbi payments through a bank in Hong 
Kong to its trade counterpart in Mainland China.  
o Renminbi can be purchase or Renminbi credit can be obtained from any bank 
in Hong Kong if needed.  
• For sales of good to Mainland China:  
o An Offshore company can receive renminbi payments through a bank in 
Hong Kong from its trade counterpart in Mainland China.  
o The Renminbi proceeds can be deposited with a bank in Hong Kong, 
invested in a wide range of renminbi financial products or converted into 
other currencies  
• At the wholesale level, an offshore bank can convert renminbi with or borrow 
renminbi from another bank in Hong Kong, the clearing bank in Hong Kong, or a 
correspondent bank in Mainland China.  
Global Hub for Renminbi Financing  
The First Offshore Renminbi bond was issued in Hong Kong in 2007. The Renminbi 
bond market in Hong Kong, or the dim-sum bond market, has since developed steadily 
and is now the largest outside Mainland China. The Outstanding bonds amounted to 
















Over the years, the range of issuers in the renminbi bond market in Hong Kong has 
broadened from the sovereign (Ministry of Finance of China) and Bank in Mainland 
China, to financial institutions and corporates from different parts of the world, as 
well as corporates from Mainland China starting from 2011. At the same time, the 
range of investors has widened from institutional and private wealth investors to 




Renminbi bonds in Hong Kong by type of issuer 






• Benefits of raising renminbi funds through a cost-
effective platform based on international practices.  
• Great flexibility in managing renminbi funds raised in 
the offshore market.  
• Ideal platform for financing investments in Mainland 
China (Remittance of proceeds to Mainland China 






• New market with a growing base of investors and 
issuers globally.  
• New business for origination, distribution, investment 
and trading services.  





Financial Institutions Access Index (FIAI) 
Financial Institutions Depth Index (FIDI) 
Financial Institutions Efficiency Index (FIEI) 
Financial Markets Access Index (FMAI) 
Financial Markets Depth Index (FMDI) 
Financial Markets Efficiency Index (FMEI) 
Renminbi (RMB) 
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